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ABSTRACT
There are high expectations for companies to act responsibly and provide transparent
and reliable information about their operations and financial status. Regulations such
as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) have put pressure on companies to
increase their technical controls and formalize their internal control and compliance
systems. At the same time, authorities are adding significantly more weight on
company ethics and the “tone set at the top” in determining whether a compliance
program is comprehensive and effective. For example, the most recent DOJ guidance
(U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019) on evaluating corporate
compliance programs does not recommend that companies adopt a specific set of
policies or procedures. Rather, it instructs prosecutors to assess whether a company
has “incorporated the culture of compliance into its day-to-day operations.” This
study is about understanding the relationship between these written rules (i.e.,
technical control) and the culture of compliance (i.e., social control).
Technical controls constitute written rules and procedures, whereas social
controls are about the efforts to persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms,
and ideas about what is good and important in terms of work. Increased attention
toward this softer aspect of controls is because, in many accounting fraud scandals,
the issue has not been the lack of technical controls but the existence of toxic culture
and poor tone at the top. To meet the stakeholders’ expectations of acting as 
responsible corporate citizens, companies need both technical and social controls.
Despite this realization, the research around management control systems has still
been largely focused on technical control systems. Social controls have been studied 
in the sociological literature, with only a few studies focusing on the relationship
between social and technical controls. 
This study explores the different elements of control systems and their
interrelations in a rather unexplored context: focusing on the design and 
implementation of an internal control system under a SOX compliance program. The
study seeks to understand what happens when an organization introduces new
technical controls as part of its SOX implementation project. More specifically, the
focus is on the relationship between technical and social controls. Furthermore, this
study seeks to differentiate between the control design, which is a management task,
and the control implementation, which is about how the controls are introduced to
and adopted by the employees. Empirical analysis is drawn from a case setting in
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which Nokia, a Finnish-based public company subject to SOX legislation, has 
designed an internal control system and introduced it to its employees globally. 
This study provides managerial and legislative implications and contributes to
the literature on both management control and internal control systems. The
management control literature has previously considered internal control as
primarily related to controls that are in place to safeguard assets and ensure financial
reporting quality. This study widens this traditional view and brings the definition of
internal control closer to the concept of management control.
The key finding of this study is that the social controls can play a significant role
in implementing technical controls. This study suggests that these two control types
should not be considered as isolated in the control design process because their
continuous interplay will affect how the controls are perceived and performed. It is
a matter of how managers apply social control when designing and introducing 
technical controls. They must consider that employees do not always follow the
controls as a result of rational decision-making; instead, employees’ emotions affect
how they decide to act. In this study, employees who had strong emotions toward
the controls were also more likely to perform the controls. Thus, emotions are tied
with employee perceptions of the controls. Even though today’s technology provides
endless possibilities for automated, system-based controls, a human factor will 
always be central in an effective internal control system. 
KEYWORDS: internal control, management control systems, technical control,
social control, SOX compliance, global companies, Nokia
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TIIVISTELMÄ
Yrityksiltä odotetaan vastuullisuutta, läpinäkyvyyttä ja luotettavaa raportointia
toiminnastaan ja taloudellisesta asemastaan. Yhdysvalloissa vuonna 2002 säädetty 
Sarbanes–Oxley laki eli niin kutsuttu SOX-lainsäädäntö on lisännyt Yhdysvaltain
pörssissä noteerattujen yritysten painetta kiinnittää huomiota sisäisen valvonnan
järjestämiseen ja compliance-ohjelmien rakentamiseen. Usein tämä johtaa siihen,
että, yrityksissä otetaan käyttöön helposti todennettavia kontrolleja, kuten ohjeita ja
sääntöjä sekä henkilöstölle suunnattuja koulutusohjelmia. Samaan aikaan
viranomaiset ovat lisänneet huomattavasti enemmän painoarvoa eettisesti kestävään 
yrityskulttuuriin ja johdon osoittamaan esimerkkiin, kun ne arvioivat, onko yrityksen
compliance-ohjelma kattava ja tehokas. Esimerkiksi viimeisimmän Yhdysvaltain 
oikeusministeriön (Department of Justice, DOJ) asettaman compliance-ohjelmien
arviointia koskevan ohjeistuksen mukaan ei ole suositeltavaa laatia ainoastaan
toimintapolitiikkoja tai menettelytapoja. Sen sijaan DOJ kehottaa syyttäjiä arvioi-
maan, onko yritys "sisällyttänyt asianmukaisen toimintakulttuurin päivittäiseen
toimintaansa". Tämän tutkimuksen ytimessä ovat näiden formaalien sääntöjen eli
todennettavien kontrollien sekä yrityskulttuuriin pohjautuvien sosiaalisten kontrol-
lien välisen vuorovaikutuksen ymmärtäminen. 
Todennettava kontrolli muodostuu kirjallisista säännöistä ja menettelytavoista,
kun taas sosiaalinen kontrolli tarkoittaa pyrkimystä saada ihmiset sisäistämään tietyt 
arvot, normit ja ajatukset siitä, mikä on hyvää ja tärkeää sekä yksittäisen työntekijän 
että organisaation edun kannalta. Lisääntynyt huomio tälle pehmeämmälle
ohjaukselle johtuu siitä, että monissa yritysskandaaleissa kysymys ei ole ollut
todennettavan kontrollin puutteesta, vaan myrkyllisen yrityskulttuurin erilaisista
ilmentymistä. Yritykset tarvitsevat sekä todennettavaa että sosiaalista kontrollia
pystyäkseen vastaamaan sidosryhmien odotuksiin toimia vastuullisina yrityskansa-
laisina. Tästä huolimatta johdon ohjausta koskeva tutkimus on edelleen keskittynyt
suurelta osin todennettaviin ohjausjärjestelmiin. Sosiaalista kontrollia on tutkittu
sosiologisessa kirjallisuudessa, ja vain harvat tutkimukset keskittyvät sosiaalisten ja
todennettavien kontrollien väliseen suhteeseen.
Tässä tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan ohjausjärjestelmien eri elementtejä ja niiden
välisiä suhteita melko tutkimattomassa yhteydessä: tutkimus keskittyy sisäisen
valvonnan rakenteiden suunnitteluun ja toteuttamiseen SOX-compliance -ohjelman 
kontekstissa. Tutkimuksella pyritään ymmärtämään, mitä tapahtuu, kun organisaatio
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ottaa käyttöön uusia todennettavia kontrolleja osana SOX-projektiaan. Tarkemmin
sanottuna keskitytään todennettavien ja sosiaalisten kontrollien väliseen 
vuorovaikutukseen. Lisäksi tässä tutkimuksessa pyritään erottamaan sisäisen
valvonnan suunnittelu, joka on johdon tehtävä, ja sisäisen valvonnan käytännön
toteutus, mikä liittyy siihen, miten kontrollit esitellään organisaatiolle, ja miten
työntekijät ovat lopulta valmiita   noudattamaan niitä. Empiirinen analyysi perustuu
tapaustutkimukseen, jossa Nokia Oyj, suomalainen SOX-lainsäädännön alainen
julkinen yritys, on suunnitellut sisäisen valvonnan järjestelmän ja ottanut sen
käyttöön maailmanlaajuisesti läpi organisaation.
Tutkimus kontribuoi johdon ohjausta ja sisäistä valvontaa koskevaan
kirjallisuuteen. Aiempi kirjallisuus on liittänyt sisäisen valvonnan käsitteen vahvasti
kirjanpidon luotettavuuden varmistamiseen ja yrityksen omaisuuden turvaamiseen. 
Tämä tutkimus laajentaa sisäisen valvonnan määritelmää ja tuo sen lähemmäksi
johdon ohjauksen määritelmää.
Tämän tutkimuksen keskeinen löydös on, että sosiaalisella kontrollilla voi olla
merkittävä rooli siinä, miten hyvin ja laajasti henkilöstö ottaa sisäisen valvonnan 
ohjeita ja sääntöjä käyttöön. Tutkimuksen tärkeimmät tulokset viittaavat siihen, että
näitä kahta ohjaustyyppiä ei tulisi tarkastella erillään sisäisen valvonnan 
suunnitteluprosessissa, sillä niiden jatkuva vuorovaikutus vaikuttaa siihen, miten
kontrolleihin suhtaudutaan ja miten ne lopulta suoritetaan – tai jätetään suorittamatta.
Avainasemassa on se, miten esihenkilöt soveltavat sosiaalisia kontrolleja, kun he
suunnittelevat ja panevat täytäntöön todennettavia kontrolleja. Heidän on otettava
huomioon, että työntekijät eivät aina noudata kontrolleja järkevän päätöksenteon
seurauksena; sen sijaan työntekijöiden käsitykset ja tunteet vaikuttavat siihen, miten
he päättävät toimia. Tässä tutkimuksessa työntekijät, joilla oli voimakkaita tunteita
kontrolleja kohtaan, myös suorittivat kontrolleja todennäköisemmin. Siten tunteet
ovat sidoksissa siihen, miten työntekijät suhtautuvat kontrolleihin. Vaikka
teknologia tarjoaa lähes rajattomat mahdollisuudet automatisoituun, järjestelmiin
perustuvaan valvontaan, inhimillisen tekijän merkitys on aina keskeinen tehokkaan
sisäisen valvonnan järjestämisessä.
ASIASANAT: sisäinen valvonta, johdon ohjausjärjestelmät, todennettava kontrolli, 
sosiaalinen kontrolli, SOX, globaalit yritykset, Nokia
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“You cannot regulate a corporate culture.”
(Vice President, Sales Unit Finance and Control)
Introduction
1.1 Why study internal control?
A series of corporate scandals in the early 2000s triggered the passage of the
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in the U.S. to introduce significant reforms in the
corporate governance, accounting, auditing, and reporting environment of publicly 
traded firms. Since then, companies have been faced with pressures to increase their
technical controls and formalize their systems of internal control to satisfy these
regulatory requirements. However, for many companies, these efforts have resulted
in more inefficiencies in control systems, to the point where many organizations have
withdrawn from the market (Tessier & Otley 2012b, 777). This has made the
successful implementation of internal controls a primary concern for practitioners 
and regulators (March, Schulz and Zhou 2000).
SOX focuses on internal controls over financial reporting; these are typically 
technical controls such as rules, procedures, or standards describing how to perform
and document certain tasks. SOX also mandates corporate management to assess the
effectiveness of the internal control structure and report to the SEC1 on any
shortcomings in these controls. As SOX emphasizes the need for technical controls,
many companies focus their efforts on creating a heavy regime of technical controls
comprising policies, procedures, and system-based controls. Less attention is given 
to social controls, the manageable aspects of organizational culture (Malmi & Brown
2008; Merchant & Van der Stede 2007) that consist of efforts to persuade people to
adapt to certain values, norms, and ideas about what is good and important in terms
of work (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004, 426). Social controls appeal to employees’
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission1 
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Niina Ratsula
emotions (Ray 1986, 288), thus having an important role in engaging them to
perform the technical controls. Many technical controls can be embedded in
technology, yet we can never ignore the human factor needed to perform and
understand the controls. With a modern definition, an effective system of internal
controls comprises both technical and social controls (COSO 2013).
Though SOX emphasizes the role of technical controls, social controls have 
recently increased their importance in the eyes of the authorities when determining
whether a compliance program is comprehensive and effective. For example, the
most recent DOJ guidance (U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019) on
evaluating corporate-compliance programs does not recommend that companies
adopt a specific set of policies or procedures. Rather, it instructs prosecutors to assess
whether a company has “incorporated the culture of compliance into its day-to-day 
operations.” This recent emphasis is no wonder, as in many accounting fraud 
scandals, the root cause for failure has not been the lack of technical controls.
Instead, poor tone-at-the-top and toxic corporate culture have been raised in many
of these cases, such as at Toshiba, Enron, or Wells Fargo (Healy & Serafeim 2019;
Verschoor 2015). Thus, to meet stakeholders’ expectations of ethical and lawful
behavior, companies indeed need both technical and social controls. 
Many studies have recognized the importance of social controls over a firm’s
formal control system (Collier 2005; Kraus, Kennergren and von Unge 2017;
Marginson 1999; Pierce & Sweeney 2005). However, research around management
control systems has still been largely focused on technical control systems (Malmi
& Brown 2008). Social controls have been studied in the sociological literature (e.g.,
Schein 1992), but only a few studies have focused on the relationship between social
and technical controls (see, e.g., Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Kraus et al. 2017),
even though management control literature has recognized that the controls work 
interactively and in concert, comprising sociotechnical artifacts (Berry, Coad,
Harris, Otley and Stringer 2009). Thus, the focus should not be on whether any
particular controls are used but on how they are used (Simons 1995) and how they 
interact with other controls (Grabner & Moers 2013; Malmi & Brown 2008; Mundy 
2010). 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2007) suggest that different control elements
should be combined to ensure better control because they complement each other. In
addition, it should be considered how these different control elements affect each
other. Many studies around control systems in global companies primarily treat the
control elements as separate tools that can substitute for each other (Chang & Taylor
1999; Chung, Gibbons and Schoch 2000), even if their possible interactions are
noticed (O’Donnell 2000). As Moilanen (2012, 136) suggests, “This view may 
consider that the tools together create certain effects but does not empirically
acknowledge the possible effects of control systems or elements on each other.”
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Introduction
Therefore, although different management control system elements are
interdependent, their relationships are still largely unexplored (Chenhall 2003;
Malmi & Brown 2008; Otley 2008). Much of the management control research is 
focused on single themes or certain forms of control that are not connected to other
forms of control or to the context in which they operate. Thus, there is a risk of
arriving at erroneous conclusions because the different forms of control do not
operate in isolation (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Chenhall 2003, 131; Fisher 1998).
Legislations such as SOX have pressured organizations to adopt more technical
controls – usually at the expense of social controls. Evidence exists that changes in
control style from informal to formal can lead to dysfunctional behavior and distrust
in the management (Johansson & Baldvinsdottir 2003). Scapens (2006) suggests that
if the control system is initially more open to design and creation (meaning that it
has the dominant features of social controls over technical controls), it will later be
more or less taken for granted among the many users, and therefore, it will become 
more difficult to change. This may explain why many organizations have failed in
their technical control implementation projects. When employees are used to
operating in an environment based on empowerment and social control, they may
interpret the change toward tighter controls as a lack of trust. This may result in
decreased motivation and change resistance.
Instead, why not turn this question around: Could strong social control be utilized
as an asset by management who wants to implement a new set of technical controls?
Could a strong culture in fact facilitate (instead of hinder) the adoption of these new
technical controls? Forms of social control, such as the tone at the top, social
arrangements, and group pressure (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 90) are used to
creating cultural norms that govern employee behavior. Could we use the power of
these cultural norms to engage employees to adopt new technical controls?
We already have some answers for the above question. For example, Kraus et al.
(2017) found that managers were able to avoid resistance toward the implementation
of formal controls by using “ideological talk” as a form of social control: through
the interplay with the predominant ideological control in place, the formal 
management control system became vested with symbolic significance.
Furthermore, Alvesson and Kärreman (2004, 441) discovered that socio-ideological
control is intimately tied to bureaucracy and output control. According to them, it is
not an alternative to the latter two, as claimed by most of the literature on control
(e.g., Ouchi 1979, 1980), nor is it useful only in situations where complexity and
uncertainty make rules prescribing behavior and the precise measurement of results
impossible.
This study aims to shed more light on the issues just discussed in a rather
unexplored context: How can organizations apply technical and social controls when
designing and implementing a system of internal control in the context of a SOX
15 
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program? This is a question of how to balance between social and technical controls
and how these two types of controls interrelate. Besides choosing the types of
controls to be used, management also has several other aspects to further consider
when designing a new system of internal control: How should control objectives be
designed? How should the controls be used to search for the desired result? How
should the controls be presented to the employees? On the other hand, employees
subject to follow the presented controls may perceive the controls in different ways
despite managerial intentions: they can see the controls either as adding value to their
work or as an additional burden. As a result, they may choose to follow the controls
or ignore them. 
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 182) developed a framework that accounts for all of
these various aspects of control design and implementation. They suggest that more
research should be conducted to understand what affects employee perceptions of
controls and how these perceptions may impact organizational performance. Adler
and Borys (1996) also called for studies to focus on the variability in how controls
are perceived.
But why study internal control? And how do internal controls differ from other
control concepts? Internal controls are broadly defined as a process for assuring
achievement of an organization’s objectives in three key areas: operational
effectiveness and efficiency, reliable financial and non-financial reporting, and 
compliance with laws, regulations, and internal policies (COSO 2013). Management
controls generally focus on implementing organizational goals as defined by the
management, whereas internal controls aim to ensure data quality for management
decision-making, mitigate the risks involved in achieving the organization’s
objectives, and ensure compliance. Effective internal control also provides
confidence in the information reported by the management to investors and other
stakeholders (Frankel, Kothari and Zuo 2019).
We have a growing body of existing research around internal control, yet many
researchers suggest that it still remains relatively unexplored (see, e.g., Arwinge
2010, 2014; Barra 2010; Liu 2005; Maijoor 2000). Furthermore, the current research
is fragmented, and most recent studies focus only on relatively narrow segments of
internal control, such as the control environment, fraud, or internal control evaluation 
and reporting (see, e.g., Barra 2010; Caplan 1999; D’Aquila 1998; Krishnan &
Visvanathan 2007; Maijoor 2000). The establishment of SOX has increased interest
in the topic of internal control. However, the vast majority of internal control– and 
SOX-related studies is largely descriptive; when considering the existing research
from a methodological perspective, it is fair to say that it relies on rather generic or
16
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publicly available data, such as the CRSP2 database, public company disclosures on
internal control deficiencies, annual reports, or large survey questionnaires
completed by corporate CFOs. SOX emphasizes the external reporting of internal
control effectiveness; consequently, the research mainly deals with the external
implications of SOX, neglecting the social controls enacted by inside organizations. 
One reason for this fragmented and narrow character of the existing literature 
might be the fact that the definition of internal control is not yet clear because the
term internal control covers vastly different concepts in the sub-area of accounting
research (Maijoor 2000, 102). Traditionally, in the professional accounting
literature, internal controls have been associated with accounting controls such as
the segregation of duties, authorization policies, organization structure and measures
to protect assets and information. The definition of internal control is much more
complex, dynamic, and constantly evolving in more recent literature, including in a 
variety of interpretations and philosophies (e.g., Arwinge 2010; COSO 2013; Kinney
2000; Maijoor 2000). In fact, according to a modern view, a significant amount of
organizational activity can be considered to fall under the concept of internal control
(Maijoor 2000). 
Selto and Widener (2004) assessed and interpreted correspondence (or lack
thereof) between published research topics and topics of the practice literature in the
management accounting area. The objective of their study was to use observed 
divergences between management accounting research topics and issues of practice
to identify interesting, practice-oriented research questions. Their results classify
internal controls as an area where practice literature exceeds research. This supports
the idea that there is both a need and room for new research opportunities in the area
of internal control. Humphrey (2007, 171) argues that little is known about auditing
in “practical settings,” which typically involves the assessment of companies’
internal control over financial reporting; therefore, it can also be concluded that little
is known about internal control in practical settings, so additional studies on the
details of the workings of internal control seem important.
1.2 Objective of this study
This study will explore the different elements of control systems and their
interrelations in a rather unexplored context – the design and implementation of an
internal control system. This study seeks to understand what happens when an
organization introduces new technical controls as part of its SOX compliance
project. More specifically, the focus is on the relationship between technical and
2 Center for Research in Security Prices
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social controls. In the scope of its analysis, this study includes a variety of different
control elements and their interrelations (Chenhall 2003; Malmi & Brown 2008)
instead of focusing only on certain types of controls. Furthermore, it seeks to
differentiate between the control design, which is a management task, and the control
implementation, which is about how the controls are introduced to and adopted by
the employees.
Selecting internal control as a unit of analysis provides a new angle to study
control systems. Typically, studies on the implementation of control systems have
focused on certain management accounting technologies, such as activity-based
costing systems or balanced scorecards. Management control systems are also
usually studied in the context of voluntary adoption, whereas this study will look at
a SOX compliance project in which the requirement to establish the internal control
system results from a regulatory compliance requirement. This might provide some
interesting insights into the impacts that regulation can have on the development of
control systems. 
This study’s objective is twofold and can be scrutinized through the following
questions:
RQ1 How do social and technical control interplay in the design and
implementation of an internal control system?
RQ2 How does the presentation of internal controls impact employee
perceptions and performance of internal controls? 
The first question concerns the actions taken by management regarding control
system design and presentation, in which the interaction between technical and social
controls plays a key role. The second question is about how the controls are
perceived by employees, which ultimately impacts the implementation’s success.
The important difference between these two questions is that the employee
perceptions are outside the management’s influence, i.e., management may use 
various techniques to persuade employees to behave a certain way but can never
have complete control over how they feel and behave based on those emotions. 
Separating the managers’ intention and employees’ perceptions allows us to 
emphasize that both groups’ views of controls might deviate from each other.
The management control literature shows that internal control differs from
management control because it is not, in itself, about management decisions. Instead,
internal controls are fundamental to ensuring the integrity of data used in any control
system; they consist of systems that safeguard assets from theft or accidental loss
and ensure reliable accounting records and financial information systems (Simons
1995, 181). The practical frameworks even consider internal control in much broader
18
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terms: COSO (2013) defines internal control as a process designed to provide
reasonable assurance regarding the achievement of objectives relating to operations, 
reporting, and compliance. This process consists of ongoing tasks and activities,
including not only technical controls, such as establishment of policies, procedures,
structures, reporting lines, and approval rights, but also social controls, such as tone
from the top, communications, job design, and management commitment to integrity
and ethical values. COSO underlines that internal control is not merely about policy
and procedure manuals, systems, and forms but also about people and the actions
they take at every level of an organization to affect different elements of internal
control.
This study’s empirical analysis is drawn from a case setting in which a global
company (Nokia) subject to SOX legislation has designed an internal control system
and introduced it to its employees globally. The research questions are addressed
through the recent study around internal control and management control systems.
A framework developed by Tessier and Otley (2012a) is used to explain the case 
study findings. This framework is a revised version of the Simons’ (1995) Levers of
Control (LOC) framework, which has been used frequently in the literature over the
years.3 It has many strengths, including different types of controls and providing a
broad perspective (Ferreira & Otley 2009). However, as Tessier and Otley argued
(2012a, 172), its main weakness is the definitions of its concepts, which are too
vague and sometimes ambiguous. A framework for the design and implementation
of an internal control system is presented to conclude the empirical analysis of this
study. This framework adds internal control theory elements to the framework
developed by Tessier and Otley (2012a) and refines it further. 
This study considers the different control types holistically and analyzes the
empirics through the current management control and internal control literature.
When analyzing the use of social controls in this study, Merchant and Van der
Stede’s (2016) definitions of personnel and cultural control are used; these include
typical elements of social control, such as tone at the top, employee selection and
job design, group rewards, informal communication, and social arrangements.
Technical controls are defined here as those that are based on procedures, policies,
rules, and standards that specify how tasks are to be performed and how individuals
and groups are organized (Malmi & Brown 2008; Tessier & Otley 2012a; Simons
1995). Technical controls are embedded in the technology of work, and they govern
day-to-day activities. These are the more visible, objective components of the control
system and are, thus, the easiest to research. Within the context of the case analysis,
Simons’ framework has been cited 1168 times in the literature according to Scopus
(2019) findings and 4151 times according to the search findings of Google Scholar
(2019).
3 
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the technical controls that are identified as part of the internal control system at Nokia
are within the scope of this study. Furthermore, the social controls at Nokia are
limited to covering only the aspects of introducing the technical controls relevant
here. Thus, social control per se is not in the interest of this study. 
This is one of the first studies to discuss the detailed components and aspects of
internal control and how they are interrelated (see Rae & Subramaniam 2008; Jokipii
2010). It will contribute to the understanding of the nature of management
accounting and internal control and the interdependencies between social and
technical control by studying control practices at various levels within the
organization (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004). 
A clear motivation exists for adopting a holistic perspective on management
control: empirical management control studies have produced ambiguous findings
and conflicting results because too few components have been studied compared to
more comprehensive and integrative approaches (e.g., Chenhall 2003; Ferreira &
Otley 2009; Otley 1999). Arwinge (2010, 188) suggested that more research is
needed to increase our understanding of how firms design and manage their internal 
control systems. Berry et al. (2009) have called for further research on the interplay
between the rational design of management control systems and socially constructed
realities. To build on these two gaps, this study finds it important to learn not only
how to design an internal control system but also to understand how those controls
are perceived by an organization’s employees. In a project such as SOX, there is
always a chance that the controls are formally introduced “by the book,” but they 
fail to become embedded and robust in the day-to-day operations. As many recent
corporate scandals have taught us, a technically qualified control system can be
overridden by poor tone at the top and toxic culture, leading to significant
compliance failures. Thus, it is necessary to include social control elements in the 
scope of this study.
This study contributes to the literature on both management control and internal
control systems, bringing these two concepts closer together; it will include both
technical and social controls by utilizing the Tessier and Otley (2012a) framework
to guide and frame the empirical analysis. It will also help us gain a better
understanding of how the control system functions as a whole and how the different
elements of control interact by looking at the internal controls system holistically
instead of circumscribing only certain aspects of control. Furthermore, this study will
propose some refinements to the Tessier and Otley (2012a) framework to 
demonstrate how it can be applied in the context of internal control design and 
implementation. There will be useful insights from the managerial implication
perspective for companies in the process of implementing systems of internal
control, as increasingly demanded by the regulatory environment. Furthermore, it
will provide some reflections from the legislative implication perspective as well.
20
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1.3 Research setting
This study occurs in a setting in which Global Company (Nokia) is required to design
and implement an enhanced internal control system following the enactment of
Sarbanes-Oxley legislation (SOX). SOX was enforced in 2002 after some substantial
financial scandals like the case of the Enron corporation, introducing major changes
to the regulation of financial practice and corporate governance on public companies
listed on the New York stock exchange. SOX addresses the duties of the CEO, CFO, 
and auditors and makes management personally responsible for ensuring the
credibility of the financial reporting to its stakeholders. Misleading information, 
when and if discovered, carries stiff penalties for the CEO, CFO, and auditors. 
The mandatory internal control assessment and public reporting imposed by
SOX aims to improve the effectiveness of controls over financial reporting, hold
corporate management more accountable for designing and maintaining effective 
controls, and make it easier for prosecutors to establish management’s knowledge
and intent in case of alleged fraud (Shapiro & Matson 2008, 224). SOX is just one
example of the increased self-reporting requirements that corporations are facing 
today regarding corporate governance and sustainable business. For example, the EU
Non-Financial Reporting Directive and The Modern Slavery Act also require
companies to report on their compliance and corporate responsibility efforts.  
Healy and Serafeim (2016) used Transparency International’s ratings of self-
reported anticorruption efforts for 480 corporations to analyze factors underlying the
ratings. They concluded that, on average, firms’ self-reported anticorruption efforts
signal real efforts to combat corruption and are not merely cheap talk. This provides
encouraging evidence that companies are walking the talk in compliance matters. 
However, whether an organization can really gain benefits from legislative
requirements such as SOX is dependent on the way its SOX controls are designed
and implemented. We have examples of companies such as Bear Stearns, Lehman
Brothers or Washington Mutual, which have all been SOX compliant but have yet
failed. These scandals have proven that the consequences can be severe if the
compliance is only ostensible. The root cause of many scandals like Enron and
Lehman Brothers has not been the lack of technical controls but, rather, a toxic
corporate culture and poor tone at the top.
As such, an organization may reach formal compliance “on paper” by
introducing a set of technical controls that are formally tested and provide the basis
for management to externally report on the internal control’s effectiveness. This
study aims to learn how these technical controls are actually perceived and followed
by the employees and what role the social controls play in the formal SOX
compliance. The important question is how to successfully implement a SOX
compliance program?
21 
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This study assumes that a successful implementation is about designing and
implementing controls that serve a business purpose while simultaneously providing
assurance for legal compliance. Furthermore, it is not enough that a company designs
a comprehensive system of internal control that looks good on paper; it must also 
sell the idea of the controls to its employees. We must recognize that employees do
not always perceive nor follow the controls as management intended, and employees
must be motivated to perform the controls to accomplish a successful
implementation of controls. Otherwise, we might be left with only an illusion of
control. This leads into the point where we must understand employee attitudes.
Employee perceptions of controls will determine their attitudes toward controls. The
employees’ individual attributes, such as the socio-cultural environment in which
they evolve and the level of knowledge they have regarding controls, play a role in 
their perceptions (Berlo 1960).
This study examines how a system of internal control is designed and
implemented in a SOX implementation context. Nokia uses a global approach to 
align local practices with the global policies and procedures to ensure SOX
compliance throughout the organization. Utilization of the organizational
capabilities worldwide is an important source of competitive advantage for Nokia
(Ghoshal & Bartlett 1988; Grant 1996; Kogut 1991). Thus, it will attempt to leverage
these practices worldwide. 
As part of its SOX compliance program, Nokia identified a new set of technical
controls to be implemented throughout the organization. These controls covered the
key end-to-end processes which had the most impact on the financial reporting. Prior
to SOX, the company did not have a stringent set of technical controls, but the control
environment was characterized by very strong social controls in which individuals
were empowered to make decisions and spend company money without a heavy
control regime. Those social controls, which appeal to the emotional elements within 
employees (Ray 1986, 288), comprise core values, beliefs, norms (Alvesson &
Kärreman 2004; Simons 1995) and symbols (Malmi & Brown 2008; Schein 1992).
Social control is not always consciously designed, as it often derives from, or is an
artifact of, the organizational culture. One of its top financial executives described
the company culture as follows:
“Our culture originally was very much of trust, and it was very much based on
trust in individuals to do the right decisions, and trust in individuals to do the
right thing... and, you could say it was very much around empowerment.” (A
Vice President of Finance and Control)
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The social form of control is based on the assumption that individuals do what is
best for the organization either because they are self-directed or because they are
influenced by social pressure. Technical controls, on the other hand, specify how
tasks are to be performed (Perrow 1986) and how individuals and groups are
organized (Malmi & Brown 2008). They are based on rules, procedures and 
standards that govern day-to-day activities. Once SOX was enacted, the social
controls were to be complemented and partly replaced by the technical controls. This
meant, for example, introducing a broad variety of new written policies and rules,
approval flows and documentation requirements. As a practical example: before
SOX, marketing managers would typically have a budget under which they could
operate without heavy documentation authorizing the transactions. In practice they 
could call to a supplier and order a marketing campaign, as long as it was within the
approved budget. After SOX, they could no longer manage the purchasing decisions
on their own but must contact the sourcing organization to negotiate the deal. All
phases of the transaction had to become traceable, meaning, for example, that the
transactions would must have purchase requests, written approvals and written 
purchase orders to be delivered to the supplier. 
“…What changed after SOX? Well, if we look at spending, I think nobody
would ever buy 800 000 Singapore dollars worth of advertising using an SMS
any more…” (Director, Treasury Finance & Control)
Global implementation projects can easily result in a tension between the need
for global integration, on the one hand, and local adaptation, on the other hand 
(Kostova & Roth 2002; Rosenzweig & Singh 1991). Thus, it is not enough simply
just to enforce a set of technical controls; managers must also consider how to
introduce the controls, how employees might perceive the controls and how to
manage the potential change resistance. The social controls are trying to impact the
emotional aspect of individuals, and the perception of the controls is about how
employees feel about them. Hence, to understand the phenomena relevant for this
study, we must understand the interaction that occurs between technical and social
control elements.
1.4 Methodological considerations and case
company introduction
1.4.1 Case study approach in this research
Internal control is operationalized in complex, dynamic organizations that differ
substantially across time, across organizations, and across cultures. Due to this
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inherent complexity, it is difficult to capture measures of internal control process
quality in an experiment, an archival study, or even a survey (Arwinge 2010; Kinney 
2000, 88). Rae and Subramaniam (2008) have suggested that researchers should find
better and more holistic measurements of internal control rather than relying on one
single source such as the perceptions of internal control quality according, for 
example, to the financial controller. Furthermore, Cruz, Major and Scapens (2009,
91) have suggested that more qualitative studies should be conducted on the adoption
of externally imposed practices in global/local settings. This research is about
internal control and about the interplay between different types of control: a field-
based case research is considered the most suitable method to study such complex
phenomenon.
A case study can be characterized as a research strategy that focuses on
understanding the dynamics present within a single setting (Eisenhardt 1989, 534),
and it has been suggested (Arwinge 2010) as a useful research method in the area of
internal controls, because it can help to gain a deeper understanding of how
managers, directors and other specialists are working with internal control in their
day-to-day activities. To date, however, only a few in-depth case studies have been
conducted to study internal control (Arwinge 2014; Pfister 2009). This might be
partly because internal control is considered as a rather sensitive topic, so researchers
face challenges in accessing qualified research data.
The case study method allows the researcher to study complexity and the special
characteristics of certain phenomena in detail and is particularly useful when the
phenomenon under investigation is difficult to study outside its natural setting.
Selecting only one case company means it is possible to get into very detailed
information, which is essential to rich field studies (Ahrens & Dent 1998, 25).
Researchers will benefit from obtaining information and views from a wide range of
organizational members. Using only one case company means it is also possible to
accomplish the interpretive research aims of the study.
As a response to Zimmerman's (2001) view that nothing has or can be learned
from field research, Ittner and Larcker (2002, 788) note that it is difficult to imagine
how research in an applied discipline such as managerial accounting could evolve
without the benefit of detailed examination of actual practices. According to Ittner
and Larcker (2002, 789), “field-based research is not simply an ill-defined and non-
scholarly method for conducting practitioner-oriented studies of consultant behavior.
Rather, when done correctly, field-based research may be the only way to truly
understand the antecedents and consequences of managerial accounting practices.” 
Since Ittner and Larcker’s argument, field studies have reserved their place as a
useful strategy to study managerial accounting practices.
SOX legislation is a U.S.-based phenomenon, so it is not surprising that the
majority of the SOX-related studies are U.S. based. Thus, all of the prior SOX-
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related studies have been mainly following the mainstream paradigmatic choices
(see, e.g., Chan, Kleinman and Lee 2009; Hammersley, Myers and Shakespeare
2008; Huang 2009; Vakkur, McAfee and Kipperman 2010). In practice the studies
have been performed with quantitative methodological choices, e.g., by sending out
surveys to corporate executives or analyzing publicly available data, such as internal
control statements within the published annual reports. Much research also utilizes
different databases, such as Compustat and AuditAnalystics (e.g., Huang 2009). A
few suggestions regarding the weaknesses of the prior research can be made to justify
the selection of an interpretive approach in this study. 
First, when trying to gain an understanding of the functioning of organizations’
internal control systems, the survey filled out by corporate executives may not 
provide enough reliable data to capture the intended phenomenon. A survey might
be a suitable method to compare different characteristics of companies under SOX
and find some correlations. However, the objectives of this study are likely to be
achieved via alternative methods. Typically, the qualitative research is suggested to
be the most suitable method to understand questions related to why and how, which 
are at the core of this study.
Second, information about internal control design, use and outcomes has not
been generally available to company outsiders (Krishnan 2005, 650). It is very likely
that we only touch the tip of the iceberg when we use only the information available
in annual reports or different databases as the research data. Statements about
whether there are material weaknesses in corporations’ internal control systems do
not address the question of how an organization has designed and implemented its
internal control system or how employees have perceived the controls. Additionally, 
the threshold for reporting such material weaknesses is very high, so even without
reporting any weaknesses, very interesting issues might still be happening inside the
organization that are not visible to the outsiders. We have multiple examples of
companies (Ericsson, Volkswagen, Wells Fargo) who have externally reported SOX
compliance or appealing CSR4 reports but yet have failed in their ethics and
compliance programs. Issues in the control environment and lack of an ethical
culture seem to be related to many fraud and corruption situations.
Several accounting fraud cases suggest that leadership has a strong impact on
unethical financial reporting (see, e.g., Mihajlov & Miller 2012; Tourish & Vatcha
2005). An in-depth case study is indeed required to understand the leadership 
implications, which is at the core of social control.
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) report is a periodical (usually annual) report
published by companies with the goal of sharing their corporate social responsibility
actions and results.
4 
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We must apply interpretive study methods that rely on the assumption that
meanings are constructed by human beings as they engage with the world and that
they are interpreting in order to understand the complex interrelations between
different types of controls within an organization and what is really occurring inside
the organization. The interpretively oriented researchers often emphasize the value
of storytelling as a natural way of communicating rich meaning structures and,
therefore, they value detailed narratives over general and abstract models (Kakkuri-
Knuuttila, Lukka and Kuorikoski 2008, 277). In practice this means that there must
be multiple sources gathering the research data; interviewing different stakeholders 
in different levels of the organizational hierarchy, studying the archival data of
project documents and flowcharts and also gathering data through unofficial “coffee
break” conversations.
The researcher in this study was an employee of the case company at the time
when gathering the data and her responsibilities were closely related to the examined
phenomenon. Thus, some characters of an interventionist research can be identified
in this study setting. Jönsson and Lukka (2007, 374) define interventionist research
as a kind of field experimentation in which the researcher, not having complete
control over the design of the experiment, seeks to determine the experimental
situation through observation, acts on that situation in concert with the host
organization, observes process and outcome, and analyzes findings in view of the
relevant literature.
The researcher’s role in the case organization was to coordinate several activities
aiming to ensure Nokia’s compliance with SOX legislation and internal control
requirements. She was an active actor in the real-time flow of life in the field, and
she was bound to adopt, or at least consider, the emic perspective to the issue at hand
(cf. Jönsson & Lukka 2007, 374). Such a perspective means to become an “insider”
in the sense that the researcher is seen as a competent and trustworthy member of the
world where she is doing the fieldwork. This not only enables her to understand the
meanings and actions of the actors in the field, but it also enables her to communicate
and act together with them (Jönsson & Lukka 2007, 374.) Being one of the
“insiders,” it was rather easy to gain the access to records, people and processes.
Furthermore, it enabled the researcher to establish a relaxed, open atmosphere during
the interviews, also allowing the difficult and sensitive topics to emerge. However,
despite the interventionist characters acknowledged in the research setting, the 
approach also included an ex post facto type of research in which the researcher
examined what, how, and why something occurred in the past (cf. Jönsson & Lukka
2007, 375).
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1.4.2 Case selection and introduction of Nokia
Selecting the object for a case study must be consistent with the research problem,
and the case must correspond to the study’s theoretical framework and variables
(Ghauri 2004, 112). In light of the established research setting, the potential case
company had to fulfill the following criteria:
1. The company had to be listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE)
and thus be obligated to comply with Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
2. The company had to still employ most of the people (or access to relevant
ex-employees should be available) who had been involved in the SOX
implementation to assure the gathering of qualified data related to the
phenomenon subject to this research.
These criteria were in place in the company where the researcher was employed.
Thus, for the researcher it was a natural solution to suggest the case study for her
employer in 2007. In fact, as Nokia was the only Finnish-based company left on the
NYSE in 2007, it was, in fact, also the only possible selection for the researcher. The
research access was negotiated with the Senior Vice President, Group Controller in
2007. The manuscript of the research was finalized in February 2020, after which it
was provided to Nokia for review and final approval. 
Nokia is a large multinational company headquartered in Finland. At the time of
selection as the case company for this research, the company was one of the largest
worldwide vendor of mobile phones and smartphones, with over 130.000 employees
in 120 countries, sales in more than 150 countries and global annual revenues of
EUR 39 billion (as of 2011). The company had sites for research and development, 
manufacturing and sales throughout the world. After a partnership with Microsoft
and subsequent market struggles, its mobile phone business was bought by Microsoft
in 2014. After the sale, Nokia began to focus more extensively on its
telecommunications infrastructure business and on Internet of things technologies.
The company then also experimented with virtual reality and digital health. The
Nokia brand has since returned to the mobile and smartphone market through a
licensing arrangement with HMD Global. Nokia continues to be a major patent
licensor for most large mobile phone vendors. As of 2018, Nokia is the world's third-
largest network equipment manufacturer.
Nokia is listed on the NYSE and thus had gone through a SOX-implementation
program that started in 2005. The first year to be compliant with SOX was the fiscal
year 2006. Thus, the company filed its first 20-F5 form statement on internal control
The 20-F is a form filed by a company with the SEC which is completed and submitted
by foreign companies which have shares traded on a US exchange.
5 
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Niina Ratsula
in 2007. During the time of empirical data gathering (2007-2012), most of the key
persons who had been involved in the implementation project since the beginning
were still working for the company, thus they had the knowledge of the events during
the whole period of implementation. This enabled interviewing the people who had
the most relevant information about the research phenomenon.
Being a multinational company with over 130.000 employees globally, it was
possible to study the phenomenon from many different viewpoints of the
organization and its inter-organizational setting, also taking into consideration the
potential cultural differences between different local entities.
The researcher herself was employed by the case company in a global position
during the whole period of empirical data gathering (with the exception of the two
last interviews); thus, there were no issues about gaining access. The empirical case
study began with a pilot discussion between the researcher and a representative from
the case company who was nominated as the researcher’s coach during the research
process. The coach had been the program manager for the SOX implementation 
project and thus was the most crucial informant in identifying the relevant objects of
the research data. Following the process of the data gathering and analyses, the
researcher and coach held several discussions to ensure the research data’s adequacy
and sufficiency. The following table summarizes the significant events in the case
company concerning the researched phenomenon and the timing of the research field 
work.
Table 1. Fieldwork and the significant SOX-related events in Nokia
2002 2003-2004 2005 2006 2007 2008-2012
SOX 
legislation
was 
established
SOX activities 
were initiated 
by the
Accounting
function (FSP), 
but no group 
level SOX 
program existed
Nokia 
established its
group-level
SOX 
implementation
program, 
overseen by 
the top 
financial
management
1st year
under
SOX 
regulation 
at Nokia
Nokia filed the first Internal
control
governance
model was
functioning as 
part of daily 
processes
20-F form
according to SOX
SOX 
implementation 
program ended,
and new internal
control governance 
model was
established
Field work and data gathering
The fieldwork started when the researcher was employed by the case company
in August 2007. She held several different specialist and managerial roles in the area
of internal controls and financial control during her employment with the company.
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The researcher actively participated in the implementation and development work of
SOX compliance and internal control during 2007-2009, but after that she held a
position in the Finance & Control organization, which was less involved in the
operational level of the research area until the end of year 2011, when she departed
the company. Due to the strong involvement in the researched phenomenon, the
researcher constantly was conscious of her role in the field and also documented it
clearly in the research papers. She recorded 43 out of the 45 interviews during her
employment period. The last two interviews occurred in early 2012, when the
researcher was no longer employed by the company6.
1.4.3 Empirical data gathering
Empirical evidence in qualitative case studies may derive from documentation,
archival records, interviews, direct observations, participant observations, and
physical artifacts (Eisenhardt 1989, 534; Yin 2009, 100). As an internal employee,
the researcher had wide access to internal data repositories such as financial process
related tools and systems, archives, the Intranet, project materials and concept
documents. She was also able to utilize the company Intranet phone book and the
help of colleagues to identify potential informants and data sources. The data
repositories were used to strengthen the researcher’s own understanding of the
research phenomenon and to verify and compare the information received through 
interviews (c.f. Ghauri & Grønhaug 2002, 115-116).
Interviews are one of the most important methods of generating empirical
evidence in the case study context, and they were also selected in this study as the
primary data gathering method. Interviewing about past events gives a researcher
insight into how these events and their contexts were experienced. The insiders’
perceptions can also be employed in explaining real processes. (Soulsby & Clark
2011.)
It is important to identify the relevant people to be interviewed to gain relevant
and reliable data (Daniels & Cannice 2004, 193; Ghauri & Grønhaug 2002, 176;
Rowley 2002, 19). The interviewee should have sufficient knowledge of the issue
under question. It was also worth learning whether the person held a position relevant
in this study at the time of the events under study. All interviewees were carefully
selected based on their expertise in the subject matter and current or past position in
the organization. The aim was to gather representatives of both managers and
employees to be interviewed to acquire insights not only on the control design and
managerial intentions but also on how employees perceived the controls. In addition, 
These interviews had been scheduled prior to her leaving the company.6 
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one group of the interviewees represented the “SOX community”, i.e. employees
who worked full-time in the SOX compliance program core team.
The interviewees were selected in order to reach a wide cross-sectional sample
of actors. The strategy behind the choice of interviewees was to select key informants 
across the organization, as described above. All interviewees were interviewed once,
but the SOX program manager was interviewed twice. This was necessary as he was 
a key informant in the SOX program. After conducting 45 interviews, similar themes 
began to appear in the discussions, and thus, the researcher concluded that there were 
enough data. The reason for conducting the two last interviews only after the
researcher had left the company was purely technical. Those two interviewees had
been identified as key informants, but due to conflicting schedules, there was no time
to conduct the interviews prior to leaving the company. The researcher’s access to
the case company remained open even after her departure. However, conducting
further interviews was not considered to enhance the saturation at that point. 
By the time of the first interview, the researcher had already been working in the
company for 18 months, which helped to identify the best informants. Suggestions
for further potential interviewees were also asked in the course of each individual
interview. The resulting suggestions in most cases were the same persons whom the
researcher had already identified herself. This affirmed the researcher’s confidence 
that the relevant interviewees had been selected.
The interview procedures were standardized and included the steps illustrated in
table 2.
Table 2. Steps taken for conducting interviews
STEP 1 Sending request by e-mail or orally asking for an interview
STEP 2 Setting an appointment
STEP 3 Sending interview guidance in advance
STEP 4 Conducting and recording the interview (in person or via conference call)
STEP 5 Transcribing interviews
STEP 6 Analyzing transcripts
Altogether 45 semi-structured interviews were conducted at different
organizational hierarchy levels and functions during the years 2009-2012 (see
Appendix 2 for the detailed list). All interviews were recorded and transcribed into
written form. The group of interviewees consisted of personnel from all levels of the
organization, which was considered vital to gain a comprehensive understanding of
the research phenomenon. Interviewees can be divided roughly into three groups:
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1. SOX community, consisting of key persons involved in the process of
designing the controls and running the SOX compliance program. This
group included members of the Internal Controls and Internal Audit team,
the SOX Program lead, SOX Coordinators and External Audit Partner.
The people in this group had been daily involved with internal controls
and internal audit-related work, including also leading the SOX
implementation project. This group of employees consisted the best
informants to gain detailed information about the SOX implementation
project and the level of controls prior SOX. Thus, they form the majority
of the interviewees.
2. Managers, including representatives of senior financial management,
such as the CFO, Corporate Controller and Vice Presidents within the
Finance & Control Community. This group also included the financial
heads for different organizational units or locations and team leaders, e.g.
in purchasing and accounting departments. These interviewees were in a
key role in ensuring SOX compliance and control implementations in
subunits. The key focus in interviews with this group was to understand
how the controls were introduced to employees and how the leaders had
experienced the SOX program.
3. Employees across the different organizational units and local entities. This
group was selected to gain data specifically for the second research
question (employee perceptions and performance of the controls). It
comprised controllers, accountants, concept owners, buyers and sourcing
coordinators. The key focus in interviews with this group was to
understand how the employees perceived the controls.
The following table summarizes the number and length of the interviews for each
of the interviewee group.
Table 3. Summary of the interviews
INTERVIEWEE 
GROUP
NUMBER OF THE
INTERVIEWS
TOTAL LENGTH OF 
THE INTERVIEWS /
MIN
AVERAGE LENGTH
OF ONE INTERVIEW /
MIN
SOX COMMUNITY 20 1303 65
MANAGERS 15 802 53
EMPLOYEES 10 550 55
TOTAL 45 2655 59
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Each interviewee was initially contacted either face to face or by e-mail and
provided a short description of the research project and interview themes. All the
approached candidates accepted the interview invitation. The interviews lasted from
20 minutes to two hours and were all audio recorded and subsequently transcribed 
to increase the trustworthiness of the study (Wilkinson & Young 2004, 211) and to
facilitate the data analysis.
Most of the interviews were conducted on the premises of the case company, 
either in the interviewees’ own offices or in small conference rooms. The interviewer
was no longer employed by the company in two of the cases, so those interviews
occurred outside the case company on the premises of interviewee’s current
employer. The interviewees were given an option to choose the language of the
interviews using either English or their mother tongue. This enabled them to talk
about the phenomenon in a way that is most comfortable to them. As a result, 40 out
of 45 interviews were conducted in English, because it was the most natural way for
most of the interviewees to discuss the issues, as it was also the company’s official
language. Five interviews were conducted using Finnish, which was the mother
tongue of the both the interviewees and interviewer. These interviews were
translated into English in the transcription phase to ensure the congruence of the
data.
A face-to-face interview was not possible in eight out of 45 cases due to
geographical limitations, so the interviews were conducted via phone and/or
videoconference. It is important in telephone interviews to have or to establish
personal contact with the interviewees and to gain their trust, otherwise they may be
unwilling to express themselves openly, especially when sensitive questions are 
asked (Saunders, Lewis and Thornhill 2003, 269). This was not a problem in this
study, as the researcher knew personally five out of the eight interviewees 
beforehand after having worked in the same company for over a year in close co-
operation, so the trust and personal relationship were established before the
telephone interviews occurred. The remaining three telephone interviews were
completed successfully, too, and the researcher did not observe any behavior that
could be interpreted as compromising the data credibility. The researcher did not
note differences between any of the telephone and face-to-face interviews in terms
of data quality or atmosphere. 
It was essential to allow new issues and ideas to emerge during the interviews
due to the interpretative nature of this study. This suggested the use of the semi-
structured interview approach. The interviews were conducted with the help of
interview guides that varied depending on who was being interviewed (see Appendix
3 and 4 for an example). For instance, the interviews of the accountants addressed
partly different issues than the interview of the CFO. The interview guides included 
themes that were previously determined, although the interviews did not adhere
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precisely to the form and order of the predetermined questions (cf. Hirsjärvi &
Hurme 1991). The guides were sent to the interviewees two days before the
interview, which allowed them to familiarize themselves with the topics to be
discussed. The interview themes were derived from the initial framework of the
study; however, they developed during the research project. The interview guides
were utilized as a checklist to ensure that all the intended topics were covered and to
direct conversations so that they remained on the intended course (cf. Daniels &
Cannice 2004). Follow-up and clarifying questions were employed when the
researcher felt the need for clarification, further detail and explanations from the
interviewees’ initial responses.
The researcher made notes during the interviews, especially regarding the
additional questions, to clarify the answers and to identify issues that the
interviewees specifically emphasized. The notes were useful in the data analysis
phase to recall the interview’s atmosphere and to identify issues of particular
importance (cf. Wilkinson & Young 2004). 
The interviews in this research consisted of both retrospective (such as the
introduction of SOX) and current topics (such as interviewee’s current perceptions
and attitudes towards internal controls). Challenges may occur during retrospective
interviews, because interviewees are fallible due to memory loss or personal
reinterpretation of past events (see, e.g., Soulsby & Clark 2011; Halinen & Törnroos
1995; Simmons 1985). The only way to at least partially overcome these limitations
is by triangulation of evidence, which implies use of multiple informants and
complementary written material (Halinen & Törnroos 1995; Soulsby & Clark 2011).
The findings and conclusions are more convincing and accurate if they are based on 
several different sources of information (Yin 2009, 116). The aim of the triangulation 
is to draw on the different strengths of various data gathering methods. Interviews
can provide in-depth information and personal feelings; secondary sources may
complete the data with factual information, whereas observation might indicate
discrepancies between what is said and what is actually occurring within the
organization. (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008; Pettigrew 1990) The facts presented
through interviews were verified by reflecting them to the data gathered from
internal data repositories. What’s worth acknowledging is that in this study the
personal feelings noted above also were important, as those were in scope of this
study.
Field notes were also taken during the time spent in the field in situations when
the researcher felt it useful to record the behaviors, activities, events, and other
features of an observation setting. Notes included also the researcher’s own thoughts, 
ideas, questions, and concerns related to the research. This data consist of 11 separate
field note diaries altogether, with lengths from one to five pages each. The notes
were written during 2009-2012. 
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Electronic archives and design-related projects 
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Along with the semistructured interviews, field notes and use of data
repositories, the secondary data gathering method was observation, which means 
collecting empirical data by human, mechanical, electrical, or electronic means
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 86). Observation occurred in several ways during the
researchers’ daily work in the case company, because she actively participated into
internal control-related activities, such as control assessment sessions in various 
subunits and countries as well as the control development and design-related
projects. Observation also occurred through attending various internal meetings,
trainings and workshops and through informal discussions with other members of
the organization. The researcher took general notes from the observations and 
included those into the field note diaries.
One of the advantages of making observations is that they record actions as they
occur, which is different from people describing afterwards what they said or did or
what they believe they will say or do in the future, as people do in interviews
(Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 86). On the contrary, observation does not provide
insights into what a person thinks about an action or what might motivate it. This
issue was tackled by data triangulation, i.e., conducting the interviews as the primary 
data-gathering method. Figure 1 roughly summarizes the data triangulation within 
this study.
Figure 1. Data triangulation in this study
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During the data gathering, the researcher carefully communicated to the SOX
community and interviewees about her role in the field. Access to the relevant data
and materials was secured by agreement with the Group Controller.
1.4.4 Data analysis
Unlike quantitative analysis, qualitative data analysis has no well-established
methods or guidelines available. Thus, data analysis is regarded as one of the most
challenging aspects of qualitative research (Eisenhardt 1989, 539; Miles 1983; Yin
2009, 127). The aim of the data analysis is to find meanings and explanations and to
interpret the data with a view to drawing conclusions. Data analysis is greatly
dependent on the researcher’s own way of rigorous thinking, together with a
sufficient presentation of evidence and thorough consideration of alternative
interpretations (Yin 2009, 127). As researchers are the main instrument in qualitative
data analysis, it is not always possible to identify or describe in detail from where a
specific insight originated (Langley 1999).
A preliminary data analysis was conducted during each step of the research
project. A more systematic analysis occurred after all data were gathered. Interviews
were transcribed into written form in parallel with data gathering. Since there were
45 interviews with an average length of 59 minutes, CAQDAS7 software, QSR
Nvivo, was utilized to support the comprehensive analysis. Using specially designed
software for analyzing large qualitative data facilitates the management,
organization and analysis of the data.
Sinkovics, Penz and Ghauri (2008) also suggested that CAQDAS helps to
formalize the analytical process and thus contributes to more reliable research
findings. However, it is the researcher who decides the theoretical concepts and ideas
employed to frame the study (Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008; Lindsay 2004). As
suggested by Eriksson and Kovalainen (2008), the analysis in this study was based
on analytical frameworks that were developed prior to the analysis. The process
employed in data analysis involved data summarization, classification and
interpretation. Using the NVivo software enabled the rapid retrieval of specific
quotes based on various search criteria. The contents of the interview transcripts
were organized to focus on both the variables and the relationships between the
variables. The transcription enabled the researcher to identify patterns in the
explanations provided by interviewees and to draw out both common and unique
CAQDAS is an acronym for computer-assisted qualitative data analysis and is
employed to refer to special computer software for handling qualitative analysis (see
Eriksson & Kovalainen 2008, 106).
7 
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themes. These allowed the identification of related categories that contributed to the
explanation of practices and relationships (Shank 2006).
The data were arranged in chronological order to ease the analysis, as suggested
for the longitudinal qualitative data (e.g., Rowley 2002, 23; Mäkelä 1990, 53). “A
critical Incident Chart” (see Miles & Huberman 1994) was created to outline the
major events within the case company and its environment during the research
period. This provided a more comprehensive visual representation of the data
analysis.
Furthermore, thematic categories were defined and used to facilitate the
comparison and coding (Saunders, Lews and Thornhill 2003, 381; Mäkelä 1990, 54).
All the interview transcripts, field notes and other written material were analyzed
several times in a search for the themes and patterns suggested by the theoretical
perspectives that were drawn on to address the research questions (Scapens 2004).
As a result, particular sections of the interviews were highlighted and grouped into
categories, such as:
• Technical and social controls before SOX
• Establishment of the SOX Program
• Technical and social controls after SOX
• Internal control components (based on COSO framework)
• Introduction of the SOX controls to the organizational units
• Objectives of the controls
• Managerial intentions for the controls
• Presentation of controls
• Employee perceptions of controls
• Control performance.
Once the data were categorized, the key findings in each category were analyzed
in the light of the relevant literature. Several quotes were selected from the material
to illustrate the empirical material, demonstrate the case study findings, provide
additional insights and strengthen the study findings.
1.5 Structure of the study
This research report comprises four chapters. The first chapter’s purpose is to
introduce the motivation, research objectives and research setting, introduce the
methodological considerations and explain the case study method used in this study 
in detail.
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The second chapter discusses the theoretical and conceptual foundations relevant
for this study in more detail, defines the concepts of organizational control systems
and internal control, and analyzes the relationship between these two concepts. It
also introduces the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, as an important part of the case study
setting. The concepts of social and technical control are at the core of this study, so
they are also introduced. This chapter also looks at the most relevant management
control frameworks in this study, including Simons’ Levers of Control framework
of 1995 and its refined version by Tessier and Otley (2012a). Last, this chapter
discusses the use of and development of the frameworks and concepts relevant in
this study.
Chapter three presents the actual empirical examination of the design and
implementation of a system of internal control. First, it describes the case company
story about the SOX compliance program. Then, it reflects on the empirical evidence
through the literature around internal control and management control – adding both 
technical and social control perspectives into the analysis. This chapter will also
interpret the case analysis via the COSO framework for internal control (2013), the
framework by Tessier and Otley (2012a) and the literature on technical and social
control. Finally, chapter three discusses the empirical findings and presents the
refined framework, which pulls together the analysis of the design and
implementation of an internal control system based on the current internal control
literature and the Tessier and Otley (2012a) framework. The end of the chapter 
summarizes and discusses this study’s key findings.
Chapter four presents the key conclusions of this study and discusses some
managerial and legislative implications and evaluates the study’s validity and
reliability. Last, this chapter presents the study’s limitations and some suggestions
for future research.
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2 Theoretical and conceptual
foundations
2.1 The concept of organizational control systems
This chapter introduces both internal control and management control to provide
understanding of the two topics. The different typologies and concepts of controls in
the management accounting and control literature include strategic control,
management control, internal control, and management control systems, to name just
a few of them. These different concepts are used in multiple, different contexts and 
for different purposes and have different interpretations among various authors,
which leads to many overlaps between the concepts. This study will reflect many of
these partly overlapping control concepts, those definitions are listed in Appendix 1. 
The term “control” is ambiguous due to the difficulty of translating it into other
languages, such as Finnish. Pfister (2009, 15) noted that some variations or
differences in interpretations may be due to reasons that are more linguistic in nature.
The meaning and use of the English word control is quite different than, for example,
when control is directly translated into Swedish, German or Finnish language. The
English term “control” includes more proactive and forward-looking meanings, 
whereas in Finnish, for example, control has more reactive and backwards-looking 
meanings. However, it can be argued that control is one of the key functions of
management. 
Merchant (1985, 1-2) summarizes the definition of control as “keeping things on
track” and identifies it as “the final function in the management process.” Anthony,
Dearden and Bedford (1989, 5) provided a definition of control that emphasized
command and control:
“Control is the process of guiding a set of variables to attain a preconceived goal
or objective. It is a broad concept applicable to people, things, situations and
organizations. In organizations, it includes various planning and controlling
processes.”
Organizations achieve control in many ways, ranging from direct surveillance to
feedback systems to social and cultural control (Simons 1995, 5). Many researchers
38
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conclude that control means different things to different people; thus, it can be
viewed from many different perspectives. Chua, Lowe and Puxty (1989, 4), for
example, articulated these three distinct meanings of control:
• as a means of steering or regulation, which is the classical cybernetic 
meaning;
• as a means of domination of one or more people or groups of people by
other people or groups, which has a more sociological and political tone;
and
• as a process of management control and power.
It is assumed that a certain degree of control is necessary to manage any
organization. Control is used as a means of ensuring that participants will act in
accordance with an organization’s objectives. Ouchi (1979, 845-846) argued that the
design of organizational control mechanisms must focus on the problems of
achieving cooperation among individuals who hold partially divergent objectives.
Basically, such a gathering of people can be moved towards cooperative action
through one of three devices (Ouchi 1979):
• a market mechanism that precisely evaluates each person's contribution
and permits each to pursue non-organizational goals but at a personal loss
of reward;
• a clan mechanism that attains cooperation by selecting and socializing
individuals such that their individual objectives substantially overlap with
the organization's objectives; and
• a bureaucratic mechanism that does a little of each: it partly evaluates
performance as closely as possible, and it partly engenders feelings of
commitment to the idea of legitimate authority in hierarchies.
Merchant and Van der Stede (2016) distinguish four categories of control: action
controls, results controls, personnel controls and cultural controls. Action, personnel
and cultural controls define to individuals and groups what are desirable and 
undesirable actions for the organization. Results controls are based on monitoring
the actions taken. Results controls do not determine the actions employees should
take but focus their attention on the results to be achieved and, hence, motivate them
to take appropriate actions they believe will generate the desired results. Results and
action controls are often defined as formal or bureaucratic controls, which are based
on rules and prescribed procedures (Ouchi 1979). By contrast, informal or softer
(personnel and cultural) controls do not usually have predefined forms and may
occur spontaneously. Personnel controls seek to increase the likelihood of employees
self-monitoring, whereas cultural controls are used to encourage mutual monitoring. 
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An organization’s culture is based on shared traditions, norms, beliefs, values, 
ideologies, attitudes, and ways of behaving; thus, it creates a powerful group pressure
on individuals who do not act compliantly. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007).
One of the most cited classifications for management controls is the four levers
of control by Robert Simons (1995). According to this typology, diagnostic control
is the standard use of performance measures and is primarily focused on feedback
control. Performance is measured against a target and management acts on the
variance. Diagnostic control also means that performance is regularly reviewed in
formal meetings such as board, departmental and team meetings. Budgeting is an
example of such a system. Interactive control is an approach senior managers use to 
create meaningful and purposeful conversations right across the company and to
interact at all levels. Boundary systems are a statement of what the company is not
going to do: it is a mechanism for ensuring people do not spend time investigating
and developing new opportunities that the company is never going to pursue. Finally,
belief systems are there to communicate the vision, mission and values of the
business. In so doing, they are communicating what the organization is trying to 
achieve and how individuals are to behave to each other, to customers and suppliers
and to society at large.
In any given control process, a set of controls must be designed: these sets
constitute segregation of duties, authorization procedures, security and system
access, verification- and supervisory review, to name a few (Picket 2001, 51-53).
The importance of balancing different types of controls has been pointed out in
general management control research (see, for example, Simons 1990), and prior
research has revealed a wide range of different types of controls. Most of these
control definitions overlap with the controls introduced in accounting and auditing
texts but use different technical terms (Merchant & Otley 2007, 788). As a result, the
research on control generated by different fields remains fragmented and has
developed rather independently of each other. Hence, there seems to be an obvious
need to integrate the different findings and concepts (Arwinge 2010, 133; Maijoor
2000, 102; Merchant & Otley 2007, 788). 
As just demonstrated, the literature provides several different classifications and
categories for organizational controls. Furthermore, the terms management accounting 
(MA), management accounting systems (MAS), management control systems (MCS),
and organizational controls (OC) are sometimes used interchangeably. Chenhall
(2003) makes the following distinction between these terms:
“MA refers to a gathering of practices such as budgeting or product costing, 
whereas MAS refers to the systematic use of MA to achieve some goal. MCS is
a broader term that encompasses MAS and also includes other controls such as
personal or clan controls. OC is sometimes used to refer to controls built into 
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
activities and processes such as statistical quality control, just-in-time
management.” 
Organizations’ control systems comprise a set of different forms of control that
systemically interact with each other. However, many studies focus only on looking
at certain types of controls, such as accounting controls or formal controls in general.
Malmi and Brown (2008), who have criticized this and highlighted especially the
importance of informal control, introduced a package of controls framework 
consisting of five control types: planning, cybernetic, reward and compensation,
administrative and cultural controls. 
This study also looks at the control systems from a holistic perspective and uses
terms technical and social control to recognize the different control types. Furthermore, 
it will combine the concepts of management control systems (MCS) and internal
control (IC). MCS have been referred to as “the set of formal procedures and processes
that managers use to help ensure that employees achieve both their own and their
organization’s objectives” (Bisbe & Otley 2004; Otley & Berry 1980; Tucker & Parker
2013). Internal control traditionally had a fairly direct relationship to the accounting
records, but recently the definition has broadened closer to the concept of general
management control and corporate governance (Arwinge 2010, 13).
2.2 Internal control
According to Kinney (2000, 83), knowledge about internal controls is an essential
element that affects the welfare of management, corporate directors, shareholders,
an entity’s trading partners, auditors and society at large. Public attention has
increased towards the topic during the past two decades as new laws, regulations and
pronouncements have emerged in the area of internal control, (see, e.g., Caplan 1999;
D’Aquila 1998; Jokipii 2006; Krishnan & Visvanathan 2007). Different
stakeholders, such as regulators, supervisory authorities, audit committees, top 
management, business analysts and investors, are showing increasing interest
towards firms’ internal control and governance practices. Despite the growing
interest in the topic of internal control, it is still yet relatively unexplored by 
researchers, and boundaries for the definition of internal control seem unclear (see,
e.g., Arwinge 2010; Barra 2010; Liu 2005; Maijoor 2000). 
Recent literature has differentiated the view of internal control into a limited
view and a more comprehensive view (see, e.g., Pfister 2009, 17). Ever since the
concept of internal control was established in formal literature over 100 years ago
(Dicksee 1892; 1905), it seems that there have been ongoing debates about its
definition, some of them quite controversial (Arwinge 2010, 13; Hay 1993; Heier,
Dugan and Sayers 2005). 
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Niina Ratsula
The limited view links internal control closely to the accounting records and
views internal controls as the “detailed, procedural checks and balances” (Simons
1995, 84). With the more recent, broader definitions, internal control has
significantly expanded its domains into general management control and corporate
governance (Arwinge 2010, 109), placing more emphasis on a holistic approach to 
internal control and emphasizing operational effectiveness, efficiency and
compliance with laws, regulation, and internal policies. Thus, internal control today 
forms an integral part of organizational governance.
Next, we will take a closer look at these two aspects of internal control literature
– the limited and comprehensive views.
2.2.1 Limited view of internal control
The traditional, narrow perception of internal control draws upon accounting and
auditing theory, which focuses on auditors performing their duties as prescribed by 
generally accepted auditing standards. English audit specialist Lawrence Dicksee
(1905, 53) referred in his book to the general system of internal checks:
“This is a matter that may very profitably engage the careful attention of the
Auditor, for not only will a proper system of internal check frequently obviate
the necessity of a detailed audit, but further possesses the important advantage
of causing any irregularities to be corrected at once, instead of continuing until
the next visit of the auditor.“
That statement by Dicksee (1905) is considered to be one of the first explicit
accounts and slight recognition of the importance of internal control (Arwinge 2010,
102; Brown 1962; Heier et al. 2005). Heier et al. (2005) argued that one of the first
times that the term internal control was used in authoritative literature was the year
1936, in a work entitled Examination of Financial Statement by Independent Auditors. 
Section II of this document by the American Institute of Accountants stipulates that:  
“In determining the nature and extent of this examination, the accountant will
necessarily take into consideration, among other things, (a) the purpose of the
examinations, (b) the amount of the detail included in the statements to be
covered by this report, (c) the type of business accounts which are to be
examined, and (d) the system of internal check and control.” (American Institute
of Accountants 1936, 7)
As that statement demonstrates, the American Institute of Accountants (1936, 7)
referred to internal control as the system of internal check and control, which closely 
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resembled Dicksee’s definition of internal control provided in 1905. In these early
interpretations of internal control, the term was closely linked to the accounting
procedures and the financial reporting process, as it was used as a means by which
the financial statement auditor could improve audit process efficiency and
effectiveness. Ever since, the focus of the academic research concerning external
auditing has been on these traditional accounting controls, which are studied in the
context of decision making by auditors. As a result, the main interest has been in
how accounting controls affect the reliability of financial reporting. Even in today’s
literature, internal controls are still linked to the auditing field.
To conclude, the traditional approach views internal control as primarily related
to financial controls: controls that are in place to safeguard assets and ensure
financial reporting quality, such as segregation of duties, authorization policies, 
organization structure and credibility tests (Maijoor 2000, 104-105). Merchant and 
Van der Stede (2016, 82) also refer to internal controls as “the control-oriented term 
used by the auditing profession.” According to them, most of the internal controls
fall into the category of what they call behavioral constraints, such as segregation of
duties, which aim to prevent employees from doing things that should not be done.
The constraints can be applied physically or administratively.
Simons’ (1995, 84-85) view of internal control is similar to Merchant and Van
der Stede’s. He refers to internal controls as the “detailed, procedural checks and
balances” that are designed to safeguard assets from misappropriation and ensure 
that accounting records and information systems are reliable. Simons (1995, 86)
distinguishes internal control from other levers of control and points out that internal
controls are essential to ensure the integrity of the other systems that managers use
to implement strategy (Figure 2). 
Figure 2. Internal controls: The foundation for effective control (Simons 1995, 86)
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Niina Ratsula
According to Simons (1995, 85), internal controls are different from boundary
systems. The latter specify the risks to be avoided, whereas internal controls specify
the detailed procedures and safeguards for information handling, transaction
processing, and record keeping. Belief systems and boundary systems (introduced in 
chapter 2.5) delineate core values and proscribed behaviors, but management must
still guard against both willful violations and unintentional errors in company 
processes (Simons 2014, 280). Data from different measurement systems, such as
profit statements, ROI and EVA measures and balanced scorecards, can be relied
upon only if managers have faith in the accuracy of the numbers. Simons argues
(2014, 280) that every manager should be alert to the possibility of errors in the
numbers, which can occur for two reasons; untrained staff may make unintentional
errors or employees may misappropriate company assets for personal gain and then
falsify accounting records to avoid detection. 
Thus, the limited view of internal control suggests that effective internal control
is the primary means for preventing, detecting and correcting fraud and errors by 
employees. Carmichael stated (1970, 237), "individuals have inherent mental, moral
and physical weaknesses; therefore internal control methods and measures are
necessary to achieve information processing system goals.” Segregation of duties is
one of the key internal control mechanisms against fraud (see Lee 1971; Merchant
& Van der Stede 2016, 82; Simons 2014, 280), which generally refers to the
appropriate segregation of activities between people and functions. Other fraud
controls include fraud policies, whistle-blowing hotlines, employee reference
checks, vendor contract reviews, analytical reviews, password protection, firewalls
and digital analysis (see Bierstaker, Brody and Pacini 2006, 523). 
Simons (2014, 280) classifies internal controls into three categories: structural
safeguards, staff safeguards and system safeguards (Figure 3). Simons
emphasizes that each of these safeguards is needed in any business where the 
manager or owner delegates custody of assets and/or the processing of accounting
transactions to subordinates. Simons distinguishes internal controls from other
levers of control and states that internal controls form the foundation for every
business.
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Figure 3. Elements of internal control (Simons 1995; 2014)
Structural safeguards
Structural safeguards include an active audit committee of the board, an independent
internal audit function, segregation of duties, defined levels of authorization, and 
restricted access to valuable assets (Simons 1995).
According to Simons (2014, 280), the cardinal rule of internal control is that one
person should never handle all aspects of transactions involving valuable company
assets. Segregation of duties requires one person to check or reconcile the work of
another. The segregated activities generally are divided into authorizing, approving,
recording, issuing and receiving assets, and making payments. Once more
individuals are involved in processing one transaction, the likelihood of catching any
errors or inconsistencies will increase.
Most employee frauds are perpetrated when an individual has access to either
cash or securities and the ability to record accounting transactions for those actions
(Simons 2014, 280). Little and Best (2003, 420) noted that research on internal
controls and external auditors’ judgments has indicated that the assessment of the
segregation of duties is a dominating factor in the auditors’ evaluation of the internal
control structure. It is assumed that adequately segregated duties will deter or detect
fraudulent activity, thus having positive effects on firm performance. 
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Niina Ratsula
Defined levels of authorization is “the principle that requires an individual’s
access to company funds to be commensurate with their level of responsibility, 
thereby limiting exposure to error and fraud” (Simons 2014, 281). For example, a
manager could have authorization to approve invoices up to 5.000 Euros, whereas
all invoices above that amount must be approved by a superior.
Restricted access to valuable assets means that the assets subject to theft or
misuse should be protected by vaults, gates and locks, for example. When valuable
assets cannot be easily counted and reconciled, direct surveillance becomes
necessary to ensure that individuals are adequately safeguarding the assets. The
intangible assets, such as patents, trademarks and copyrights, should also be secured.
Boards of directors are ultimately responsible to shareholders for the integrity of
internal controls. In larger companies the board selects from its members an audit
committee, which oversees the work of independent auditors, i.e., external and
internal audit. The importance of an effective audit committee is widely recognized
in both professional and academic writing as well as in most regulatory texts. In a
Welsh study on effective working relationships between audit committees and 
internal audit, Davies (2009, 44) claims that “the role of the audit committee has 
definitely evolved.” The role of an audit committee traditionally has been to oversee
the financial reporting process, but their responsibilities have extended recently 
towards overseeing risk management, control, compliance and internal investigation 
processes.
Recent studies (Turley & Zaman 2007; Zaman & Sarens 2013) on audit
committee work have also shown that the informal processes and structures - as 
opposed to the formal ones that are often specified in corporate codes and regulations 
- are important and may enhance audit committee effectiveness. Zaman and Sarens
(2013) emphasize the importance of the background of the audit committee
chairperson on the effectiveness of an organization’s governance process. Their
study strengthens the idea that in addition to formal mechanisms, such informal
processes as communicating outside of formal, pre-scheduled meetings between the
internal audit and audit committee, play a significant role in corporate governance.
Staff safeguards
Staff safeguards include adequate expertise and training for all accounting, control,
and internal audit staff, sufficient resources, and rotation of key jobs.
Simons (1995, 85, 181) argues that internal control relies on staff professionals 
such as trained accountants, who typically install and maintain controls that are then 
periodically evaluated by internal and external auditors. Simons (2014, 283)
emphasizes that the design and operation of good internal controls requires 
significant technical expertise, typically attained via professional education, such as
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
certified public accountant (CPEs) and certified management accountants (CMAs).
According to Simons (2014, 283), “accounting professionals must be hired, systems
installed, and clerical staff trained to perform reconciliations and checks.” 
Rotation in key jobs is a control to discover irregularities in financial accounts.
If an employee is hiding accounting irregularities, an independent person who is
asked to take over that job for a period of time will usually discover the
discrepancies. Thus, Simon suggests (2014, 281) that a good practice is to insist that
employees with access to critical accounting records take regular vacations.
System safeguards
System safeguards are designed to ensure adequate procedures for transaction
processing and timely reports. These include complete and accurate record keeping,
adequate documentation and audit trail, relevant and timely management reporting,
and restricted access to information systems and databases. These system safeguards 
are close to the early definitions for internal controls referred earlier (Dicksee 1905;
American Institute of Accountants 1936).
Complete and accurate record keeping deals with the very basic functions of
accounting. Company must have procedures that ensure all transactions are recorded 
accurately and promptly in the accounting records. According to Simons (2014,
282), accounting data becomes worthless for management purposes if it is inaccurate
and untimely. An audit trail gives a step by step documented history of a transaction.
It enables the auditor to trace the financial data from general ledger to the source
document, such as an invoice or a receipt. For example, a proper audit should enable
the auditor to trace a customer payment back to an accounts receivable statement,
which in turn can be traced back to a sales invoice and shipping record.
Integrity of accounting data can only be assured if access to information systems
is restricted to those who have a legitimate right to change or view accounting 
records (Simons 2014, 282). This calls for secure databases that prevent
unauthorized access or tampering. Passwords, data encryption, and internal
verification routines are necessary to ensure the integrity of information. 
Managers should receive accounting and control information in a timely manner.
If the reports are provided late, feedback may be too late to act upon, and the business
may be vulnerable to losses or poor management decisions based on faulty 
information (Simons 2014, 283). 
Reflection
Simons (1995, 85) acknowledges the risk of opportunistic actions of human nature
when designing diagnostic controls such as budgets. Humans have a natural
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Niina Ratsula
tendency to do what must be done to meet budget. Thus, managers should not only 
ask for more results but also send a message that bending the rules to meet targets is
not tolerated. According to Simons (1995, 84), internal controls are then used as a
solution to ensure that diagnostic control systems operate effectively, i.e., reported
data is accurate and complete.
Using the preceding example, Simons views internal controls as purely technical
controls, such as checks and balances to ensure the integrity of the reported data.
This view ignores the social part of the control. In fact, the example of a manager
sending the message not to bend the rules exemplifies the tone at the top, a core
element of social control. This is part of the belief systems in Simons’ categorization,
which are ‘‘the explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers
communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose,
and direction for the organization’’ (Simons 1995, 34). Simons does discuss
management attention in the context of internal control, but it is weakly integrated
into the concept of tone at the top and leading by example (c.f. Pfister 2009, 182).
To summarize, Simons (1995) clearly separates the social part of management
control as distinct from internal control.
Another limitation of this limited view of internal control is the responsibility for
internal controls. According to Simons (2014, 284) good internal controls provide
the checks and balances to assure managers that errors will not creep into critical
operating systems, and unauthorized actions will not be allowed to impair assets.
Simons (2014, 284) adds that managers usually should not spend too much time on 
designing or reviewing the details of internal controls. Instead, “they delegate this
responsibility to trained accountants and auditors.” Simons (2014, 284) does 
acknowledge that business managers should be aware that “if there is ever a
significant financial or operating loss due to poor internal controls, they must
shoulder the responsibility. Because systems of internal control are essential for the
security of assets and the integrity of performance information, managers are
accountable for ensuring these controls are in place. Thus, business managers must
be sure that sufficient resources are devoted to operating these controls effectively.”
Based on that, Simons limits the responsibility for demonstrating internal control
to the finance and auditing area and places little emphasis on the fact that internal
control should, in fact, be of concern to all people within an organization (Pfister 2009, 
18). Furthermore, by distinguishing internal controls from other management controls
and by classifying them to only focus on detailed procedural checks and balances, we
fail to recognize the social form of internal control, which, according to the
comprehensive view, forms an integral part of an organization’s internal control. 
Furthermore, Simon’s framework seems to evaluate the effectiveness of internal
control based on the success of the technical controls (i.e., whether there are enough
qualified resources to perform the detailed procedures and balances). However, not
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
even the most sophisticated controls are enough when management wants to
overlook them. As we have witnessed in multiple corporate scandals during the
2000s, the most crucial control failures have resulted not from the missing procedural
checks and balances but from a toxic or impassive corporate culture. For example,
in the case of the Siemens bribery scandal exposed in 2007, several hundred senior-
level people from the company engaged in bribery, despite their established
compliance controls, code of conduct and clear rejection of bribery as a business
practice. Even though they had all formally signed the business code of conduct, not
only were bribes informally accepted but sanctions were also not carried out. What
these examples indicate is that culture influences control and control also influences
culture (Pfister 2009, 3). Campbell and Göritz (2014) found that corrupt
organizations perceive themselves to fight in a war, which leads to their taken-for-
granted assumption that “the end justifies the mean”. This assumption inspires
many values and norms of the organizational culture.
A study by Zaman & Sarens (2013) also found evidence that in addition to formal
mechanisms, informal processes such as communication outside of formal pre-
scheduled meetings between the internal audit and audit committees play a
significant role in corporate governance. This is a clear sign of the need for social
control also in the audit committee’s work. Thus, to better study internal control, we
must take into consideration the interaction between technical and social forms of
control and view the internal control system holistically.
2.2.2 Comprehensive view of internal control
A broader definition of internal control has significantly expanded the concept closer
to general management control and corporate governance (Arwinge 2010, 109;
Maijoor, 2000; Merchant & Otley 2007, 787), placing more emphasis on a holistic 
approach to internal control and emphasizing operational effectiveness and
efficiency and compliance with laws, regulation, and internal policies. 
The academic study concerning internal control from the wider perspective
draws on theoretical concepts found in fields other than accounting and auditing, 
such as management control, organization, risk management and strategy (Kinney
2000, 88; Maijoor 2000, 105). Many of these studies do not specifically mention the
term internal control, even though the areas under study fall under the broader
definition of internal control.
Control research from an organization theory or management control perspective
has studied controls mainly in the context of the organizational effectiveness of
departments and divisions. The typical organizational measures distinguished in this
area of research are different control typologies, such as action controls, results
controls, personnel and cultural controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016). The
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action controls listed by Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 81-84) are the
accounting controls that have typically been in the focus of literature concerning
external auditing. Results controls refer to management systems based on rewarding
individuals for generating good results. Personnel and cultural controls are based on
systems in which employees control either their own or each other’s’ behaviors. The
comprehensive view of internal control considers all of these different types of
controls as part of the internal control system.
Many national corporate governance reports and reforms include
recommendations for internal control. The guidance provided by public authorities
in the field of auditing and corporate governance uses wide definitions of internal
control. Maijoor noted already in 2000 that our understanding of internal control
from a wider corporate governance perspective is incomplete. According to Maijoor
(2000, 108), assumed relationships that are critical from a corporate governance
perspective and are thus critical for policy recommendations for internal control
should be further studied. 
One of the most referenced definitions in the practical literature for the
comprehensive view of internal control is the COSO Internal Control (COSO IC8)
framework (2013). The history of this framework goes back to the 1980s, when the
adequacy of financial reporting systems was challenged by the accounting scandals
(Ge & McVay 2005, 139). The National Commission on Fraudulent Financial
Reporting (known as the Treadway Commission) was established in the U.S. in 1985
to investigate the causes of fraudulent financial reporting and make
recommendations to reduce its likelihood. The Treadway Commission addressed
internal control aspects such as the control environment, code of conduct, audit
committees, and internal audit. The Commission’s recommendations led to a task
force that was built under the Committee of Sponsoring Organization of the
Treadway Commission (COSO). 
COSO’s main objective was to identify the factors that cause fraudulent financial
reporting and to make recommendations to reduce its incidence. COSO has
established a common definition of internal controls, standards, and criteria against
which companies and organizations can assess their internal control systems. COSO
emphasizes the importance of management’s involvement in understanding internal
control functions and establishing an adequate and effective control system. The first
COSO framework was established in 1994, and it was updated in 2013 to ease the 
use and broaden the application of the framework. However, the core definition of
COSO has published several frameworks, both for internal control (Internal Control –
Integrated Framework, 2013) and risk management (Enterprise Risk Management –
Integrating with Strategy and Performance, 2017). When COSO framework is
mentioned in this study, it refers to the Internal Control – Integrated Framework.
8 
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internal control has remained the same even after the revision. This framework has
now become the leading guidance on internal control for directors and managers
worldwide (Power 2007, 49).9 
The traditional approaches, in which controls are generally directly related to the
accounting records, have now been supplemented by the wider approach to internal
control. One of the fundamental elements of this comprehensive view is that internal
control is defined as a process as opposed to being a structure or a system10, which
was the case in earlier definitions (Heier et al. 2005, 57). COSO (2013) defines
internal control as a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management,
and other personnel, designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the
achievement of objectives in the following categories:
• Operations Objectives - These pertain to the effectiveness and efficiency
of the entity’s operations, including operational and financial performance
goals, and to safeguarding assets against loss. 
• Reporting Objectives - These pertain to internal and external financial and
non-financial reporting and may encompass reliability, timeliness,
transparency, or other terms as set forth by regulators, recognized standard
setters, or the entity’s policies.
• Compliance Objectives - These pertain to adherence to the laws and
regulations to which the entity is subject.
COSO (2013) defines internal control as consisting of five interrelated
components. These components provide an effective framework for describing and
analyzing the system of internal control implemented in an organization. These five
components are 
9 Kinney (2000, 84) notes that the COSO definition is widely accepted in practice, which
can be seen through the application of similar conceptual definitions by other relevant
groups around the world. For example, the Canadian Guidance on Control Board
(CoCo) defines internal control as “all the resources, processes, culture, structure, and
tasks that, taken together, support people in achieving those objectives”. The CoCo
definition explicitly mentions internal elements such as “internal reporting,” 
“information within the organization,” and “internal policies” as part of internal control.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) emphasizes
the importance of responding to risk and, for instance, states that internal control has to 
do with “behaviors.” The European Federation of Accountants (FEE) defines internal
control as going “beyond procedures” and includes “elements such as corporate culture,
systems, structure, policies and tasks” into the definition, which relate to governance.
All these definitions support the COSO definition.
10 While acknowledging this notion between a system and a process, this study uses the
term “internal control system” to describe the comprehensive view of internal control.
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• control environment, 
• risk assessment,
• control activities,
• information and communication and 
• monitoring activities11. 
Figure 4 demonstrates the relationship between the internal control objectives
and components within different organizational entities, divisions, operating units or
functions. The five COSO components are described in more detail later in this
chapter.
Figure 4. COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework (COSO 2013)
The five COSO components are further clarified via 17 principles. These
principles provide the basic ideas that should be considered when designing or
assessing the system of internal control. Table 4 outlines these 17 principles.
11 The COSO model was updated in 2013: the name of the “monitoring” component was
changed to “monitoring activities”. To ensure consistency with this text, the latter term
is used only in this study.
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Table 4. Internal control components and principles (COSO)
INTERNAL CONTROL PRINCIPLES
COMPONENT
CONTROL 1. Demonstrate commitment to integrity and ethical values
ENVIRONMENT 2. Ensure that board exercises oversight responsibility
4. Demonstrate commitment to a competent workforce
5. Hold people accountable
3. Establish structures, reporting lines, authorities and 
responsibilities
RISK ASSESSMENT 6. Specify appropriate objectives
7. Identify and analyze risks
8. Evaluate fraud risks
9. Identify and analyze changes that could significantly affect
internal controls
CONTROL ACTIVITIES 10. Select and develop control activities that mitigate risks
11. Select and develop technology controls
12. Deploy control activities through policies and procedures
INFORMATION AND 
COMMUNICATION
13. Use relevant, quality information to support the internal control
function
14. Communicate internal control information internally
15. Communicate internal control information externally
MONITORING
ACTIVITIES
16. Perform ongoing or periodic evaluations of internal controls (or a 
combination of the two)
17. Communicate internal control deficiencies
This study will look at internal control through this comprehensive view and use
COSO as the core definition for internal control. Next, we will look at the five COSO
components (2013) in more detail and reflect the recent academic work within these
elements. 
Control environment
According to COSO, the control environment forms a foundation for an effective
internal control, consisting, e.g., of the tone at the top, holding people accountable
for their actions and promoting an organization’s ethical values (COSO 2013). A
weak control environment leads into ineffectiveness of other internal control
elements. This idea differs from Simons’ view (1995), in which the technical
(internal) controls form the basis for other levers of control.
Control Environment is the set of standards, processes, and structures that
provide the basis for carrying out internal control across the organization. The board
of directors and senior management establish the tone at the top regarding the
importance of internal control, including expected standards of conduct. Control
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environment is the foundation for all other components of internal control, providing
discipline and structure. Five principles of the control environment are:
1. The organization demonstrates a commitment to integrity and ethical
values. This means that management and board management actions
should contribute to strengthening standards of conduct, integrity and
ethical values. The oversight function of the board of directors exercised 
through policies and committees has attracted wide attention from
researchers and has been found to play a crucial role in preserving
integrity of accounting practice (e.g., Lamberton, Mihalek and Smith 
2005; Merchant & Rockness 1994). 
2. The board of directors demonstrates independence from management and 
exercises oversight of the development and performance of internal
control. In other words, the board of directors must accept its supervisory
responsibilities and the executive management must take the appropriate
actions to implement effective control system.
3. Management establishes, with board oversight, structures, reporting lines,
and appropriate authorities and responsibilities in the pursuit of
objectives. This principle provides for executive management and the
management board to introduce multiple structures (operational units,
legal entities, geographical distribution, outsourcing of services) and
various reporting lines to support the achievement of objectives.
4. The organization demonstrates a commitment to attract, develop, and retain 
competent individuals in alignment with objectives. This means that 
organizations should look for applicable policies and practices for
anticipating and developing competencies. In fact, in many of the internal
control weaknesses, the root cause relates to personnel. Personnel weaknesses
may include a shortage of skilled people, disgruntled employees, inadequate
skills, poor training, overwhelming workloads, excessive staff turnover,
absence of mentoring, weak segregation of duties and poor supervision. 
5. The organization holds individuals accountable for their internal control
responsibilities in the pursuit of objectives. This principle refers to the
mechanisms established to empower the staff and to take corrective
measures in different situations. Appropriate performance measures,
incentives and other rewards must be aligned with the responsibilities
established both on the short-term and on the long-term objectives.
As such, the control environment is much about tone at the top. Prior empirical
research has primarily focused on structural elements of the board of directors (e.g.,
gender diversity and CEO age) and examined their effect on organizational practices,
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
including financial reporting (Abbott, Parker and Presley 2012; Huang, Rose-Green 
and Lee 2012). However, according to Amernic, Craig and Tourish (2010), a more
fundamental and direct manifestation of tone at the top is the CEO’s narrative
language. Discursive narration is a critical element for the enactment of leadership,
because it enables CEOs to construct organizational identity (Heracleous & Barrett
2001), enhance their role as sensemakers (Weick, Sutcliffe and Obstfeld 2005),
manage consent (Kuhn 2008), and sharpen their charisma (Den Hartog & Verburg 
1997). The narrative language deals largely with the social controls – it’s about 
creating the culture and the context in which the employees are expected to comply
with the controls. This part of the internal controls should simply not be overlooked.
Risk assessment
COSO prescribes that a second important component of the internal control process
comprises the organizational risk assessment process. Every entity faces a variety
of risks from external and internal sources that must be assessed. A precondition to
risk assessment is establishment of specific suitable objectives. Risk assessment
includes identification and analysis of relevant risks related to achievement of the
assigned objectives. Risk assessment is a prerequisite for determining how the risks
should be managed. Assessing the fraud-related risk is also important, as is
constantly identifying and analyzing significant changes that may have an impact on
the risk assessment. These are the four COSO principles for risk assessment:
6. The organization specifies objectives with sufficient clarity to enable the
identification and assessment of risks relating to objectives. This principle
lays the groundwork for doing the risk assessment itself. A company
ordinarily must describe its operational, reporting (external financial,
external nonfinancial, internal) and compliance objectives. According to
COSO guidance, while setting strategies and objectives is not part of the
internal control process, objectives form the basis on which risk
assessment approaches are implemented and performed and subsequent
control activities are established.
7. The organization identifies risks to the achievement of its objectives
across the entity and analyzes risks as a basis for determining how the
risks should be managed. As compared to the limited view on internal
control, COSO looks at the objectives and risks related to operations,
reporting and compliance, not just focusing on the risks related to
safeguarding of assets and ensuring accuracy of financial reporting.
8. The organization considers the potential for fraud in assessing risks to the
achievement of objectives. This principle looks at how fraud could
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prevent the entity from achieving the objectives identified in Principle 6.
The assessment that management performs with respect to this principle
considers fraudulent reporting, possible loss of assets and corruption
resulting from the various ways that fraud and misconduct can occur.
9. The organization identifies and assesses changes that could significantly
impact the system of internal control. This principle requires an
assessment of change in the organization on an ongoing basis - both
externally and internally - that could affect risk. External changes include
those in the economic, regulatory and physical environment. Internal
changes include those in company’s business lines and operations,
overseas markets and operations, new technologies, as well as changes in
leadership and company philosophy.
In 2004 COSO issued another framework entitled Enterprise Risk Management
- Integrated Framework (updated in 2017). This COSO ERM framework explicitly
tied internal control even closer to risk, viewing internal control as a treatment for
risk exposures. Internal control as a part of ERM is thus regarded as one of the means
for managing risks (Fraser & Henry 2007, 393).
Control activities
The board of directors sets the tone at the top and establishes policies by which
management and the organization are to be guided. Based on these board policies,
management then designs appropriate rules and procedures that will enable
employees throughout the organization to ensure that management directives are
carried out.
According to COSO, these policies and procedures are called control activities. 
They help to ensure that necessary actions are taken to address any risks to 
achievement of the entity's objectives. Control activities occur throughout the
organization at all levels and in all functions. Professional standards on internal
control tend to view control activities as consisting of two parts: one policy part that
outlines the control objective and what should be done (i.e., describing the design of
the control) and one procedure part that implements the policy (i.e., the actual
performance of the control) (Arwinge 2010, 68). The COSO principles for control
activities are:
10. The organization selects and develops control activities that contribute to
the mitigation of risks to the achievement of objectives to acceptable
levels.
11. The organization selects and develops general control activities over
technology to support the achievement of objectives.
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
12. The organization deploys control activities through policies that establish
what is expected and in procedures that put policies into action.
In general management control research, the control activities are sometimes
referred to as administrative controls to which standard operating procedures and
rules, for example, have been included (see, e.g., Langfield-Smith 1997, 208). These
controls are also referred as feedforward in nature (ex-ante controls), which states
what should be done, i.e., serve as guidance for future organizational behavior.
Feedback controls, such as different types of monitoring controls, are in turn often
considered as being vital, supplementary controls to more detailed control activities
(Arwinge 2010, 68).
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 82), most internal controls fall
into the category of what they call behavioral constraints, which are one form of action 
controls. An example of a behavioral constraint is the segregation of duties, which 
aims to prevent employees from doing things that should not be done. The constraints
can be applied physically or administratively. Based on the COSO definition, internal
control could, in fact, be any of the action controls12 (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016),
covering also pre-action reviews (approving or disapproving proposed actions), action 
accountability (holding employees accountable for the actions they take) and 
redundancy (having backup employees or equipment available). All of the action
controls contribute to making it more likely that employees act in their organization’s
best interest (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 80-82).
Based on COSO, control activities contribute to mitigating and keeping the risks
to the achievement of objectives to an acceptable level. Control activities include a
range of diverse activities, such as approvals, authorizations, verifications,
reconciliations, reviews of operating performance, physical controls such as the
physical security of assets or access to assets, and segregation of duties. All of these
measures fall into Simons'  internal control definition (1995). According to COSO,
a company should select and develop control activities, including general controls
over technology, and deploy those controls through policies and procedures. 
Internal control comprises a series of actions that are integrated with business
activities and conducted throughout the organizational units and functions.
Furthermore, Porter (1985, 46) divides business activities into primary activities that
generate value, such as inbound logistics, operations, and sales, and secondary
activities, such as human resource management, infrastructure and procurement that
support the primary activities. The operations, reporting, and compliance aspects
promoted by COSO are integrated within all these primary and secondary activities.
Thus, the comprehensive view suggests that internal control is not just part of finance
Action controls are defined in Chapter 2.5.1 in more detail.12 
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and accounting, as the limited view claims, but is part of any other activity such as
marketing and sales, logistics and technology development (Pfister 2009, 21-22).
The comprehensive view supports the idea that internal control is not an
exclusive function of the board, executives, senior finance managers or internal and 
external auditors but of all the people in the organization. According to COSO (1994,
89):“Virtually all employees play some role in effecting control. They may produce
information used in the system of internal control – for example, inventory records,
work- in-process data, sales or expenses reports – or take other actions needed to
effect control. These actions may include performing reconciliations, following up
on exception reports, performing physical inspections or investigating reasons for
cost variances or other performance indicators. The care with which those activities 
are performed directly affects the effectiveness of the system of internal control.”
Based on that and with the comprehensive view of internal control, the control
activities should be viewed as covering any of the business processes, and those are
applicable to all of the employees. Thus, the perspective is wider than Simons’ idea
(1995, 85, 181), according to which internal control relies on staff professionals,
such as trained accountants, who typically install and maintain controls, which are
then periodically evaluated by internal and external auditors.
Information and communication
According to Simons (1995), internal controls are designed to ensure that accounting 
records and information systems are reliable. This idea is also included in the COSO
definition, which states that information systems play a key role in systems of
internal control, because they produce reports, including operational, financial and 
compliance-related information, which enable management to run and control the
business. In other words, internal control prepares the information for management
decision processes and impacts the decisions made by management.
People’s ability to fulfill their responsibility and make adequate decisions relies
significantly on the quality of the information they receive. Sunder (1997, 56)
emphasizes that management depends on the information people share within the
organization. It is people’s own decisions about which information they are willing 
to share and how accurately and truthfully they share it. In contrast, an organization
can easily go in the wrong direction if the information people receive is incomplete,
incorrect or manipulated. Thus, effective internal control provides people in the
organization with appropriate, timely, accurate and accessible information. As such,
COSO also promotes effective communication, which must ensure that information 
flows down, across and up the organization. Effective communication should also
be ensured with external parties, such as customers, suppliers, regulators and
shareholders. 
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
The COSO principles for information and communication are:
13. The organization obtains or generates and uses relevant, quality 
information to support the functioning of internal control.
14. The organization internally communicates information, including
objectives and responsibilities for internal control, necessary to support
the functioning of internal control.
15. The organization communicates with external parties regarding matters
affecting the functioning of internal control.
In general, the importance of information and communication and the must to
produce relevant, timely and reliable information for decision-making purposes
specifically through information-based systems is a fundamental concept of any
management accounting and management control (see, e.g., Johnson & Kaplan 
1987; Simons 1990, 1991 and 1995; Langfield-Smith 1997; Otley 1980, 1994, 1999,
2003 and 2008; Chenhall 2003). The control system in this context is often defined
as a normative information feedback system (Simons 1991, 49) in which control
systems deliver information that managers depend on when making informed
decisions based on feedback on actual performance and the established
organizational objectives. Simons (1991, 49) defines a management control system
as "the formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain
or alter patterns in organizational activities" - thus highlighting the importance of
information-based routines and the communicative elements of these processes.
From a financial reporting perspective, financial transactions and other types of
information must be accurately recorded and distributed through information
systems. Methods and systems used in the company must ensure that financial data
and transactions are valid, timely recorded, properly classified, valued and comply 
with generally accepted accounting standards. Furthermore, from a broader
perspective, however, methods and systems used should also enable managers and
staff to understand and execute other internal control components (Arwinge 2010,
70). Information must be identified, captured, distributed and used in the
organization so that people are able to complete their internal control responsibilities.
Thus, various types of internal information systems and reporting methods should
support the understanding of processes, controls, tasks and individual
responsibilities (COSO 2004, 11). The information and communication systems are
vital if relevant information is to be captured, distributed and acted upon in a cost-
effective manner (Arwinge 2010, 70).
One of the key elements of Principle 14 is the need for separate reporting lines
for employees to communicate about potential misconduct. As these so-called
whistleblower channels have become more popular in organizations as a method to
detect fraud and misconduct, they have also gained increased attention in the
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academic field (see, e.g., Lee & Fargher 2013; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran
2005; Miceli, Near and Dworkin 2009; Dyck, Morse and Zingales 2010; Bowen,
Andrew and Raigopal 2010). Most research on whistle blowing has focused on who
the whistleblowers are, individual reporting intentions, the effectiveness of whistle-
blowing systems, and the consequences of whistleblowing. Lee and Fargher (2013)
studied variation in the extent of whistleblowing disclosures. As a measure of
whistleblowing implementation, they further examined the provision of a hotline
channel. Their results suggest that the extent of whistle-blowing disclosures is
positively associated with the permissibility of anonymous reporting and 
organizational support for whistle blowing. This is a direct link towards the control
environment, which should – when functioning effectively – support a culture in 
which speaking up is allowed and supported without a fear of retaliation. 
Monitoring activities
Systems of internal control must be monitored though a process that assesses the
quality of the system's performance over time. This is accomplished through ongoing 
monitoring activities or separate evaluations, as defined by COSO. Internal control
deficiencies detected through these monitoring activities should be evaluated and 
communicated further, and corrective actions should be taken to ensure the
continuous improvement of the system. 
The COSO principles are:
16. The organization selects, develops, and performs ongoing and/or separate
evaluations to ascertain whether the components of internal control are
present and functioning.
17. The organization evaluates and communicates internal control
deficiencies in a timely manner to those parties responsible for taking
corrective action, including senior management and the board of directors,
as appropriate.
The evaluation and reporting of internal controls is one of the most frequently
occurring themes in existing research on internal controls. Evaluation of internal
controls was seen traditionally as part of the auditing process (see, e.g., Simons
1995), but today management is also paying increasing attention to it (see, e.g.,
Mock, Sun, Srivastava and Vasarhelyi 2009). This is natural, as the ultimate
responsibility for the system of internal control lies within management.
The assessment of internal control is a result of testing the effectiveness of the
controls and of the auditor’s professional judgment. After the establishment of SOX, 
the assessment is no longer performed only by internal or external auditors, but is
also performed by corporate management, because section 404 of SOX requires
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annual companies’ reports to include management’s assessment of the effectiveness
of their internal controls and procedures for financial reporting. The annual report
must report all material weaknesses discovered during the assessments. In addition
to the management assessment of internal control, all managers within an
organization should take seriously their management oversight role. This means that
managers should not only rely on the technical controls to provide safeguards, but
they should also oversee their subordinates’ transactions themselves. More
importantly, they should also lead by example to set the standards of social control. 
Both qualitative and quantitative methods exist for evaluating internal controls. 
In addition to the quantitative methods such as statistical analysis, auditors have also
adopted qualitative methods for evaluation purposes, such as questionnaires,
checklists, flow charts, and tests of transactions (Mock et al. 2009, 66). Different
methods for documenting internal control evidence, such as narratives, checklists,
questionnaires or flowcharts, may emphasize different aspects of the system of
internal control (Bierstaker 2003; 91) and should be used in addition to transactional
tests. However, auditors are often reminded not to solely rely on standardized 
checklists when evaluating internal controls to avoid “check the box mentality”
(Bierstaker & Thibodeau 2006, 878).
Monitoring activities should provide management information on whether the 
internal controls are functioning as they should. Companies exposed to fraud have
often been associated with inadequate internal controls (Fagerberg 2008, 58). 
Opportunity-related reasons for committing fraud include insufficient controls,
external collaboration, management override, internal collaboration, anonymity
within the company and foreign business customers (Fagerberg 2008, 45). Signs of
weak internal controls include lack of integrity and ignoring ethical values, a weak
control environment, failure to link top-level objectives with objectives for the
operating and support units, poor communication within the organization and an
inability to understand and react to changing conditions (Fagerberg 2008, 46). Often
only the awareness of the internal controls being in place in the organization reduces
the risk of someone committing fraud. In other words, personnel are less likely to
conduct any suspicious behavior when they know that somebody is watching (Wells
2002).
O’Leary, Iselin and Sharma (2006) suggest that a weakness in the control
environment elements appears to have the most significant effect on overall
evaluation of internal control, as that impacts upon evaluations of all other elements
as well. The traditional view of auditing has been to ensure the effectiveness of the
controls over financial accounting, so a risk exists of ending up in a false conclusion
on the overall effectiveness of internal control when the evaluation of the control
environment is neglected. This is why, again, the need for including social control
within the scope of internal control is essential. 
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Reflection
Simons’ (1995, 181) limited view of internal control sees internal controls as being 
focused on ensuring that accounting records and information systems are reliable.
COSO’s (2013) wider definition considers many other organizational measures to 
be part of systems of internal control, too. For example, whereas Simons (1995, 42)
lists codes of conduct as being the most basic forms of boundary systems, COSO
(2013) sees the code of conduct, tone at the top and the commitment to ethical
standards as being the basic foundation for internal control. Merchant and Van der
Stede (2016) view tone at the top as being part of the social controls, whereas they
note (see, e.g., 2016, 87) that internal controls are mainly action controls, such as
physical or administrative behavioral constraints. However, they do not make a clear
distinction on the difference between internal and management controls. In a broad
sense, it can be argued that a wide range of organizational measures contribute to
internal control as defined by COSO framework. Thus, many features provided by
the wider definition of internal control could be viewed as important components of
any management control system.
A challenge with this wider definition of internal control is that the boundaries
of internal control remain unclear (Maijoor 2000, 105; Spira & Page 2003; Woods
2009, 69). Having said that, it should be emphasized that a crucial element in
effective internal control is paying attention to social control. Several accounting
fraud cases suggest that leadership has a strong impact on unethical financial
reporting (see, e.g., Mihajlov & Miller 2012; Tourish & Vatcha 2005). Patelli and 
Pedrini (2015, 3) argue that its leaders instill ethical attentiveness throughout an
organization. Hence, leadership traits can craft an environment characterized by
either integrity or unethical practices. By analyzing the language used in CEO letters
and financial reporting aggressiveness, Patelli and Pedrini (2015, 3) tested whether
specific leadership traits are associated with unethical accounting practices. They
found that aggressive financial reporting is positively associated with CEO letters
using language that is resolute, complex, and not engaging. This empirical finding
highlights the importance of the role of tone at the top in influencing accounting
practices, providing more support for the idea that social control matters. 
Rae and Subramaniam (2008, 104) argue that the quality of internal control
procedures has a moderating effect on the relationship between perceptions of
organizational justice and employee fraud. Furthermore, they claim that internal
control procedure quality is significantly and positively related to three key
organizational factors: the corporate ethical environment, the extent of risk
management training of staff, and the internal audit activity level. The study by 
Ziegenfuss (2001, 322) also corroborates the claim that the strength of an
organization’s internal control structure and, principally, its control environment is
negatively related to its incidence of fraud. This means that the technical controls
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performed by the accounting professionals (Simons 1995) are not enough to prevent
fraud but that we should also pay attention to the control environment and training 
of the employees outside the finance and accounting departments. 
2.2.3 Conceptualizing internal control in this study
The five internal control components based on COSO are tightly interrelated and are
essential for achieving an effective system of internal control. Understanding these
components and the relations among them is one of the most important
considerations in the framework (Ramos 2004, 30). However, prior research has
mainly focused on examining only particular elements of COSO, such as the control
environment (D'Aquila 1998; Patelli & Pedrini 2015; Ziegenfuss 2001), control
activities (Barra 2010), communication (Hooks, Kaplan and Schultz 1994) or risk 
assessment (Mills 1997). So far only a few studies have considered all five
components of internal control (see Stringer & Carey 2002 and Jokipii 2006).
An effective system of internal control builds on the combination of all the five
interrelated components, so it is important to conduct more studies that take into
consideration all the five components and interactions among them. This study will
address this gap and consider internal control from the comprehensive view (c.f.
Arwinge 2010; Pfister 2009). This means that we recognize that internal control is
not just about manual checks and procedures, such as fulfilling required manuals and
forms. Equally important, it is also about how people conduct internal control – how
they design, implement, maintain and monitor control as part of their day-to-day 
activities (c.f. Pfister 2009, 22). Most importantly, if the social controls do not the
support the idea of the technical controls, it is more likely that the controls will not
provide the intended benefits, such as helping to meet the operations, reporting and
compliance objectives.
Table 5 summarizes the key differences between the limited and comprehensive
views of internal control, which this chapter covered and discussed comprehensively
earlier. Though internal controls and its different components have been in the scope
of various studies as earlier described, the uniqueness of this study is to address the
concept of internal control through this comprehensive view and via in-depth case 
study and to acknowledge the interrelations between the technical and social
components of internal control.
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Table 5. Summary of the limited and comprehensive views of internal control
CONTROL
ENVIRONMENT
Active audit committee and 
defined levels of authorizations 
represent the structural
safeguards on internal control.
Internal control relies on staff
professionals, such as trained 
accountants.
In addition to formal structures, such as 
an audit committee, informal structures 
(i.e., how managers act and talk) are
needed. The tone at the top that supports
integrity and ethical values is the 
foundation for an effective internal control
system. Instead of relying only on finance
and control professionals, internal control
is about demonstrating commitment to a 
competent workforce in all key positions.
All people within an organization should 
be held accountable for internal control.
CONTROL
ACTIVITIES
Internal control is primarily
related to financial controls,
controls that are in place to
safeguard assets and ensure 
financial reporting quality, such 
as segregation of duties,
restricted access to assets and 
account reconciliations.
Control activities do not only relate to 
financial controls but should be viewed as 
covering any of the business processes,
which are applicable to all employees.
INFORMATION 
AND 
COMMUNICATION
System safeguards include
adequate documentation and
audit trail and relevant and
timely management reporting.
From a financial reporting
perspective, financial
transactions and other types of
information must be accurately
recorded and distributed
through information systems.
Methods and systems used in 
the company must ensure that
financial data and transactions 
are valid, timely recorded,
properly classified, valued and 
comply with generally accepted 
accounting standards.
From a broader perspective, methods and
systems used should also enable 
managers and staff to understand and 
execute other internal control components
than accounting controls. Information
must be identified, captured, distributed
and used in the organization so that
people are able to complete their internal
control responsibilities. Thus, various
types of internal information systems and
reporting methods should support the
understanding of processes, controls,
tasks and individual responsibilities. The
control training should focus not only on 
the accounting and audit profession but
also on any business process owners and 
persons responsible for performing 
controls.
MONITORING
ACTIVITIES
The internal audit function 
evaluates the controls installed
and maintained by the trained 
accountants.
Separate evaluation of controls is not only 
the job of an audit function; managers
should also consider other evaluations. In 
addition to separate audits, internal
COMPONENTS 
OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL
RISK 
ASSESSMENT
LIMITED VIEW OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL
Internal controls are the 
primary means for detecting
and preventing the risk of fraud
and errors.
COMPREHENSIVE VIEW OF INTERNAL 
CONTROL
Internal control is about managing any
risk related to operational, reporting and 
compliance objectives, including the risk 
of fraud and errors. 
controls should be monitored
continuously.
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To summarize, internal control must be addressed from the comprehensive view
to profoundly understand the interrelations within the different aspects of control.
Internal control is not just about technical control, such as checks and balances to
ensure the integrity of the reported data, nor it is just a job of the finance and
accounting department. Internal control is a responsibility of all employees within
an organization, especially the managers. A risk exists of underestimating the role of
the social part of the control, which deals largely with the organizational culture, by
looking at internal control purely from the accounting controls and safeguard 
perspective. According to Pfister (2009, 22), organizational culture represents the
common understanding among organizational members on how controls must be
performed in an organizational setting. Thus, to study internal control, we must
understand not only the technical part of the control, but also the social context where
the technical controls are supposed to be performed by the employees. Looking at
these two elements – social and technical controls - and their interrelations will 
provide a fresh and holistic perspective to study internal control.
2.3 The relationship between internal control and 
management control
COSO more or less takes into account all of the different elements of control. Thus,
the wider definition of internal control overlaps in many ways with the general
definition of management control (see, e.g., Chenhall 2003; Eisenhardt 1985;
Langfield-Smith 1997; Otley 1994, 1999, 2003, 2008; Ouchi 1979, 1980; Simons
1990, 1991, 1995). However, internal control has many features that distinguishes it
from the general management control definition (Arwinge 2010, 111). 
One of these features is the strong focus on the corporate governance perspective
in which internal control is regarded as a fundamental defense mechanism against
downside risk (see Rae & Subramaniam 2008, 106). Thus, internal control holds an 
explicit relationship to risk: Internal control forms part of a formal system of risk 
responses to ensure that risk is effectively treated (Arwinge 2014, 34). Internal
control specifically aims to manage the risks involved in achieving the objectives 
related to efficiency and effectiveness of operations, financial and non-financial 
reporting and compliance with laws and regulations (COSO 2013). 
One of the core features of internal control is also the concept of reasonable
assurance (Pfister 2009, 30). Due to their inherent limitations, internal controls may
only provide reasonable assurance and not absolute assurance. Flaws in the design,
implementation and maintenance of controls generally lead to a risk, which can never
be eliminated, simply because no perfect control systems exist. People in charge can
make errors or commit fraud, and they must consider relative cost and benefit when
designing and executing internal control (Pfister 2009, 30).
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Lastly, internal control differs from management control because it is not about
management decisions itself. A useful way to address this is the illustration provided
by Pfister (2009, 24) which demonstrates the interrelation of strategic control,
management control and internal control based on Simons’ original model (see
Figure 5). However, what’s worth noticing is that this figure relies on the limited
view of IC, isolating IC from management control.
Figure 5. Interrelation of strategic control, management control and internal control, based on the
limited view of IC. Pfister (2009, 23), adapted from Simons (1995, 128)
According to Pfister’s (2009, 23-24) illustration, internal control is shown at the
bottom of the figure as the foundation of all other control systems. Internal control
provides reasonable assurance that information on which any system in the
organization builds is reliable and that assets are being protected. The information 
quality provided by internal control enters into strategic and management control
systems and builds the foundation for any formal and informal strategic and
management control decision. As such, internal control, management control and
strategic control interrelate (gray arrows in figure 5). This idea is built on the basis
of Simons’ limited view for internal control, which separates strategic control,
management control and internal control into isolated boxes. Based on the
comprehensive view for internal control (Chapter 2.2.2), the boxes for management
control and internal controls should not only interrelate, but remarkably overlap, as
many organizational controls can be put under both of these definitions. With the
comprehensive view, the definition for internal control also goes beyond the
information quality assurance and protection of assets. Balakrishnan, Matsumura
and Ramamoorti (2019) identified areas in which the generally known internal
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
control, risk management and management control frameworks13 overlap. Their
analysis showed that the internal control and risk management frameworks are
largely overlapping with management control frameworks and their use promotes an 
integrated view of organizational control and aids assessment of the efficacy of a
firm’s control over its strategic and operational processes. Their view supports the
idea that internal controls should not be viewed only through the controls over
financial reporting, but also as a way to achieve organizational objectives that go
beyond compliance.
Management decision processes are part of strategic control and management
control. According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 8), strategic management
control involves managers addressing questions such as “is our strategy still valid,
and if not, how it should be changed?”. Management control focuses on execution
and involves addressing the general questions, such as “are our employees likely to
behave appropriately?”. Whereas strategic management control deals with issues 
external to the organization (they examine industry and their organization’s place in
it), managers addressing management control issues, conversely, have primarily an
internal focus: They reflect on how they can influence their employees’ behaviors’
in desired ways (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 9). 
Different aspects of internal control are similarly discussed in strategic and
management control. Internal control provides organizational decision makers with 
information so they can choose among alternatives that are best for the achievement
of their organizational objectives. For example, a due diligence check of a new sales
agent (example of an internal control) can provide supporting information for
management on the potential risks involved with this particular agent. However, it is
a management decision whether to enter the business relationship with this agent or
not. In other words, internal control cannot prevent the taking of strategic and
operational decisions that are, in retrospect, incorrect (CoCo 1995, 5). Thus,
management’s decisions to act and what actions to take are outside of internal
control. 
2.4 Sarbanes-Oxley legislation
This study occurs in the context of SOX project implementation. Thus, this chapter
introduces the legislation’s background and the most important provisions of SOX. 
It will also address the questions that relate to the consequences of SOX, dealing
with both its benefits and costs.
13 COSO Internal Control Integrated Framework (2013), COSO Enterprise Risk 
Management Integrated Framework (2017) and Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control
Framework
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2.4.1 Background of SOX
At the beginning of this century, the world economic system witnessed in monetary 
terms the largest dollar level of fraud, accounting manipulations and unethical
behavior in corporate history (see, e.g., Rockness & Rockness 2005, 31–35). These
corporate scandals showed significant internal control failures associated with
fraudulent financial statements, which led the regulators to put a major focus on 
internal control. As a result, the U.S. government established the Sarbanes-Oxley 
(SOX) Act of 2002. All companies whose securities are listed under the SEC14 must 
comply with SOX. In practice this means all of the companies listed in the U.S., 
including their foreign filers.
The initiators of SOX required significant improvements in the corporate
governance and control of public registrants. SOX addresses the duties of the CEO, 
CFO, and auditors and makes management personally responsible for ensuring the 
credibility of the financial reporting to stakeholders. Misleading information, when
and if discovered, carries stiff penalties for the CEO, CFO, and auditors.
SOX has introduced a number of changes that were to have considerable impact
on the accounting profession (see, e.g., Yakhou & Dorweiler 2004). Many practice-
led manuals and methods for dealing with the SOX requirements were introduced
after the establishment of the legislation (see, e.g., Marchetti 2007; Moeller 2008;
Ramos 2008a; Ramos 2008b). While this practice-oriented literature deals with SOX
implementation, the academic research has been more focused on the outcomes of
SOX, such as firms’ going-private decisions in response to the passage of SOX
(Engel, Hayes and Wang 2007), financial consequences brought by SOX (see, e.g.,
Zhang 2005 and Leuz 2007), or the internal control weaknesses reported in financial
statements (see, e.g., Canada, Dixon, Sutton and Kuhn 2009; Chan et al. 2009;
Doyle, Ge and McVay 2007).
The next subchapters will provide a brief account of the Act's internal control
requirements.
2.4.2 Corporate responsibility for financial reports
Section 302 of SOX requires that CEOs and CFOs personally certify the accuracy of
financial statements and disclosures in the periodic reports and that those statements
fairly present in all material aspects the results of operations and financial condition
of the company. Furthermore, the executives must certify that financial controls and
procedures have been implemented and evaluated and that any changes to the system
of internal control since the previous quarter have been noted.
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission14 
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Theoretical and conceptual foundations
Section 906 of SOX requires CEOs and CFOs to sign and certify the report
containing financial statements; they must confirm that the document complies with
SEC reporting requirements and fairly represents the company’s financial condition
and results. Willful failure to comply with this requirement can result in fines of up
to $5 million and imprisonment for up to 20 years. 
2.4.3 Management assessment and auditor attestation
requirements
Section 404 of SOX deals with management’s assessment of the entity’s internal
control over financial reporting15 (ICOFR). It requires each organization’s annual
report to contain an ‘internal control report’ that should include the following:
• a statement acknowledging responsibility for establishing and
maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting
• a statement identifying the internal-control framework used to evaluate
the effectiveness of internal control over financial reporting 
• an assessment of the effectiveness of the company’s internal control over
financial reporting as of the end of the most recent fiscal year
• disclosure of any material weaknesses16 in the company’s internal control
over financial reporting (if any material weaknesses exist, then internal
control over financial reporting is deemed ineffective)
• a statement that the independent auditor has issued a report on the
company’s assessment of internal control over financial reporting.
Section 404 prescribes that the external auditors are required to assess and report
on both management’s assessment of the ICOFR and the operating effectiveness of
the ICOFR. This attestation is required to be in accordance with the standards for
attestation engagements issued by the PCAOB17. The auditor’s report must include
the disclosure of any material internal control weaknesses and any procedures and
corrective actions taken regarding the weaknesses. When one or more material
internal control weaknesses exist, the auditor is required to issue an adverse opinion
on the effectiveness of internal controls. 
15 Thus, excluding controls related to other internal control objectives.
16 A material weakness is a deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal
control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material
misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial statements will not be
prevented or detected on a timely basis.” (PCAOB 2007).
17 Public Company Accounting Oversight Board is a private, nonprofit corporation
created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 to oversee the auditors of public companies.
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The management assessment and auditor attestation have brought rather
extensive requirements for companies. They have really put the spotlight on the
company's systems of internal control and whether or not those systems were
operating effectively (Arwinge 2010, 89). In practice the implementation of SOX
requirements has meant that companies have had to identify, document and assess
their systems of internal control. As a result, the evaluation process has led to
improvements in technical controls such as reconciliations and segregation of duties
(Rittenberg & Miller 2005). For most companies this has been a major program, 
because previously the internal controls and related processes may have not been
adequately documented or evaluated. Furthermore, although requirements for firms
to maintain adequate systems of internal control date back to the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977, not until the establishment of SOX Section 404 has the
disclosure of material internal control weaknesses in the annual report been a
mandatory requirement for publicly traded firms.
Implementing provisions of Section 404 has also dramatically increased the time
and amount of work it takes to complete an external audit (Jiang, Rupley and Wu
2010, 41). Not only do public companies pay high prices for audits, but they also
must purchase or create internal control software, create an internal control plan and
track and review their internal performance. Penalties for non-compliance can be
extensive.
Krishnan and Visvanathan (2007) studied the role of audit committees and
auditors in the reporting of internal control deficiencies after the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. They conclude that a higher number of meetings of the audit
committee, lesser proportion of financial experts in the audit committee, and more
auditor changes characterize firms that report weaknesses in their internal controls
compared to firms with no weaknesses.
The announcement of a material weakness in systems of internal control has been
associated with drops in stock price, increased share volume, and even some CFOs 
losing their jobs (Durfee 2005). Zhang, Zhou and Zhou (2007) argue that firms are
more likely to be identified with an internal control term weakness if their audit
committees have less financial expertise or, more specifically, have less accounting
financial expertise and non-accounting financial expertise. Furthermore, they are 
also more likely to be identified with an internal control weakness if their auditors
are more independent or in case of recent auditor changes. Doyle et al. (2007) suggest
that material weaknesses in internal controls are more likely for firms that are
smaller, younger, financially weaker, more complex, growing rapidly, and/or
undergoing restructuring. These firm-specific characteristics seem to create
challenges for companies in maintaining strong internal controls.
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2.4.4 The consequences of SOX
The purpose behind SOX was to introduce significant reforms in the corporate
governance, accounting, auditing, and reporting environment of publicly traded
firms (He & Ho 2011, 624). The most visible and expensive step of SOX has been
the requirement for companies to identify and disclose weaknesses in their systems
of internal control, as stated in Section 404 (Ockree & Martin 2009, 42). SOX has
been argued to be the most significant legislation affecting the U.S. securities
markets since 1930s when the Securities Act was established (Banham 2003;
Coustan, Leinicke, Rexroad and Ostrosky 2004, 43). 
The requirements of Section 404 have had a dramatic impact on the internal
control practices of firms worldwide (Ge & McVay 2005; Krishnan, Rama and
Zhang 2008; Patterson & Smith 2007; Rittenberg & Miller 2005; Tackett, Wolf and
Claypool 2004) and have also generated a substantial amount of research (see
DeFond & Francis 2005). However, Heier et al. (2005, 39) have argued that SOX
may be simply one of many developments in the evolution of internal control theory
and practice that has occurred over the previous century.
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been widely discussed since it was established.
The supporters see the Act as a necessary reaction to gain the public trust in financial
reporting. SOX proponents have asserted that increased disclosure requirements and 
stiffer penalties for corporate malfeasance will lead to greater transparency, and thus
create gains for investors (Engel et al. 2007, 117). 
Opponents argue instead that SOX imposes substantial compliance costs and
unduly raises the cost of being a public entity, which harms the competitiveness of
U.S. capital markets (Ball 2009; Engel et al. 2007; Zhang 2007). The critics believe
that SOX does more economic damages than it prevents: One of the most criticized 
issues has been the cost effects of implementing the internal control requirements
required by SOX. 
Rittenberg and Miller (2005) surveyed the costs and benefits associated with
Section 404 work. The results suggest that SOX has brought the following
improvements:  
• A more engaged control environment with active participation from the
board, audit committee and management.
• More thoughtful analysis of monitoring controls.
• More structure to the year-end closing process and recording of journal
entries.
• Implementation of anti-fraud controls with defined processes.
• Better understanding of the risks associated with general computer
controls.  
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• Improved documentation of controls and control processes.
• Improved definition of controls, and the relationship of risks and controls.
Improvement in audit trail.
• Control concepts more embedded in organizations.
• Re-implementation of basic controls which have been previously eroded. 
Many studies also focus on the stock market’s reactions to the internal control
certification reports required by SOX, such as disclosure of internal control
deficiencies or management certification of internal control efficiency (see, e.g.,
Hammersley et al. 2008; Kim & Park 2009; Li, Pincus and Rego 2008; Litvak 2007;
Ockree & Martin 2009; Zhang 2007). 
The investors’ reactions have also been studied under the internal control
reporting (ICR) requirements imposed by SOX. Zolnor (2009) argues that US
investors continue to invest in foreign markets despite the fact that those markets
maintain less demanding ICR requirements than those required by Section 404. 
Moreover, investors do not respond negatively to Section 404 disclosures. Zolnor
(2009) believes that Section 404 does not provide useful information to investors.
According to him, considering Section 404's ineffectiveness and the burdensome
costs it imposes on reporting companies, it is clear that Section 404 is an example of
over-regulation and should be repealed.
Critics suggest that the costs of complying with SOX requirements will dwarf
the benefits for smaller companies (Engel, Hayes and Wang 2004, 117). For
example, Section 404’s requirements are designed to apply to all public companies, 
regardless of their size. Many negative impacts occur as a result. Kamar, Pinar and
Talley (2008), for example, found that compliance costs are so high that it induced
many small firms to exit the public market during the year after its enactment. Engel
et al. (2007) argue that firms go private in response to SOX only if the SOX-imposed 
costs to the firm exceed the SOX-induced benefits to shareholders, and this
difference swamps the net benefit of being a public firm prior to the passage of SOX.
To summarize the cost and benefits of SOX: Both the opponents and critics of
the legislation have well-grounded arguments. SOX has been proven to increase the
transparency and oversight over public firms’ internal controls, but it also has
imposed larger costs on them. But is the legislation’s effectiveness unquestionable?
2.4.5 Relevance of SOX in this study
SOX provides an interesting context to study internal control. In Nokia, it was the
force that triggered the systematic development of internal control system. But does
the implementation of SOX result in more effective internal control? If companies
comply with SOX only superficially, the expensive internal control mechanisms may
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not necessarily bring substantial improvement to the effectiveness of the corporate
governance system. For example, Sonnenfeld (2002) pointed out that Enron had
appropriate financial competences and expertise on its board and its audit committee.
In other words, the board and its audit committee met all the standards but were still
unable to prevent the massive accounting fraud. Similarly, Forster, Loughran and
McDonald (2009) found that the code of ethics and code of conducts are essentially
identical in many S&P 500 companies. Is this the result of the fact that the
requirement of disclosing a code of ethics may only induce superficial adoption of
the code, while it may not achieve its desired result of promoting ethical behavior by
publicly traded firms? Thus, if a company makes only nominal changes in its internal
control designs but is unwilling to demonstrate the changes in the daily way of
working, this expensive compliance may have little effect in controlling managerial
malfeasance and safeguarding shareholder interests.
The preceding questions can be answered by looking at the controls from both
technical and social perspectives. Technical controls represent the adequate policies 
and procedures that companies must put in place when designing the system of
internal control. However, the social controls are indeed needed to ensure that these
controls will be enacted in the daily operations and become embedded in the
organizational culture. Without them, the adoption of the technical practices might
serve only as a symbolism rather than having any actual effects.
This study aims to learn how can an organization design and implement a system
of internal control to comply with SOX. To reach the formal compliance one must
create and establish a disciplined technical control system. However, as many recent
corporate scandals have taught us, we cannot ignore the role of the social control.
This study will consider both of these control types and their interrelations.
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2.5 The concepts of technical and social control
2.5.1 Technical controls
Understanding the interrelations between technical and social control is at the core
of this study. Thus, in this chapter we will define in more detail these two concepts
and their relationship to the comprehensive view on internal control. 
Technical controls are based on procedures, policies, rules and standards that
specify how tasks are to be performed and how individuals and groups are organized
(Malmi & Brown 2008; Simons 1995; Tessier & Otley 2012a). Technical controls
are embedded in the technology of work and govern day-to-day activities. These are
the more visible, objective components of the control system, and thus, the easiest
to research. Also, SOX emphasizes the importance of technical controls, and SOX
compliance assessments18 rely heavily on the results gained from assessing the
effectiveness of the technical controls.
Many of the technical controls fall under the definition of Merchant and Van der
Stede’s (2007, 2016) action controls, such as passwords and expense limits and some
personnel controls, such as job descriptions and procedure manuals. Furthermore, as
with goal setting, output controls, results controls and cybernetic controls can be 
classified as technical controls (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Macintosh 1994;
Merchant & Van der Stede 2007; Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180), since often they are
implemented through written procedures (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180). 
Action controls, as defined by Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 81), aim to
ensure that employees perform certain actions known to be beneficial to the
organization and that they do not perform certain actions known to be harmful to it.
Action controls are the most direct form of management control, because they
involve taking steps to ensure that employees act in the organization’s best interest
by making their actions themselves the focus of control. Action controls take any of
four basic forms: behavioral constraints, preaction reviews, action accountability, 
and redundancy. Most of these action controls fall under Simons’ definition of
internal control (1995, 181), because they aim to ensure the integrity of data,
safeguard assets from theft or accidental loss and ensure reliable accounting records
and financial information systems. As such, according to Merchant and Van der
Stede’s view (2016, 81) internal controls and management controls overlap. This is
According to SOX, all annual financial reports must include an Internal Control Report
stating that management is responsible for an adequate internal control and an
assessment by management of the effectiveness of the internal control over financial
reporting. Any shortcomings in these controls must also be reported.
18 
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different from Simons definition, according to which internal control system is
different from management control system. 
Behavioral constraints aim to prevent employees from doing things that should
not be done. The constraints can be applied physically or administratively. Physical
constraints include locks on desks, computer passwords, and limits on access to areas
where valuable inventories and sensitive information are kept. Administrative
constraints are used to place limits on an employee’s ability to perform all or a
portion of specific tasks or actions, such as restriction of decision-making authority. 
Managers at lower organizational levels may be allowed to approve expenditure of
up to $1.000, those at higher level up to $5.000, and so on. Another example of
administrative constraints is segregation of duties, which involves breaking up the
task necessary for the accomplishment of certain sensitive duties, thus making it
impossible, or more difficult, for one person to complete the entire task on their own.
Business critical duties are typically categorized into four types of functions:
authorization, custody, record keeping, and reconciliation. In a perfect system, no
one person should handle more than one type of function. (Merchant & Van der
Stede 2016, 81-83.)
Pre-action reviews involve the scrutiny of the action plans of the employees
being controlled. Reviewers can approve or disapprove the proposed actions, ask for
modifications, or ask for a more carefully considered plan before granting final
approval. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 83.) Planning and budgeting processes
are typical examples of pre-action reviews, and they also fall under the definition of
internal control. 
Action accountability involves holding employees accountable for the actions
they take. The implementation of action accountability requires (1) defining what
actions are acceptable or unacceptable; (2) communicating those definitions to 
employees; (3) observing or otherwise tracking what happens; and (4) rewarding
good actions or punishing actions that deviate from the acceptable. (Merchant & Van
der Stede 2016, 83-84.)
The actions for which employees are to be held accountable can be
communicated either administratively or socially. Administrative communication
takes the form of work rules, policies, and policies, contract provisions, and company 
codes of conduct. The importance of the procedures is reinforced through training
and examinations. The desired actions can also be communicated in oral form, e.g.,
face to face format. Sometimes the actions desired are not communicated in written
form at all; instead, individuals can be held accountable for their actions that involve
professional judgement, i.e., doctors, auditors and lawyers should act
“professionally.” (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 83-84.)
Although action accountability controls are most effective if the desired actions
are well communicated, communication is not sufficient by itself to make these
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controls effective. The affected individuals must understand what is required and be
confident that their actions will be noticed and rewarded or punished. Managers and 
supervisors are monitoring the actions of an employee to evaluate whether those are
acceptable. Internal audit is also examining the evidence about compliance with pre-
established action standards. According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 84),
action accountability is more implemented with negative enforcements by punishing
individuals for non-compliance rather than rewarding compliance. (Merchant & Van
der Stede 2016, 83-84.)
Redundancy involves assigning more employees or equipment to a task than is
strictly necessary or having backup employees or equipment available. It’s classified
in action controls, because it increases the possibility that a task will be satisfactorily
completed. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 84.)
Results controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016) are an indirect form of
control, because they do not focus explicitly on the employees’ actions. Pay for
performance is an example, because it involves rewarding employees for generating
good results. The challenge with this type of controls is that they may create greedy
and short-termism cultures. Results controls may easily lead into a situation in which
the rewards are given to the most talented and hardest working employees. Results
controls influence actions, because they cause employees to be concerned about the
consequences of their actions.
2.5.2 Social controls
Social controls represent the manageable aspect of organizational culture (Malmi &
Brown 2008, Merchant & Van der Stede 2007) and include all the “efforts to
persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms and ideas about what is good,
important, praiseworthy, etc. in terms of work and organizational life” (Alvesson &
Kärreman 2004, 426). Social controls appeal to the emotional, non-rational, affective
elements within employees (Ray 1986, 288); they include elements such as values,
beliefs, norms and symbols (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Simons 1995; Malmi &
Brown 2008; Schein 1992).
By acknowledging this non-rational element of social control, this study
considers that whether an individual will comply with a control requirement or not
is not always a result of a rational decision making. There might be some non-
rational elements involved in the decision to comply or not to comply. And these
may relate to emotions: It is evident from the literature that positive emotions play a
transformational effect, whereas negative emotions have an influential impact upon
decision making (Babin & Babin 1996; Bagozzi, Dholakia and Basuroy 2003;
Khodayari & Hanzaee 2011; Perugini & Conner 2000; Schlösser, Dunning and 
Fetchenhauer 2013). These self-conscious emotions and neutralization techniques
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(Sykes & Matza 1957) provide evidence of why people do not always act rationally.
Understanding how social controls may impact these emotions and neutralizations
will help us to understand how employees will perceive the controls and, ultimately,
how that might impact on their performance of the control.
The social form of control is based on the assumption that individuals do what is
best for the organization either because they are self-directed or because they are
influenced by social pressure. Social control is not often consciously designed,
because it is often derived from, or is an artifact of the organizational culture.
Managers use different ways to encourage and facilitate self-control and social
pressure by, for example, applying selection and placement, training, cultural
control, group-based rewards, and providing necessary resources (Merchant 1985,
40). Ouchi (1979) argued that in situations in which there is a low ability to measure
output and imperfect knowledge of the transformation system, the traditional control
measures of output and behavior are no longer sufficient. Social norms can substitute
for formal management systems by applying clan control.
The previously described action controls (i.e., technical controls) are commonly
used in organizations, but according to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 81), they
are only feasible when managers know what actions are (un)desirable and have the
ability to ensure that the (un)desirable actions (do not) occur. In addition to action 
controls, Merchant and Van der Stede (2016) have defined personnel and cultural 
controls, which are forms of social control. Personnel controls are designed to make
it more likely that employees will perform the desired tasks satisfactory on their own,
because the employees are experienced, honest, hard-working, and derive a sense of
self-realization and satisfaction from performing tasks well. Cultural controls exist
to shape organizational behavioral norms and to encourage employees to monitor
and influence each other’s behavior. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 81-88.)
Cultural controls are designed to encourage mutual monitoring, a powerful form of
group pressure on individuals who deviate from group norms and values. According
to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 90), organizational cultures can be shaped in 
many ways, both in words and by example. 
Personnel controls include selection and replacement, training, job design and
providing necessary resources. Employee selection and replacement means finding
the right people to do a particular job. Training is used to increase the likelihood that
employees act as expected; it can provide useful information about what actions are
expected and how employees should perform their duties. Proper job design allows 
motivated and qualified employees a high probability of success. Necessary
resources to do a good job may include information, equipment, supplies, staff
support, decision aids, or freedom from interruption.
Cultural controls include codes of conduct, group-based rewards, intra-
organizational transfers or employee rotation, physical and social arrangements and 
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tone at the top, which all are enacted to shape organizational culture (Merchant &
Van der Stede 2016, 90-94). Codes of conducts, codes of ethics, organizational
credos or statements of missions and visions are formal, written documents
providing broad statements of organizational values, commitments to stakeholders
and the ways in which the management would like the organization to function.
(Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 91.) They can take the form of a technical control
when they are enacted through a formal employment handbook, training course or
employee certification. They are typically embedded into the organizational culture
and leadership when applied via social control.
Group rewards are incentives based on collective achievement, which can
encourage creating of peer pressure on individual employees to exert themselves for
the good of the group. Intra-organizational transfers or employee rotation help 
transmit culture by improving the socialization of employees throughout the
organization, giving them a better appreciation of the problems faced by different
parts of the organization and inhibiting the formation of incompatible goals and
perspectives. Physical arrangements include office plans, architecture, and interior
design, whereas social arrangements may include dress codes, institutionalized
habits, behaviors and vocabulary (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 93). Finally, 
management can shape the culture by setting a proper tone at the top. This tone
derives from the words and actions taken by management to demonstrate the
expected behavior. Tone at the top is an integral part of the control environment as
defined by COSO (2013), forming the foundation for effective internal control.
2.5.3 The relationship of technical and social controls
As just described, managers have at their disposition two types of controls - technical
and social (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180). The degree of formalization of an
organization, as defined by Adler and Borys (1996), is based on the proportion of
social and technical controls that comprise the control systems. Chenhall and Morris
(1995, 487) argue that entrepreneurial organizations are likely to de-emphasize 
formal accounting control, while conservative entities place a heavier reliance on
formal accounting procedures.
While assessing the level of formalization could be done by simply listing what
technical and social controls the organization has in place, prior studies suggest that
the level of interaction between the two types of control is important and requires
more attention. For example, Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) find that social and
technical controls are tied rather than being substitutes, as Ouchi (1979, 1980)
argued. According to Alvesson and Kärreman (2004), technical controls
communicate ideals and have a strong symbolical content (social aspect), but they
are also influenced by the organization’s beliefs and norms of behavior. Moreover,
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Bartunek (1984) describes how social controls influence technical controls, and
Abernethy and Chua (1996) suggest that technical controls can help rationalize the
social components of the control package. 
Thus, it can be concluded that technical and social controls interrelate and should
not be considered isolated from each other. For example, the effectiveness of results
controls, such as ´pay for performance´, can be dependent on how the social controls
are applied in an organization: An organization’s culture may either encourage
employees to bend the rules to achieve the short term targets, or it can support
employees in situations in which doing the right thing could mean fewer profits in 
the short run. This all depends upon the way the technical controls are introduced to 
employees by management and how employees perceive them.
This interesting interrelation between technical and social control requires
further exploration; thus, it will be at the heart of this study. The objective is to better
understand how technical controls, as required by SOX, can be implemented via
applying various types of social control within internal control system. By 
understanding these interrelations, better insights may be gained into why certain
internal control implementation projects fail and some succeed. 
2.6 Relevant management control frameworks in 
this study
2.6.1 Background: Simons’ Levers of Control Framework
This chapter has already discussed the concepts of control systems and internal
control. Next, we will combine these two concepts closer together to analyze how
we can study internal control through the lenses of the management control literature.
One particularly suitable framework for this purpose is a framework developed by
Tessier and Otley (2012a). It is a revised version of the Simons’ Levers of Control
(LOC) framework (1995), which has been used frequently in the literature over the
years with over 4000 citations (Google Scholar 2019). 
The LOC framework originally addressed how strategy can be implemented
through formal control systems. According to Simons (1995), managers can use four
types of control systems, which he calls four levers of control (LOC): belief systems,
boundary systems, diagnostic control systems and interactive control systems.
• A belief system, as the first lever of control, represents a set of formal
definitions of the organizational values, purpose and direction of the
organization. These systems are communicated formally through
documents such as mission statements and statements of purpose. For
example, they address what level of performance is desired and how the
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organization wants to create relationships internally and externally. Belief
systems are used to inspire and guide the search for new opportunities.
• A boundary system, as the second lever of control, sets boundaries for the
acceptable domain of activities for organizational members. In contrast to
a belief system, a boundary system is used to set limits in the search for
new opportunities. Based on the business risks, boundary systems set
limits to both business conduct and strategy.
• A diagnostic control system, as the third lever of control, is used to
motivate, monitor, and reward the achievement of specified goals.
Diagnostic controls are the formal systems that managers apply to monitor
organizational outcomes and correct deviations from preset standards of
performance. They are used to ensure that everything is on track and no
surprises will occur.
• An interactive control system, as the fourth lever of control, is used to
stimulate organizational learning and the emergence of new ideas and
strategies. Managers involve themselves regularly and personally in the
decision activities of subordinates. By focusing on strategic uncertainties,
these formal information systems provide a bottom-up process to identify
opportunities and threats.
According to Simons (1995), these four levers of control can work
simultaneously to balance the organizational tensions, such as tension between
innovation and control, profitability and growth, between the goals of the
organization (the manager) and those of the employees, and between the opportunity 
to create value in a market and the limited amount of time and attention available to
managers. These tensions are managed by what Simons calls positive and negative
control systems. Managers must understand how these four types of systems should
be used and what purpose they serve. For example, while belief systems and
interactive control systems rely on the positive and inspirational forces, boundary
systems and diagnostic control systems build constraints and ensure compliance.
Simons also underlines the importance of explaining the interrelations of control
systems: “The power of the control levers does not lie in how each is used alone but
rather in how they complement each other when used together.”
Simons (1995, 177) suggests that internal control is different from the four basic
levers of the control system: This system does not relate directly to strategy
formation and implementation but is essential in any business in order to ensure that
assets are secure and management information reliable. Without this assurance,
managers cannot rely on the control levers. Arwinge (2010, 113) notes that since
Simons provided his definition over 20 years ago, the scope of internal control has
expanded, and internal control is no longer strictly limited to specific controls over
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financial assets and the accounting records but stretches over most of the
organizations business processes and objectives. Thus, in the light of the discussion 
in the chapter 2.2.2., the comprehensive view of internal control in fact overlaps with
many of the levers of control by Simons. 
The interrelations of Simons’ (1995) LOC and COSO Internal Control
frameworks were examined by Balakrishnan, Matsumura and Ramamoorti (2019).
The researchers mapped the points of focus in the 2013 COSO framework to the
principles articulated in the LOC. They were able to identify multiple areas in which 
the frameworks overlap. They also examined the extent to which the 2017 COSO
Enterprise Risk Management (ERM) Framework captures non-overlapping areas
between the 2013 COSO and the LOC. They concluded that together COSO IC and
ERM covered most of the aspects of LOC. COSO ERM (2004, 2017) Framework
highlights the importance of considering risk in both the strategy-setting process and 
in driving performance, whereas the COSO IC Framework, as an operational tool,
does not fully integrate the impact of strategy on controls. Taken together, the IC
Framework and the ERM framework appear to span controls in the context of
strategic, operational, financial, and compliance objectives and associated contexts.
Even so, their analysis shows that the LOC framework provides a complementary
and yet broader approach for understanding the linkages among cultural, operational,
and strategic controls.
The analysis of Balakrishnan et al. (2019) supports this study’s approach:
internal controls are not external to the four control levers; instead, these two are
strongly overlapping. This promotes an integrated view of organizational control. 
Thus, it should be acknowledged that the management control frameworks, such as
Simons’ LOC (1995) or Tessier and Otley (2012a), include many elements of
internal control. By understanding the overlap between COSO and LOC, a firm
could leverage the IC to implement a strategic control system. Such an expansion
means that efforts invested in satisfying SOX requirements are beneficial beyond
protecting the company from fraud, financial misreporting, legal liabilities, and 
misappropriation of assets.
Simons’ (1995) framework has many strengths, such as including different types
of controls and providing a broad perspective (Ferreira & Otley 2009). However, as
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 177) argued, several ambiguities exist regarding the levers
of control, mainly due to their vague definitions. Tessier and Otley (2012a) suggest
that the interactive controls concept should be divided into strategic performance
control systems and the interactive use of controls. Based on this, they suggest that
diagnostic and interactive controls should be considered not as control systems as
such but rather as descriptions of how controls can be used. Furthermore, they argue
that boundary control systems operate at two different organizational levels: strategic
boundaries and business conduct boundaries. 
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Tessier and Otley (2012a, 177) identified two important characteristics of control
systems emerging from the analysis of the just-listed ambiguities: objectives of
control (performance and compliance) and organizational level (operational and 
strategic). They also argued that belief and boundary control systems do not operate
at the same level of analysis. According to them, beliefs are a type of control that
can be used to manage both performance and compliance, whereas boundaries are a 
group of controls of different types (social/beliefs and technical) that are specifically
used to manage compliance. Based on their analyses, Tessier and Otley developed a 
revised framework for LOC (2012a), introduced in the following chapter.
2.6.2 Overview of the Tessier & Otley framework
Management control literature has been criticized for having ill-defined concepts, 
causing mixed empirical results and making it difficult to build a coherent body of
knowledge. For example, Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control, even though being one
of the most used frameworks, has been criticized for its vague concept definitions. 
Based on the ambiguities listed earlier, Tessier and Otley (2012a) addressed this
issue by presenting a revised version of Simons’ framework that improves on already 
well-known concepts (e.g., interactive and diagnostic) and explores less studied ones
(e.g., positive and negative dimensions of controls). 
The revised framework by Tessier and Otley (2012a) explicitly separates
managerial intentions for controls and employee perceptions of controls. Managerial
intentions comprise three levels: 1) types of controls (social and technical) 2) that
are organized as four control systems (strategic performance, operational
performance, strategic boundaries and operational boundaries) and 3) that can be
used diagnostically or interactively, have an enabling or constraining role and can 
lead to either reward or punishment. Figure 6 illustrates this framework.
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Figure 6. Tessier and Otley’s framework (2012a, 173), adapted from Simons’ (1995) LOC
framework
One criticism of Simons’ LOC framework has been that employees are 
considered to be rather passive actors: For example, Gray (1990, 147) noted already
in  199019 that ‘while he (Simons) acknowledges a role for debate over planning, and
budgets, the acceptance of strategic initiatives by middle and lower levels is taken
for granted.’ Thus, while the LOC framework explicitly takes the point of view of
managers and their attempt to manage their control package, it should be also 
considered how employees contribute to the design of these control systems. Thus,
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 182) suggest that the concepts of employee perceptions of
controls could be studied to understand what affects employees’ perceptions of
controls and the impact of these perceptions on organizational performance. Adler
and Borys (1996) also called for studies focusing on how controls are perceived. This
consideration is extremely relevant in internal control. Employee perceptions on 
internal control should not be overlooked, as they might have direct impact on how
effectively employees will eventually perform the controls.
Simons (1990) introduced the early version of this Levers of Control in 1990 in his
paper called “The role of management control systems in creating competitive
advantage: new perspectives.”
19 
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According to Tessier and Otley’s framework, managers have individual social
and technical controls at their disposition that they can use to comprise control
systems. These controls are themselves neutral (Tessier & Otley 2012a). Instead, the 
design of control systems and the way they are presented do influence how controls
are perceived by employees. Thus, employee attitudes towards controls can be
positive, neutral or negative. Tessier and Otley (2012a, 176) emphasize that
employee perceptions of controls must be considered separately, because they could
be different from managerial intentions. 
Although Tessier and Otley (2012a) illustrated the revised framework with some
examples from the field, their study was mostly conceptual and based only on prior 
literature. This study will use the Tessier & Otley (2012a) framework to explain the
interaction between technical and social controls. The next subchapters review the
elements of this framework.
2.6.3 Types of controls
Chapter 2.5 described how controls can be classified into technical and social
controls. This classification is also at the core of this study20. This study uses
Merchant and Van der Stede’s definition (2016) for personnel and cultural control,
which together forms a concept definition for social control. These controls include 
elements such as tone at the top, employee selection and job design, group rewards, 
informal communication, and social arrangements. 
This study’s definition of a technical control is that it is based on procedures,
policies, rules and standards that specify how tasks are to be performed and how
individuals and groups are organized (Malmi & Brown 2008, Tessier & Otley 2012a,
Simons 1995). Technical controls are embedded in the technology of work and
govern day-to-day activities. These are the more visible, objective components of
the control system, and thus, the easiest to research. Many of the technical controls
fall under the definition of action controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016), such 
as preaction reviews and behavioral constraints.
Within the context of the case analysis, in this study’s scope are the technical
controls that are identified as being part of the internal control system at Nokia.
Furthermore, the social controls at Nokia are limited to cover only the aspects
relevant in terms of introducing those technical controls. Thus, social control per se, 
is not in the interest of this study.
Other classifications have also been used in the literature, such as formal and
ideological control (Etzioni 1964; Kraus et al. 2017) or technocratic and socio-
ideological (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004) controls.
20 
84
  
 
  
  
      
   
     
    
 
   
    
   
  
    
   
      
  
 
      
      
    
  
  
   
        
   
   
  
     
     
    
 
        
    
       
   
 
 
 
    
     
Theoretical and conceptual foundations
2.6.4 Objectives of controls
The second level of the revised framework comprises different control systems that 
have a specific objective, incorporating four types of control system: operational
boundary, strategic boundary, operational performance and strategic performance
control systems. Simons (1995) refers to the operational boundaries also as business
conduct boundaries. Management control systems are defined as “systems, rules,
practices, values and other activities management put in place in order to direct
employee behavior” (Malmi & Brown 2008, 290). As such, the second level is
closely related to the first level of the framework, since the latter constitutes the
former, i.e., the four control systems are sets of social and technical controls. Figure
6 represents this by the four arrows connecting the two levels.
The boundary systems are based on risks to be avoided, so they are concerned
with compliance. The operational boundary control system is defined as the sets of
controls that inform employees of the limits imposed on their actions (Tessier &
Otley 2012a, 180). These sets of controls are concerned with setting limits at
organizations’ operational level, such as proscribing certain behaviors regarding 
day-to-day activities, e.g., conflict of interest, fraud and other actions that contravene
laws (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 178). These controls are, in fact, very close to the
definition of the control activities, as defined by COSO (2013). Operational
boundary controls can be communicated through social controls such as values and
codes of conduct or through technical controls, such as written rules and procedures. 
In addition to communicating internal organizational limits, they can also address
limits established by the industry or society in which the organization evolves (for
more detail, see Simons 1995, 42-47). Strategic boundaries are sets of controls that
inform employees of the acceptable domain of opportunity seeking at the strategic
level (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180). For example, an organization could use a traffic
light system to inform employees whether they should go ahead with a project
(green), put the project on hold (yellow) or abandon the project (red). Tessier &
Otley (2012a, 180) also gave the example of organizational mottos used as strategic
boundaries: an organization used the expression “5-20-100” to inform employees
that an initiative will be acceptable if it means the organization will be ranked among
the top five of its country, the top 20 in its continent and the top 100 in the world.
The two remaining control systems are concerned with performance. The
operational performance control system focuses on critical performance variables at
an operational level. These controls include, for example, overseeing what the
organization must do well to achieve its strategy (Simons 1995). In this sense, they 
include the feedback systems that Simons included in diagnostic controls. They also
include values and organizational symbols that promote organizational performance
and procedures such as appraisal processes (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180).
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The strategic performance control system focuses on strategic uncertainties,
covering the sets of controls that monitor whether the organization has the proper
strategy to ensure the attainment of its vision (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 180). Hence,
the role of this control system is “to signal the need to review strategies” (Ferreira &
Otley 2009, 274). For example, mission statements, i.e., social controls, provide
information as to what the strategy should be accomplishing. Strategic performance
controls are similar to what Tuomela (2005) describes as strategic performance
measurement systems.
Whereas the LOC framework approaches control from the viewpoint of
implementing strategy, the COSO IC has more of an operational focus. Thus, the
focus of this study is on the operational boundaries and operational performance
related control objectives. 
2.6.5 Managerial intentions of control
The third level of the framework represents managerial intentions, which refer to 
what managers are trying to achieve by implementing controls. Managers can make
different choices regarding the control systems. They can decide which controls will
have the main focus of promoting discussion and learning (interactive use) and 
which will be looked at only if there is some deviance (diagnostic use). Managers 
can also decide whether the control will be used in a way that promotes creativity 
(enabling) or in a way that ensures predictability (constraining). Finally, they can 
decide what will be the consequences (i.e., rewards/punishments) of the achievement
(or non-achievement) of performance and compliance requirements. (Tessier &
Otley 2012a, 175, 181.)
2.6.6 Presentation of control
Once control systems are designed, managers can decide how to present them. This
includes considerations such as which channels to use (face-to-face, e-mail, etc) and
the message content itself (information to provide regarding the control, level of
language used, etc.) For controls that have more than one objective, the presentation 
of a control can be different from the overall intention, meaning that the presentation
of a control may focus on only one of these purposes rather than on all of them. This
divergence between intention and presentation, which in turn influences perception, 
could be intentional by managers to retain some level of flexibility as to how they 
use controls. (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 181.)
Presentation acts as a bridge between managerial intentions and employee
perceptions and can influence how controls are perceived. Tessier and Otley (2012a, 
175) used the following example to demonstrate this: “Total Quality Management
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programmes and SOX compliance programmes are composed of similar controls
such as flow charts and exception reports. Yet, because these two control
programmes are presented differently and in different contexts, the former is seen as
a way to improve performance (Adler & Borys 1996) while the latter is seen as a
way to ensure compliance to laws.” Thus, managers can use judgement on how they
present the controls to achieve the desired employee perception.
2.6.7 Employee perceptions of controls
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 175) suggest that the past literature has failed to
acknowledge the difference between managerial intentions for controls and
employee perceptions of controls. Managerial intentions refer to what managers are
trying to achieve by implementing a control, and thus are a design attribute of a
control system. Employee perceptions, however, refers to employees’ interpretation 
of what the control is for and, therefore, is not a design attribute of the management
control system. 
Thus, the design of control systems and the way they are presented influence
how controls are perceived by the employees (this is represented by an arrow in
Figure 6). In other words, employees have emotional responses to controls. For
example, Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 194) argue that controls such as pre-
action reviews can produce negative attitudes. Adler and Borys argue that employee
attitudes are positive when formalization enables them “to better master their tasks”
and will be negative when it “functions as a means by which management attempts
to coerce employees’ effort and compliance” (1996, 61). Adler and Chen (2011)
discuss employees’ positive and negative evaluative responses (or affect) to controls. 
However, there is also the possibility that the attitudes are neutral, in other words
that the employee has neither a positive nor a negative attitude towards the control.
Thus, the Tessier and Otley framework suggests that employee perceptions of 
controls will determine their attitudes towards controls, i.e., whether the attitude is
positive, neutral or negative. The framework emphasizes the fact that managers and
employees might not appraise controls in the same way. (Tessier & Otley 2012a,
181.)
Tessier and Otley’s (2012a, 175) illustrated the perception of controls based on 
their examples from the field as follows: “Newly implemented SOX-related controls
were generally perceived as restrictive since their main purpose was to prevent fraud
and therefore to protect value. However, some employees explained that knowing
someone else would review their work encouraged them to be more conscientious.
Furthermore, controls implemented in the organisation that already had many
procedural controls were generally perceived more positively than those
implemented in the organisation that had less in place. Finally, controls implemented
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in departments accustomed to them (e.g. R&D21) were perceived more positively
than controls implemented in departments with less (e.g. marketing).”
In addition to the design and presentation of controls, employees’ individual
attributes, such as the socio-cultural environment in which they evolve, also play a
role in the perception of controls, as well as the level of knowledge employees have
regarding controls (Berlo 1960).
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 182) conclude that, while the concepts of employee
perceptions of controls and employee attitudes towards controls are considered
important and are mentioned as separate elements in their revised framework, they
are not explored in any depth, because they are not the main focus of their paper.
Thus, they suggest that potential avenues exist for further research to study what
affects employee perceptions of controls and the impact of these perceptions on
organizational performance. Adler and Borys (1996) also called for studies focusing
on variability in how controls are perceived. 
According to Tessier and Otley (2012a, 182), perceptions of and attitudes
towards controls could also be investigated in light of the literature on employees’
participation. Multiple studies in the budget literature have suggested that
participation affects attitude and motivation (see the summary of these studies by
Shields and Shields (1998)). Participation in the design of other types of control
might also have an impact on attitude, as suggested by Adler and Borys (1996). 
2.7 Use and development of concepts and
frameworks in this study
This study attempts to identify and examine how a system of internal control is
designed and implemented in the context of a SOX compliance program. This
study’s objective is twofold and can be scrutinized through the following questions:
RQ1 How do social and technical control interplay in the design and
implementation of an internal control system?
RQ2 How does the presentation of internal controls impact employee
perceptions and performance of internal controls? 
The following theoretical concepts and frameworks are used to answer these
questions:
21 For example, R&D departments have to follow strict procedures to ensure health and
safety.
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1. Internal control is defined with the comprehensive view, as explained in
chapter 2.2.2. It is recognized that the concept of internal control overlaps
with the concept of management control, and many organizational aspects
can be classified into both of these control systems. However, this study
also recognizes the differences between these concepts, as explained in
Chapter 2.3. The empirical analysis uses the COSO internal control
framework of 2013 to classify the internal control components.
2. Internal control system consists of a set of technical and social controls.
The following definitions are used to address the interplay between 
technical and social control: Technical controls are based on procedures,
policies, rules and standards that specify how tasks are to be performed
and how individuals and groups are organized (Malmi & Brown 2008,
Tessier & Otley 2012a). Social controls consist of the personnel and
cultural controls, as defined by Merchant and Van der Stede (2016). These
are explained in more detail in Chapter 2.5.2.
3. The framework by Tessier and Otley (2012a) is used as to explain how
the internal controls are designed and implemented. This framework was
introduced in chapters 2.6.2 – 2.6.7 and it will be further refined at the end
of this this study.
These concepts and frameworks are summarized in Figure 7 and will be
addressed as follows:  At the core (first layer) of the framework are the individual
controls available to managers (types of controls). Managers have at their disposition
two types of controls: social and technical controls. Social controls appeal “to the
emotional, non-rational, affective elements within employees” (Ray 1986, 288), are
constituted of core values, beliefs, norms (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Simons 
1995) and symbols (Malmi & Brown 2008; Schein 1992). As Scott (2001) explains, 
although cultural symbols are internalized and subjective, external symbols, such as
cultural artifacts, are observable. Hence, social controls represent the manageable
aspect of organizational culture (Malmi & Brown 2008; Merchant & Van der Stede 
2003). Technical controls specify how tasks are to be performed (Perrow 1986) and
how individuals and groups are organized (Malmi & Brown 2008). They are based
on rules, procedures and standards and govern day-to-day activities. The degree of
formalization of an organization, as defined by Adler and Borys (1996), is based on
the proportion of social and technical controls that comprise the control systems. 
According to Chenhall and Morris (1995, 487), entrepreneurial organizations are
likely to de-emphasize formal accounting controls, while conservative entities place
a heavier reliance on formal accounting controls. While it is possible to simply list
the technical and social controls that an organization has put in place to assess the
level of formalization of an internal control system, prior studies suggest that the
89 
 
  
    
  
 
  
      
    
   
          
    
   
     
 
     
   
   
       
 
    
    
    
   
     
   
      
  
  
 
   
 
  
 
    
   
     
  
  
   
    
Niina Ratsula
level of interaction between the two types of control is important and requires more
attention. Alvesson and Kärreman (2004) suggest that social and technical controls
are tied rather than being substitutes, as Ouchi (1979, 1980) suggested. Abernethy 
and Chua (1996) find that technical controls can help rationalize social components
of the control package, while Bartunek (1984) describes how social controls
influence technical controls. Both technical and social aspects of internal control
design will be considered in the empirical analysis and analyze how they are
interlinked. Theoretical concepts for internal control will be drawn from the recent
comprehensive study around internal control and from the practical literature (COSO
2013). In the applied framework, the individual components of IC are in the first
layer and those can be classified into technical and social controls. Thus, the first
layer is labelled as internal control components.
The second layer of the framework (objectives of controls) constitute the internal
control system, which is closely related to the first layer of the framework, since the
latter constitutes the former; the internal control system is formed out of a set of
social and technical controls. These controls may have performance or compliance 
objectives. 
The third layer of the framework (managerial intentions) represents managerial
intentions. Choices included in managerial intentions are applicable to each control
within the internal control system. These three layers together formulates internal 
control design, as illustrated in the framework.
The second part of the framework is about the internal control implementation.
Once the internal control system is designed, managers can decide how to present
the controls. Decisions as to how to communicate with employees must be made,
such as the channels used and the message content itself (Berlo 1960). As Tessier
and Otley (2012a) emphasize, the presentation of a control can be different from the 
overall intention. This divergence between intention and presentation, which in turn 
influences perception, can be intentional by managers to retain some level of
flexibility as to how they use controls.
The design of control systems and the presentation of controls represent the
elements of the framework that managers have an influence on. In addition, the
framework includes employee perceptions, which are external to the design and 
presentation of the control system. While the design of control systems and the way 
they are presented do influence how controls are perceived, employees’ individual
attributes, such as the level of knowledge they have regarding controls, also play a 
role. Finally, perception of controls will determine employee attitudes towards
controls, i.e., whether the attitude is positive, neutral or negative. By separating the
managerial intention and employee perceptions, we emphasize the fact that these two
groups of individuals might not appraise controls in the same way.
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The three layers – internal control components (control types), internal control
system (objectives) and managerial intentions - form the design of an internal control
system and are relevant to the first research question. The remaining part of the
framework – presentation and perception - addresses the internal control
implementation and is relevant to both of the research questions. To fully answer the 
second research question, this study will also seek to understand how the
presentation of controls impacts the perception and performance of controls by the
employees.  
Figure 7. Framework used in this study and the scope of research questions. (Based on the 
frameworks by Simons (1995), Tessier and Otley (2012a) and COSO (2013))
91 
 
  
   
 
          
   
  
    
  
 
 
  
   
  
 
Niina Ratsula
Although there is some existing literature focusing on both technical and social
controls (see, e.g., Abernethy & Stoelwinder 1995; Alvesson & Kärreman 2004;
Ditillo 2004), there is still a clear motivation for conducting a further study with a
holistic perspective on control systems. This study will include both technical and
social controls in the scope of its empirical analysis by utilizing the Tessier and Otley
(2012a) framework to guide and frame the empirical analysis. The study will help us
to gain a better understanding of how the control system functions as a whole and 
how the different elements of control interact by looking at the internal controls
system holistically, instead of focusing only on certain aspects of control. While
discussing the case study findings in chapter 3.3, the aim is to further develop the
Tessier and Otley (2012a) framework to demonstrate how it can be applied in the 
context of internal control design and implementation.
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3 Design and implementation of a 
system of IC – empirical study
3.1 SOX compliance program at Nokia
3.1.1 Establishing the SOX compliance program
Nokia is listed in the New York Stock Exchange. This means that it has been 
obligated to comply with the SOX legislation starting from fiscal year of 2006. The
SOX implementation work was initiated in 2005 in one of the sub-teams in the
accounting function, aiming to implement the internal control requirements brought
by SOX globally. The initial idea was that everyone should be involved in the work
and do their own part, because everyone is responsible. Thus, the implementation
work started in all parts of the organization without central oversight. However, there
was no clear vision of how the implementation work should be done and soon the
project team realized that it needed stronger support from the HQ and top 
management. 
Following this decision, a team of top financial executives22 paid a visit to three
US-based technology companies - Dell, Xerox and IBM - to learn how they had
carried out the SOX implementation. Nokia wanted to talk to companies it thought
could be considered good benchmarks in SOX implementation. The external audit
company firm, which was also based in U.S., helped to organize these visits. During 
the reference visit, Nokia learned that the reference companies had implemented
SOX in very heavy manner, using many external resources. After the visit, Nokia
had a clear vision that it did not want to use external resources but rather to build the
competences in house, and more importantly, ensure that the SOX requirements were
implemented in a meaningful manner that would support the business without
creating too much bureaucracy. 
The US visit was seen as a turning point, when it was decided to switch from a
“bottoms up” approach to a central program mode, followed by the establishment of
22 This team included the External Audit Partner, Group Controller and other top financial
executives.
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Niina Ratsula
a central Internal Control organization, reporting directly to the Senior Vice
President, Group Controller, who took the lead of the program.
“One learning is that it (SOX implementation) is better to be done as a company 
program or project, rather than letting everyone do it themselves within the
subunits on their own phase.“ (Senior Vice President, Group Controller)
“Nokia typically implements things as projects, and this time there was no
project… Typically when you implement something you need to have a
centralized approach to do it in Nokia, to get it done properly with cost efficient
approach etcetera. So that was the thing that was the initial start, and I think that
then the change came after that gig to US.” (SOX Program Manager)
It was seen as essential that the understanding of SOX and what it meant for
Nokia would be deployed all around the organization and that people would not see
it as purely a Finance and Control function’s exercise. Furthermore, even though the
external auditors and consultants were involved in the beginning, it was clear that
the project was aimed to be completed as an in-house, rather than outsourced,
project.
“Our group controller had a very clear vision from very beginning, that really to 
get the competences, and to get the knowledge into the company, the work must
be done by us, and therefore there need to be immediately the organizations
involved. That we don't build a competence only to head office, but really to
have, and tie in the units to be responsible for things…And then if you think
maintaining it for the future, so I think that the global core team is the one
together with auditors to maintain the competence, and then deliver always the
things when they are changing or whatsoever are coming.” (Head of Accounting
and Reporting Development)
Top management designated SOX as a top priority. The CEO and CFO acted as
key messengers in the SOX- and internal controls-related communications. SOX
compliance was also widely adopted into personal incentives in all organizational
layers, proving that incentives based on collective achievement encourage cultural
control, which is designed to encourage mutual monitoring (Merchant & Van der
Stede 2016, 90). 
“I remember when I was starting in Nokia…I got the impression that (Group
controller) saw this SOX really important thing, and I think that when the owner
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
[senior finance & control management] sees something as important so it’s the
best support.” (Internal Control Manager)
“It has to initiate from the top management, otherwise it will be lost behind the
bureaucratic and technical execution.” (Senior Vice President, Group
Controller)
“So really the, the tone from the top was set well at the outset, not only by Group
Controller, but by CFO and others in the organization, including the audit
committee. People were incented to participate in a positive fashion, and to
collaborate, and everybody took it very, very seriously as a consequence. So I
think those were very good things, and obviously the effort was ultimately
successful.” (Partner, External Audit)
As the above quotes demonstrate, the control environment set by the Nokia
management was strong since the beginning of the SOX program. The tone at the
top, commitment to competence and holding people accountable for internal controls
– which all are elements of a control environment (COSO 2013) – were all very
clearly communicated both in talk and action.
3.1.2 What changed in terms of internal control?
Every company has internal controls in place, no matter whether they must follow
SOX or not. This was the case with Nokia, too. Table 6 compares the different
elements of internal control prior and after SOX, using Simons’ (1995, 84-85)
definition23 for internal control in order to illustrate how the existing internal controls
in fact changed. “Before SOX” column characterizes the internal controls which
were in place by 2004, when SOX program was kicked-off. “After SOX” column
illustrates the key changes implemented during 2004-2008, when most of the internal 
control development work took place.
See Figure 3.23 
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Table 6. Internal controls before and after SOX in Nokia (according to Simons’ (1995, 84-85)
definition of internal control)
ELEMENT OF 
INTERNAL
CONTROL
BEFORE SOX (->2003) AFTER SOX (KEY ACTIVITIES 
DURING 2004-2007)
ACTIVE AUDIT
COMMITTEE
Audit Committee existed already
before SOX
Audit Committee was added with the
responsibility for overseeing the SOX
Program.
INDEPENDENT There was no Internal Audit in the New Internal Audit function was
INTERNAL AUDIT early 2000s. It had existed in 1990s established in 2006.
FUNCTION but was mainly focusing on fraud
investigation at that time.
SEGREGATION
OF DUTIES
Segregation of duties was missing
in many functions, and those were
not carefully designed and 
integrated in the SAP. Especially in 
the smaller local subunits there 
were no systematic compensating
controls in place, either, to mitigate 
the dangerous job combinations.
Conflicting duties were defined in
SAP authorizations, and mitigating
actions were implemented and 
monitored where conflicts existed.
Many of the conflicts were mitigated 
by centralizing certain tasks (such as 
creating purchase orders) to avoid 
local units to have too wide
authorizations.
DEFINED LEVELS 
OF 
AUTHORIZATION
Local practices existed for
approving expenses, processing
purchases and allowing sales 
discounts. There was no global
approval policy, and the 
authorization levels were not
integrated in any systems. Indirect
spends (such as consulting,
marketing or IT expenditure) were 
approved as part of the budgeting,
after which managers were 
empowered to spend the company 
money without additional controls 
to monitor the spends.
Global approval policy with role-
based specified authorization levels 
were defined and integrated into 
SAP and purchasing tools. Controls 
were established to centralize 
indirect expenditure and enforce 
approvals in the systems.
RESTRICTED 
ACCESS TO
VALUABLE 
ASSETS
Valuable assets, such as 
inventories, were protected with 
basic controls, such as locks and 
inventory counts.
The existing controls were enhanced 
and documented.
ADEQUATE
EXPERTISE AND
TRAINING FOR 
ALL 
ACCOUNTING,
CONTROL, AND 
INTERNAL AUDIT
STAFF 
Accounting and control personnel
had a basic level of expertise and 
training.
Internal controls were trained across 
the company to a much wider
audience than just accounting and
control personnel. SOX testing also 
provided on-the-job learning and 
sharing best practices across units.
The ownership of controls and 
responsibilities to execute internal
controls expanded from accounting
department to all layers of
organization.
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
Table 6. Internal controls before and after SOX in Nokia (according to Simons’ (1995, 84-85)
definition of internal control) [continued]
ELEMENT OF 
INTERNAL
CONTROL
BEFORE SOX (->2003) AFTER SOX (KEY ACTIVITIES 
DURING 2004-2007)
SUFFICIENT
RESOURCES
Nokia had a basic level of
resources for performing the 
controls.
The resources for performing
controls and testing the controls 
were increased.
ROTATION IN KEY
JOBS
Rotation was not considered as an
internal control related matter.
SOX did not have impact on the job
rotation.
COMPLETE AND
ACCURATE
RECORD 
KEEPING
The basic accounting controls 
existed.
Many accounting controls (e.g.,
reconciliations) were enhanced. As
part of the internal control
documentation, the record keeping
was more also comprehensive.
ADEQUATE
DOCUMENTATION 
AND AUDIT TRAIL
Documentation was minimal in all
key control areas, except
accounting controls. IT systems 
didn't have systematical audit logs.
Control documentation requirements 
in key processes were heavily 
increased to secure proper audit
trail. IT audit logs were implemented.
RELEVANT AND 
TIMELY 
MANAGEMENT
REPORTING
Management reporting was on a
good level thanks to a global SAP.
There were no major changes in the 
basic elements of management
reporting. Monitoring of the status of
internal control deficiencies were 
added to the management reporting.
RESTRICTED 
ACCESS TO
INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS AND
DATA BASES
Some basic access controls 
existed, but those were not
documented and audit logs were 
missing, for example.
Access controls were formalized,
and documentation was increased.
Audit logs were implemented to key 
applications. Monitoring controls for
access authorizations review were 
established.
The SOX implementation project for Nokia meant identifying and documenting
the internal controls. In practice this meant rather extensive formalization of
controls: The approval and authorization policies were renewed, more formal
implementation of Nokia code of conduct was established, financial tools were
redesigned with automated controls and many control procedures were designed to 
have more strict approval and documentation steps. Even though some controls had
existed on a mental level within the organization, the change was significant in terms
of formality and documentation.
“I think that during the process (of SOX-implementation) we noticed that we
had a very incoherent way of complying with the controls and by no means did 
we have the controls in every single place where needed... thus it changed a lot. 
It was very positive change that we were able to get into the Nokia a really 
structured approach for all the approvals and the way things are controlled and
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Niina Ratsula
how the process works and that the rules are being followed. Thus, it really 
brought us assertiveness overall. It (SOX) forced us in a way to look after that
things are done in right order and in the right way.” (Senior Vice President, 
Group Controller)
“Before (SOX) I have a feeling it has been a bit Wild, Wild West, that there
hasn’t been that kind of a strict control and follow-up and monitoring.” (Head of
Group Internal Controls and Internal Audit II)
For example, before SOX the controls for indirect purchasing spend had been 
mostly relying on social control: Managers entrusted their teams to use the company
money based on their own judgment. There might have been a manager who 
approved the costs, for example, as part of the budget approval process or verbally,
but there were no company-wide controls to monitor the overall spend, nor were
there controls in place to ensure proper supplier selection, identification of potential
conflict of interests and contract negotiation. After SOX, employees were required
to use tools to document the purchase requisition approvals, and they needed to
involve the centralized indirect sourcing team to support them in the purchasing 
process. 
“When we started in 2002, there wasn’t any proper indirect sourcing process or
tools or governance or, or any kind of mandate, that you didn’t have to use
indirect sourcing function if you wanted to buy something from outside. You
could pretty much do it yourself. So we didn’t control the spend. We had over
five billion euros of spend, and much of it went through to the suppliers without
any proper controls. There was no contracts in place, there was no proper
negotiation in place, there was no professional purchasing organization in place.
And we are talking about indirect spend as being everything from IT hardware,
software, facilities, furniture, marketing, customer care, travel.. you know, all of
these in the indirect category. So it’s a huge spend, and back in those days our
coverage of that spend was maybe 15 per cent or something like that. So there 
was a huge risk, because there was no contracts in place. There was also a huge
amount of money wasted, because we hadn’t professionally negotiated the
deals” (Vice President, Head of indirect sourcing)
“We have now all these check-points, and before it was much easier to bypass
them and avoid, you know, getting approvals for things and executing without
permission and without POs (purchase order) and things like that…because
before that it was very loose. If, if you think about marketing, for example, I had 
people that said ‘Oh, I used to approve, you know, a million campaigns,’ you
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
know, or ‘I used to issue or tell agency to run one million campaigns without
any approvals.’ That’s how it was before 2006.” (Business Controller, Product
Design)
As just described, the company had only very basic levels of internal controls in
place prior to SOX, and the business was run relying a lot on social controls –
carefully selecting the right people for the right jobs and empowering them to make
decisions by using their own judgment. The SOX implementation meant changing
the level of formalization from social-based controls towards more technical
controls. 
“This kind of formalized way of doing certain analyses or certain controls and
then documenting the evidences, and storing everything and this type of practice
or discipline. I think that came then with the SOX.” (Manager Internal Controls,
Manufacturing and Logistics)
“We didn’t have that clear segregation of duties, meaning one person could do
many things there, creating a purchase order, posting a good receipt, and then
also somehow maybe touch what is happening in the invoicing area. Now these
are separated to different roles and different people, so there is now less
possibilities for fraud.” (Manager, Purchasing Process Development and
Strategy, Indirect sourcing)
“When SOX came, how we saw it first was that there were more detailed
instructions what checks needs to be done. For example, when you request
quotation from suppliers, it needs to fulfill certain minimum requirements, that
there is a price, payment terms, delivery terms mentioned in the document, and 
only after that we should use those terms in the purchase order that we send to
supplier. So, that kind of a requirement check point.” (Manager, Purchasing 
Process Development and Strategy, Indirect sourcing)
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in July 2002, Nokia made significant
efforts to reach SOX compliance in 2006 and has maintained compliance in a
continuously changing environment. The timeline in Figure 8 summarizes the key
actions that occurred in Nokia’s SOX development work.
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July 2002 the 
Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act is passed. 
• Business units started to list 
and document their internal 
controls. 
• A global control catalog 
template was drafted. 
• FSP started global period­
ic issue reporting, which 
would late fonn the basis of 
deviation reporting. 
• Management testing was 
started in all business units 
to ensure Nokia SOX 
compliance. 
• Internal controls become 
part of our day-to-day 
work. 
• SOX controls and other 
internal controls are 
continuously improved. 
• Established SOX 
responsibilities are 
continuously reviewed 
and improved. 
2008 .. 2011 
SOX piloting started 
in Financial Services 
Platfonn-unit (FSP). 
• SOX activities and responsi­
bilities were initiated. 
• An internal control team was 
established. 
• Financial end-to-end 
processes and key controls 
were defined. 
• Internal controls 
organized according to 
financial cycles. 
Created Nokia global 
common control 
catalog. 
• Unit/function controls were 
defined in control catalogs. 
• Periodical deviation reporting 
was implemented. 
• SOX management testing 
was piloted. 
Niina Ratsula
Figure 8. Key development activities within internal controls management at Nokia during 2002-
2011.
3.1.3 Internal control framework used at Nokia
According to SOX, management is responsible for establishing and maintaining an
adequate internal control structure and assessing its effectiveness annually. For this
purpose, one must select a suitable framework. COSO Internal Control Integrated
Framework (1994, 2013) has been the most widely adopted framework by 
companies subject to SOX. Thus, it was also selected by Nokia to identify, establish
and document the applicable elements of its internal control system. The COSO 
internal control framework was introduced earlier in chapter 2.2.2.
Figure 9 illustrates how the different internal control components were identified
by Nokia, based on the COSO framework. The figure is from Nokia’s internal
documentation, which was used in internal communications within the SOX
program. The figure summarizes how Nokia identified, established and documented
the most relevant structures, policies, procedures and other elements that formulated
the five COSO internal control components: control environment, risk assessment,
control activities, information and communication and monitoring activities.
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Figure 9. Nokia internal control framework
The control environment sets an organization’s tone, influencing the control
consciousness of its people. It is the foundation for all other components of internal
control, providing discipline and structure. Nokia established its control environment
by identifying and documenting key corporate level controls. Those included the
existence of a board of directors, its committees and group executive board, code of
conduct, code of ethics for top management, a whistle blowing channel for reporting 
potential non-compliance issues, background checks as part of recruiting process, 
company accounting policies and mirror certification process to certify the accuracy
of periodic reports. The IT management, organizational structure and job
descriptions were also identified as key control environment components.
Risk assessment is the identification and analysis of relevant risks to
achievement of organization’s objectives, forming a basis for determining how the
risks should be managed. Nokia’s most important activities involved in risk 
assessment were fraud risk assessment, semi-annual strategic and operational risk
analysis and risk-based scoping aimed at prioritizing the units and accounts
emphasized in the control assessment.
Control activities are the policies and procedures that help ensure management
directives are carried out. Nokia identified these through identification of the most
important financial end-to-end processes: manufacturing and logistics (make), 
revenue, purchasing, payroll, accounting and reporting and treasury. These end-to-
end processes were also called financial cycles. Manual and automated key controls
were identified in each of these cycles and documented into control catalogs. The IT
controls - access and authorization, change management and IT operations controls
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Niina Ratsula
- were also identified and documented and encompassed into all financial processes.
Outsourced services compliance was also considered an important part of control
activities. Also, centrally defined and managed policies, such as purchasing policies
and approval policies, were part of the control activities.
Pertinent information must be identified, captured and communicated in a form
and timeframe that enable people to carry out their responsibilities. Nokia defined as
its primary channels for information and communication 1) the internal control
community status meetings (SOX status meetings), where all stakeholders regularly
met to discuss the internal control topics; 2) the financial cycle working groups
where the relevant stakeholders from each financial cycle gathered; 3) the business
unit management meetings where internal controls were a standard agenda topic; and 
4) the internal control steering group that had the overall oversight responsibility for
the internal controls and SOX compliance. Intranet and internal training of
employees were also important channels to share knowledge and information about
IC requirements.
Monitoring activities are needed to assess the quality of the internal control
system's performance over time. This is accomplished through ongoing monitoring
activities, separate evaluations or a combination of the two. The primary means at
Nokia for separate evaluations were management testing, self-assessment, internal
audit and the internal investigation process, which all aimed to evaluate the
effectiveness of internal controls and promote corrective actions to improve the
process. Ongoing monitoring included the normal business practices wherein
internal control deficiencies were noted and investigated further, such as monthly
controller comments and deviation reporting, the quarterly deficiency assessment
and the prevention and detection of compliance issues through monitoring
compliance with internal policies and procedures. 
This internal control framework provides a wide and holistic view of Nokia’s
system of internal control. This is not all-inclusive but provides a good overview of
the key ingredients.
3.1.4 Internal control governance model adopted at Nokia
“I think setting up the [SOX] organization was crucial…This way it was ensured
that in all levels, all parts of the organization there’s a person who is like SOX
dedicated person. The internal controls organization ensured that it’s
implemented in all parts of the world and the organization.” (External auditor)
Following the strong support from the top financial management, a carefully
planned governance model for internal controls was established. Figure 10 illustrates
this. 
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Figure 10. Internal control governance model adopted at Nokia
The overall coordination work related to SOX compliance was handled by the
Nokia Internal Controls team24, which was responsible for defining, establishing and 
developing the instructions, templates and processes related to internal control
compliance. 
Each horizontal or business unit had nominated an internal control coordinator
(also called SOX coordinator in the SOX implementation phase) who was
responsible for coordinating the implementation and testing of the revised internal
controls in specific subunits. For every financial cycle (introduced in 3.1.3 section),
a coordinator was also nominated to coordinate the IC-related activities in that
particular cycle. Each unit and cycle had also nominated owners, who were typically
heads of the finance and controls for that area. The unit and cycle IC coordinators
reported in a matrix to the group internal controls and audit function. They were the
Nokia Internal Controls Team merged in 2019 with Internal Audit team, as reflected in
Figure 10.
24 
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Niina Ratsula
key people for ensuring that the subunits received the information needed to comply
with the SOX controls.
The purpose of the Internal Controls Committee (also called SOX Steering
Group in the implementation phase) was to ensure that effective internal controls are
maintained and important issues are escalated further within the organization.
Financial cycle owners, selected Unit IC owners, Internal Audit and the external
auditor were the members of the committee. The key tasks of the committee were to
1) approve key changes to the internal controls design, 2) validate the internal 
controls assessment approach and annual plan, 3) escalate actions to common or unit-
specific prioritized issues and 4) approve and evaluate the Internal Controls common
Short Term Incentive Plan target. Significant issues handled in committee were
escalated further to the Nokia Finance & Control Management Team and CFO. The
Group Internal Controls and Audit function was also reporting the summary of the
internal control compliance to the Nokia Audit Committee.
Internal Audit at Nokia is an independent and objective function reporting
directly to the CFO and Audit Committee. Nokia established the Internal Audit
function in 2006, which is interesting, because having no internal audit function in 
such a sizable organization was very uncommon. There had been an internal audit
function in the 1990s that was subsequently terminated. During a restructuring
project in 2009, the Internal Audit function was merged with the Internal Controls
function. Previously it had been a separate function under the CFO. After combining 
the management of these two functions, these remained as two separate teams,
because it was important to retain the audit function’s independence and objectivity. 
Nokia also had an Internal Investigations Committee and Working Group that
managed the fraud investigations. This group consisted of representatives from
Group Finance and Control, Corporate Security, Internal Audit and Internal
Controls. 
3.2 Design and implementation of internal control
system at Nokia
3.2.1 Nokia’s internal control framework - technical control
perspective
Chapter 3.1.3 presented Nokia’s internal control framework, describing at a high 
level the elements that Nokia had identified as part of its internal control system. The
interplay between technical and social control are at the core of this study, so next
this framework will be analyzed to identify how the technical and social controls
were designed and implemented. 
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
This study defines technical control as controls that are based on procedures,
policies, rules and standards that specify how tasks are to be performed and how
individuals and groups are organized (Malmi & Brown 2008, Tessier & Otley 2012a,
Simons 1995). Technical controls are embedded in the technology of work and
govern day-to-day activities. These are the more visible, objective components of
the control system, and thus, are the easiest to research.
To study the design and implementation of the technical control, some examples
were selected from each of the internal control framework elements (Figure 9) to 
demonstrate technical controls. The following criteria were used to select the
controls:
• The controls were impacted by the SOX Program, meaning that they were
either new controls or revised versions from the controls in place before
SOX.
• The controls impacted the everyday work of wide range of employees
working worldwide.
Thus, some controls that are present in Figure 9, such as Board of Directors or
Internal investigation procedure, were left outside the scope of the analysis. Next,
the selected controls are introduced. 
Control environment
Simons (1995, 42) listed codes of conduct as being the most basic forms of boundary
controls, which sets boundaries for the acceptable domain of activities for
organizational members. A boundary system is used to set limits in the search for
new opportunities, whereas belief systems address what level of performance is
desired and how the organization wants to create relationships internally and
externally. In that sense, a code of conduct can also demonstrate a belief system,
which, according to Simons (1995, 34), communicates the company’s core values
and is “the explicit set of organizational definitions that senior managers
communicate formally and reinforce systematically to provide basic values, purpose,
and direction for the organization.” From these perspectives, a code of conduct can 
be communicated to the organization, not only through unwritten beliefs or values
but also through formal policies. 
Thus, the formal document of a code of conduct demonstrates a technical control. 
Nokia established a new Code of Conduct to promote compliance with the highest
standards of ethical conduct and applicable laws among all Nokia employees,
officers and directors. From the technical point of view, Nokia’s Code of Conduct
was introduced as a written policy, available on the corporate website and intranet
in all relevant languages. Web-based Code of Conduct training was additionally 
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made available annually to all employees, and the percentage of attendance at Code
of Conduct trainings was followed.
Mirror certification was an internal document signed monthly by each subunit,
typically by the unit manager and controller, to certify that: 1) their unit’s financial
reporting purposes had been provided according to Nokia’s accounting rules and 2)
internal controls were in place and operating effectively, and all significant or
material deviations, if any, had been reported to relevant units/line managers.
Nokia’s consolidated level mirror certifications support the external certifications
given by the CEO and CFO in each annual report on Form 20-F, which is required
by the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation.
Risk assessment
Risk-based scoping and key risk analysis. One key element of the SOX program
was to identify the key controls, which would then be in the so called “SOX scope.”
SOX scope meant the controls that were periodically assessed either via management
testing or self-assessment. Each unit’s management was responsible for preparing a
Key Risk Analysis as part of short-term planning and related action plans, which
were consolidated into Nokia-level key risks. This ensured escalation through 
reporting channels and visibility to the top management. Risks were identified,
prioritized and assessed as a necessary precondition in the design of the financial
cycle’s key controls. The Risk Assessment ensured consideration of external and
internal circumstances that may occur and adversely affect records, processes and 
financial data, including fraud. Based on the risk analysis, a risk-based scoping was
conducted to select which controls and organizational units were selected into the
SOX scope. 
Control activities
Control activities are typically action controls, such as behavioral constraints
(passwords, authorizations, approval limits, segregation of duties) and pre-action 
reviews (expenditure approvals), which aim to make more it likely that employees
will act in the organization’s best interest (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 80-82). 
Before SOX, Nokia had both behavioral constraints and pre-action reviews in place 
to some extent. However, these were formalized in many ways during the course of
the SOX program’s implementation.
The control activities were documented in written policies, flowcharts and key
control catalogs. Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 82) call these written rules,
policies and procedures “action accountability,” which are also forms of action
controls. As part of the SOX project, Nokia identified the financial end-to-end 
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
processes (internally called financial cycles) and documented them in flow charts.
Table 7 summarizes the selected processes:
Table 7. Nokia End-to-end processes and key controls (Financial cycles)
CYCLE NAME SHORT NAME
From Customer Order to Revenue / CoS to Cash 
Collection Cycle
Revenue (RE)
From Raw Materials to Product Cost to Finished 
Goods
Make (MA)
From Sourcing to Payment Purchase (PU & iPU)
Treasury Treasury (TR)
From Hire to Final Payout HR
From Accounting Transactions to Consolidated
Financial Statements and Statutory Reporting
Accounting and reporting (ACR)
IT Cycle IT
Key controls were identified for each of these financial cycles and documented
into control catalogs. These key controls included automated and manual controls,
and preventive and detective controls. The documentation included e.g. the control
activity definition, control objective, related risk and description how to assess the
control effectiveness. 
Each organizational unit had to evaluate which of the key controls were
applicable in their context and ensure that those controls were in place and working
as defined in the control catalogs. The ultimate target was to utilize the company-
wide approach, so that subunits would use the general control definitions rather than
define their own controls. Controls described in the catalogs were to be performed
as follows:
1. Execute control according to instructions in the control catalog. Create
evidence documents.
2. Every performed key control needs evidence to prove that the control was
performed. If evidence is missing, it is assumed that the control was not
performed. 
3. Store the evidence as described in the control catalog. SOX evidence is
required to be stored for 7 years.
The control activities included, for example, procedures for selecting suppliers,
approving expenditures, processing payments (purchasing cycle), maintaining
customer master data, taking in customer orders, setting up and monitoring credit
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Objective 
Risk 
Control Activities 
Evidence 
..... Purchase requests are approved according to approval policy. 
..... Unauthorized/unethical use of company money. 
Approval policy with approval limits exists. Approval limits are kept 
up-to-date in SAP HR database and Purchase tool database (and also in 
..... Excel tables for related project manager approvals) and monitored 
quarterly. 
Purchase requests are approved according to the policy. 
Valid approval policies/authorities are up-to-date. Approval limits are 
up-to-date in SAP HR database and in Purchase tool database. 
..... Check that approval limit monitoring has taken place. 
Purchase request approval exists (Automatic approval flow on the basis 
oflimits and solid line manager hierarchy exists). 
Niina Ratsula
limits and discounts, and issuing customer invoices (revenue cycle). They also
included system access and authorization controls (IT controls). Figure 11 provides 
an example of an internal control at Nokia.  Purchase Request Approval is one
control from the purchasing cycle. 
Figure 11. Example of an internal control: Purchase request approval
Information and communication
Nokia used formal training mechanisms (classroom and web-based training) to 
communicate SOX requirements. When the SOX project was launched, extensive 
road shows and training programs occurred, during which the core SOX experts
travelled globally to provide face-to-face sessions for multiple organizational units.
After the major road show efforts, Nokia continued to provide formal internal control
training sessions to its employees. Information and communication were visible
through the following mechanisms:
• The intranet was the main information channel where financial cycle
process descriptions and other instructions were available for all Nokia
employees. 
• Face-to-face and remote training on internal controls and SOX, including 
a SOX e-learning package, was available for all Nokia employees.
• Financial cycle working groups existed to create and maintain financial
cycle descriptions and control catalogs and to create instructions and
provide support to units.
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
• Internal Controls status meetings (SOX status meetings) were used to
follow the status of control assessment plan and defect resolution
progress. 
Monitoring activities
The SOX program introduced multiple new mechanisms for monitoring the
functioning internal control. Deviation reporting, management testing and self-
assessment were the organization’s most visible mechanisms.
Deviation reporting is a process in which internal control deviations in the
subunits during a particular period are identified, documented and reported to
relevant management by using a specific template and time schedule established by
Nokia. The purpose of the deviation reporting process is to inform management of
the status of the subunits’ internal controls. A responsible manager also needs the
deviation reports to sign off the Mirror certification. Nokia is able to make
conclusions about the overall effectiveness of the internal control system by
periodically consolidating the deviation reports prepared by the subunits.
Management testing and self-assessment were the primary means for
performing control assessment, which serves as a basis for Management’s Annual
Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting, mandated by the Sarbanes-
Oxley legislation. The assessment was performed to verify the operating
effectiveness of Nokia’s key controls in selected countries and units based on the
formal SOX scoping. 
Management testing was the only control assessment method used in the SOX
implementation phase. In practice the management testing meant that a group of
independent peer employees were sent to assess the effectiveness of the key controls
in the SOX scope units. For example, a team consisting of two controllers from
across the company and two internal control team members would spend a week in
a sales or manufacturing unit to assess the controls in one of the scope countries. The
assessment was conducted by carefully following a predefined test script that
provided the testing team clear instructions on how to assess the control. The testing 
results were carefully documented in a system that was tailor made to fit the SOX
testing planning and documentation purposes. 
After a couple of SOX compliance years, an additional self-assessment concept
was introduced, whereby a unit assessed its controls itself: Instead of the
management testing team travelling to a site, the local site would nominate a testing
team (typically from the F&C employees) who performed the testing themselves and 
documented the results in the same manner as in the management testing method.
The results of the control assessment were subject to quality and external audit
review. Nokia had defined the methods and instructions for performing the
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Niina Ratsula
assessments, and the subunits were responsible for planning, executing and reporting 
the assessments for the identified key controls within their units. Figure 12 illustrates
the control assessment process and the link to 20-F filing25, as SOX requires. The
process consists of the following steps:
Upper row:
1. Scoping of Testing: According to SOX, a certain percentage value of
transactions and certain functions must be covered by testing each year.
In scoping, it is decided which countries, areas, and areas of business are
to be tested. The countries and areas may vary year to year, depending on
business volumes.
2. Test Designing & Test Planning: Once the scoping is done, the testing
sessions will be planned and designed by a testing manager assigned for
each testing session. The testing manager is responsible for taking care of
the testing practicalities, which covers assigning the testing team,
planning the schedule and selecting the samples (e.g., which transactions
will be reviewed).
3. Executing Tests: Testing is a crucial element of the internal control
process and is done frequently according to the performing unit annual
test plan. Tests are performed according to test scripts in control catalogs.
Testing can be either management testing or self-assessment:
• Management testing requires that independent testers assess
controls performed by the unit to verify that controls are 
performed properly. 
• Self-assessment means that the control performing unit can assess
its own controls to verify that controls are performed properly. 
However, self-assessment also must be performed by an
independent person so that those responsible for the control
activity are not testing their own work.
4. Final Report & Documentation: The Final testing report is presented to
local management. The results of the testing are documented in a selected
tool used at Nokia.
Form 20-F is an SEC filing submitted to the US Securities and Exchange Commission
and is used by certain foreign private issuers to provide information (SEC 2012).
25 
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Scoping of 
Testing 
... Test Designing ... 
and Test Planning 
Solving Deficiencies 
Quarterly 
GLAD Analysis 
... GLAD Summary ... 
(IC Committee) 
Executing 
Tests 
Retesting 
Significant 
Deficiency ... 
(Audit Committee) 
Final Report & 
Documentation 
II 
Material 
Weakness (20-F) 
Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
Middle row:
5. Solving Deficiencies & Retesting: If the evidence described in the control
catalogs was not found during testing, then the control needed to be fixed.
After a while, typically 3-6 months since the defect was found, the testing
was re-performed to evaluate whether the control performance has 
improved.
Lower row:
6. Quarterly GLAD Analysis: A detailed analysis of open defects was
performed on a quarterly basis. This was called a Global Summary of
Aggregated Defects (GLAD). 
7. GLAD Summary (IC Committee): The summary of the open “GLAD
items” was reviewed and discussed in the monthly Internal Controls
Committee meeting.
8. Significant Deficiency (Audit Committee): All defects categorized as
‘significant’ were reviewed in Audit Committee meetings. Before that, the
items were assessed by the Group Finance & Control.
9. Material weakness (20-F): In case there would be any defects categorized
as material weakness, those must be reported in the management report
on Internal Control over financial reporting by the CEO and CFO in a 20-
F filing. 
Figure 12. Control assessment at Nokia
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Niina Ratsula
So, what did SOX mean for employees’ everyday work? The new control
requirements meant significant changes in the daily tasks for many employees. SOX
impacted a substantial number of the work force, not just the Finance & Control
employees. To mention some of the practical examples of the SOX impacts:
• Employees globally needed to start formally performing key controls for
the financial cycles. For example, many subunit managers were allowed
to approve costs orally before SOX, but now they needed to do everything 
in writing and archive the documentation according to the new control
descriptions.
• Employees also needed to participate in control assessments. Many
Finance & Control personnel needed to travel to be part of the 
management testing teams. The local subunits needed to make themselves
available for the management testing and to support the testing by
providing needed evidence and documentation to justify the control
effectiveness.
• After the management testing, the subunits needed to perform corrective
action in case any internal control deviations were found. They also
needed to prepare for retesting.
• Operational and finance directors were obligated to provide the mirror
certifications and deviation reporting forms as Nokia requested. They
needed to start paying an increasing amount of time to follow up on the
internal control performance to be able to make such statements.
Changing the way of working on a global scale towards more systematic and
documented processes is a significant effort in a multinational company. It always
involves the risks of facing employee resistance and negative attitudes. Applying
social controls to introduce and implement the technical controls may provide
manager a useful solution to overcome these challenges.
3.2.2 Nokia’s internal control framework - social control 
perspective
The previous chapter described the internal control framework introduced via SOX
from the technical control point of view. COSO (2013) emphasizes that, even though 
we have many internal controls embedded in the technology and systems, an
effective internal control is largely still dependent on a human factor, i.e., on how
individuals perform the controls and are held accountable for any control failures. 
Employees must be motivated to perform their internal control-related
responsibilities and do more than just a “tick the box” exercise if they are going to
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
adopt the technical controls. Social controls seek to appeal to the emotional, non-
rational, affective elements within employees (Ray 1986, 288), so they definitely
have a role in this adoption process. Whereas technical controls are something that
we can typically document and audit by looking at the audit trail, social control
occurs usually in unwritten form. This chapter seeks the patterns of social control
that the researcher was able to identify from the field.
Managers use different ways to encourage and facilitate self-control and social
pressure, for example, by applying selection and placement, training, cultural
control, group-based rewards, and providing necessary resources (Merchant 1985,
40). An organizational culture is the foundation for social control, and it is very much
also linked to the control environment, as the COSO framework describes. Social 
control is not always consciously designed, because it often derives from or is an
artifact of the organizational culture.
Prior study suggests that the level of interaction between the social and technical
controls is important and requires more attention. For example, according to
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004), social and technical controls are tied rather than
being substitutes, as Ouchi (1979, 1980) suggested. Abernethy and Chua (1996)
suggest that technical controls can help rationalize the social components of the
control package. This study seeks to understand how this relationship can work the
other way around. In other words, next we will take a closer look at how Nokia used 
social control to introduce the technical controls. The next chapters list the technical 
controls in each of the five internal control components, as the previous chapter
described, and discuss the social controls that were identified from the field that
played a role in the introduction and implementation of the technical controls. These 
social controls consist of personnel and cultural controls, as defined by Merchant
and Van der Stede (2016).
Control environment
Technical controls: code of conduct, mirror certification 
Social controls: tone at the top, selection and placement of employees, job design,
necessary resources, group rewards
A code of conduct as a written document represents a technical control that can be
viewed as a rationalization of the social components of a control system (Abernethy 
& Chua 1996). Thus, a code of conduct serves as a good example of a control that
actually take the form of both a technical and a social control. In addition to being a
written policy, Nokia introduced its Code of Conduct as a demonstration of the
company’s values and culture. Cultural control exists to shape organizational
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Niina Ratsula
behavioral norms and to encourage employees to monitor and influence each other’s 
behaviors. Nokia had a very strong organization culture, which is the foundation for
social control, including the organization’s values, beliefs, norms (Alvesson &
Kärreman 2004; Simons 1995) and symbols (Malmi & Brown 2008; Schein 1992).
This form of control is based on the assumption that individuals do what is best for
the organization either because they are self-directed or because they are influenced
by social pressure.
According to Simons (1995), belief systems are communicated formally through
documents such as mission statements and statements of purpose. Belief systems are
used to inspire and guide the search for new opportunities. At Nokia the organization
culture was based on the "Nokia Way," which emphasized the speed and flexibility
of decision making and promoted an informal work culture. The Nokia Way was
based on the company values, which had remained unchanged during the years 1992-
200726. Many of the interviewees mentioned that the old values had been key
cornerstones in building the success of the company during the 1990s. 
Nokia is an old company that grew very fast, and mostly organically during the
1990s from a small Finnish firm into a global giant. Many interviewees described 
the old company culture as being based on trust and empowerment, which are
features of social control. One of the core old values of Nokia was respect for the
individual, which promoted teamwork - a feeling of family.
“Nokia is a company that…has a very high level of trust and reliance on
corporate P&L [Profit and Loss]. And I think that has served before the company
very well…This culture of trust enabled the organization to grow very quickly
and enabled people to go out into different markets and make decisions that were
good for the business without having to run back to Finland and get permission
for every decision they wanted to make. So people have been empowered, and I
think that served the company well.” (Head of Internal Audit)
Cultural controls represent the manageable aspect of organizational culture 
(Malmi & Brown 2008; Merchant & Van der Stede 2007) and include all the “efforts
to persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms and ideas about what is good,
important, praiseworthy, etc. in terms of work and organizational life” (Alvesson &
Kärreman 2004, 426). Cultural controls often have the advantage of being relatively
unobtrusive. Employees may not even think of the shared norms or “the way we do
things around here” as being part of the “control” system (Merchant & Van der Stede
2016, 95). As such, organizational cultures can substitute for other formal types of
The corporate values were renewed by the new CEO in 2007, briefly after the SOX was
introduced.
26 
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
controls, or, as Peters and Waterman (1982, 75) suggest, “the stronger the
culture…the less need there is for policy manuals, organizational charts, or detailed
procedures and rules.”
“SOX is only a tool. The role of top management is so important. Because you
need to have a proper tone at the top. The most important thing here [in the SOX
project] is that it should not be that much about changing people or controlling
people, but more about having a culture, where people understand that there is a
zero tolerance for breaking the rules. And you need to have a culture where
everyone understands that in the long run it’s best for the business.” (Executive
Vice President, Chief Financial Officer)
Practical frameworks and professional audit standards both indicate the
importance of management attitudes in fostering a healthy and sound approach to 
risk taking and general business practice by using terms such as tone at the top and 
the control environment. Prior literature suggests that top management support is
necessary for achieving a “real” control value in the organization (see, e.g., Arwinge
2014; Holmes, Langford, Welch and Welch 2002). Top managers must not consider
internal control to be a necessarily evil that exists to please stakeholders. Rather, it
must be both necessary and valuable, and that is displayed in both talk and action
(Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 94). 
“Top management sets the boundaries through its own actions to state that
simply nothing that goes against the rules is tolerated. You need to have a zero-
tolerance.” (Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer)
Prior study has emphasized the importance of top management’s behavior for
engineering appropriate employee behavior (see Holmes, Langford, Welch and
Welch 2002) and financial reporting decisions (see D’Aquila 1998). Several studies
show that tone at the top is a crucial determinant of ethical practices within business
organizations (e.g. Bannon, Ford and Meltzer 2010; Berson, Shaul and Dvir 2008;
Merchant 1990; Rotemberg & Saloner 2000; Schaubroeck et al. 2012; Weber 2010). 
Schaubroeck et al. (2012) present various ways in which ethical leadership is
translated into subordinates’ unethical behaviors, including the trickle-down
mechanism through which traits of ethical leadership at the top influence ethical
conduct in the lower levels of organizations. 
The top financial management at Nokia, such as the current and previous
Corporate Controller, played a key role in the internal control adoption process. It
was widely interpreted in the organization that the SOX compliance project was a
key priority of the top financial management. Chapter 3.1.1 demonstrated this.
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It was very clear from the beginning that the senior management was closely
monitoring the progress of the SOX implementation. As a result, middle
management in the subunits considered the issue as a top priority. The importance
was communicated very effectively within the organization; thus, most of the people
at all levels of the organization took internal control requirements very seriously and 
wanted to co-operate. The success of the implementation project was easy to measure
in terms of the internal control deficiencies, so it was very concrete to many
employees to understand what was expected from them. There is no question of
whether or not there was a strong tone at the top at Nokia, which supported the SOX
program.
“I have to say that the management involvement and also the management
attitude that we have is also helping a lot.” (SOX Coordinator)
According to Simons (1995, 122), middle managers are key nodes of the
information network that reveals senior management’s concerns and moves newly
collected information up, down, and sideways in the organization. At Nokia the
finance leaders for different business functions and units and local entities are
examples of middle management. They took the SOX project very seriously – and 
were expected to do so by the top management. In a global corporation with multiple
organizational layers, it is necessary to gain support from the middle managers to
ensure proper implementation. Middle managers may play a significantly greater
role in local organizations than the top executives, who never physically visit the
premises. Thus, they are key players in walking the talk and setting expectations and 
accountability within organizational units and teams. The message should be 
consistent throughout all layers of the organization. At Nokia, the role of middle
management in SOX compliance was strong: they were always present in the SOX
testing sessions, they were personally accountable for training their organizations for
the new internal control requirements and they were always in the loop of the
communications between their teams and the Internal Controls team. The message
was clear for the organization: SOX is a priority.
Employee selection – finding the right people to do a particular job – is one of
the most important personnel controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 88). At
Nokia, strong personnel controls substituted for other controls. As the Head of the
Internal Audit described:
“I think Nokia focuses very hard on, on recruitment, and…not letting people into
the organization until they are sure that they know who they are. And that they 
fit with the culture and the values…But then once they are inside the company
they have a pretty high level of freedom. And so it’s important that they know 
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
and that they live the values and the culture. And so people were generally doing
the good, right, smart things for the business, and controlling the business
properly, but it wasn’t always documented.” (Head of Internal Audit)
Strong employee controls supported forming a strong control environment. The
SOX program was a priority to the top financial management, so they wanted to
ensure that there were adequate and capable employees in the right roles to ensure
the project’s success.
Finding the right people to do a particular job and giving them both a good work
environment and the necessary resources can increase the probability that a job will
be done properly (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016). When the role of SOX
coordinator was introduced, the selected employees felt proud for being taken into 
this important role. Not only was it exciting to be a crucial part of a top priority
initiative, but it was also motivating to be able to work closely with the business.
Many interviewees emphasized how important it was that the SOX coordinator was
organizationally part of the business unit (and not central Finance & Control
organization, i.e. Internal Controls team). However, this changed during the field
work, because there was a reorganization at Nokia in 2009. As a result, the roles for
unit-specific SOX coordinators ceased, and a central Internal Control team was
expanded. In the future this centralized team would work as a pool for the business
units to provide internal control and SOX expertise. Even though this new
arrangement increased efficiency in many tasks (such as resource planning, testing,
scoping) and enabled cost savings, many old SOX coordinators were disappointed,
as they no longer felt as close to the business unit. Many business unit representatives 
also felt that the disadvantages of this arrangement exceeded the expected benefits.
To summarize, Nokia demonstrated its commitment to competence by selecting
competent people as SOX coordinators, by designing their jobs to fit the business
and control needs, and by providing enough time and budget to be able to succeed
in the SOX coordinator role. These are all important elements of social control.
Expected behavior and social norms can also be enforced through peer pressure
and informal (or social) sanctions (Fortado 1994; Nemeth & Staw 1989). Mutual
monitoring, such as group rewards, is a powerful form of group pressure on
individuals who deviate from group norms and values (Merchant & Van der Stede
2016, 90, 92). Evidence suggests that group-based incentive plans create a culture of
“ownership” and “engagement” to the mutual benefit of organizations and their
employees (Rosen, Case and Staubus 2005). According to Merchant and Van der
Stede (2016, 92), the link between individual efforts and the results being rewarded
is weak, or at least weakened, with group rewards. Thus, motivation to achieve the
reward is not among the primary forces affected by group rewards; instead, 
communication of expectations and mutual monitoring are. Group rewards can
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encourage team work, on-the-job training of new employees (when assigned to
teams that include experienced colleagues) and the creating of peer pressure on
individual employees to exert themselves for the good of the group (Merchant &
Van der Stede 2016, 92). Nokia utilized group rewards in the SOX implementation
– SOX compliance was part of the personal bonus plan for several functions and
business units globally:
“It was in a person’s incentives very clearly stated that they must succeed at
SOX, so.. I see that as the most important factor to achieve compliance.”
(Internal Controls Manager, SOX Program team)
“We really had targets related to SOX compliance, so I think that was a good
way to take it forward.” (SOX Coordinator, INS)
“SOX was in everybody’s IIPs27 and I thought that was critical, because it really
indicated to people that this was an important thing, that they were responsible,
and they had to participate and contribute on a positive fashion, and that if the
team failed, you know, if one individual failed in the team, the team could fail.
That led to a lot of cooperation and collaboration.” (Partner, External Auditor)
The management control literature suggests that organizations do reward
performance and punish nonperformance and noncompliance but do not reward 
compliance (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016; Simons 1995). However, Tessier and
Otley (2012a) noted in their study the fact that managers can decide to reward and/or
punish performance and/or compliance. This is line with what was seen in the field:
Nokia included SOX compliance objectives in the employees’ performance
appraisals and rewarded employees on the attainment of both compliance and
performance objectives. Employees were rewarded not only through formal
appraisal mechanisms but also through informal channels, for example, by
demonstrating appreciation through informal communications. 
Providing rewards or incentives based on collective achievement encourages
cultural controls (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 92). Whereas individual rewards
are typical examples of results controls, the link between individual efforts and the
results being rewarded is weaker in group rewards. Thus, organizations must think 
of ways to motivate employees to achieve the group incentives. Social sanction and
group rewards worked very well for this purpose at Nokia. 
IIP = Invest In People was the Incentive Plan used in Nokia, which served as a basis
for the personal bonus payments.
27 
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Risk assessment
Technical controls: risk-based scoping and key risk analysis
Social controls: selection of employees, job design, providing necessary resources,
training and communications
Risk assessment was one of the founding factors behind SOX compliance. Via the risk
analysis and risk-based scoping, it was decided which controls in every organizational
unit had to be assessed as part of the management assessment. Nokia wanted to involve
the business units instead of letting an external auditor, for example, perform this
exercise. This was seen as an important part of gaining the business units’ commitment
to SOX project. The role of the SOX coordinators was to understand the risks in  their
respective units, and they were given the time and budget to be able to spend a lot of
time with the business units to do the risk analysis and scoping exercise.
“The scoping part, that was done kind of like middle-up and middle-down, so it
wasn’t like bottom-up or top-down... You need to involve the people who knows
and understands the numbers and the risks.” (External Auditor)
“The scoping is a meaningless exercise if the controls in the first place don’t add
up, and if you don’t understand the real risks…I think it all starts from the solid
processes: what are the business processes and understanding those. What is it
that we are doing in different parts of the organization and then identifying what
is critical in the process, identifying the places in the process that have to be
controlled, that they somehow feed something into our financials… So, this kind
of overall process understanding and linking that to the financial statements and
then basically recognizing and building the internal control or the SOX controls
then to ensure that certain things are then done.” (SOX Coordinator)
From a social control viewpoint, Nokia used many internal resources for this
exercise. SOX scoping was also a typical theme in internal trainings and meeting
agendas. This way it was assured that everyone - at least in the Finance & Control
community - knew what this exercise meant in practice.
Control activities
Technical controls: policies and key controls
Social controls: tone at the top, selection and placement of employees, job design
and necessary resources
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Merchant and Van der Stede (2016, 90) list job design and necessary resources as a
form of personnel control. A way to help employees act appropriately is to ensure
the job is designed to allow motivated and qualified employees a high probability of
success. Employees also need a particular set of resources to do a good job, including
information, equipment, supplies, staff support, decision aids and freedom from
interruption. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016.)
Nokia invested a lot in the SOX implementation. There was a centralized "SOX
team" (later called the Internal Controls team) who provided the necessary support
to the subunits, including information, tools, instructions, staff support, coordination 
and validation work and decision aids. From the beginning, it was a clear vision of
top financial management that Nokia wanted to build capabilities in-house and
ensure that the company had enough qualified people and resources to ensure that
the SOX implementation was done successfully.
At the beginning of the SOX program, each function and business unit had
nominated a SOX coordinator who was responsible for coordinating the risk-based
scoping exercise and the implementation of the applicable key controls within
specific subunits. They were the key people for ensuring that the subunits received 
the information needed to implement the new controls. SOX coordinators were
ambassadors of the control practices within the units, because they could understand
both the specific needs and circumstances of the unit under question and also the
control activities relevant to the unit.
SOX coordinators played a very important role in the SOX implementation,
because they really took the lead in ensuring that the SOX requirements were
translated into action in the reality. The SOX coordinators were selected from the
business unit, so they knew their subunit’s daily operations very well, and more
importantly, they were already trusted by the most important internal stakeholders.
When the new control requirements were presented by the SOX coordinators, there
was very little change resistance.
Perhaps one reason for not experiencing change resistance was the overall way
the internal control compliance was governed at Nokia. Even though the company
had a very strong central coordination and supervision in the SOX project, the
subunits were still allowed to contribute to the control development work. The SOX
coordinators were the key enablers who represented the subunits, but they were also 
strongly involved in the central SOX team’s activities. They kept the discussion
ongoing between with the HQ and the subunit. 
So, the social control was enacted by carefully selecting the individuals for the
SOX coordinator role and by designing their role in a way that they were really able
to help the subunits in control implementation. In addition to the SOX organization, 
the job roles of the controllers made a difference. It was clear that SOX compliance
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was part of a controller’s job description. One controller experienced his role as a
local controller in Turkey like this:
“As a LSU [Local Sales Unit] sales controller, of course I am responsible for
SOX controls, for coordinating the SOX testings, and making sure that all the
controls are done frequently, and so on. For me, the minimum requirement for
the SOX compliance is really that we fulfill those minimum requirements from
Nokia, that, that we, we are doing the controls every month, we are kind of
passing the management tests. (Local Sales Controller)
Many interviewees experienced that SOX coordinators were the links who
translated the SOX requirements into normal business practices within the subunits.
The role of the SOX coordinators could be related to the concept of hybrid expertise
(Miller, Kurunmäki and O´Leary 2008), which refers to an expertise produced out of
two or more elements normally found separately. Individuals with hybrid expertise
make possible lateral information flows and cooperation across organizational
boundaries. In this case, they were essential facilitators in translating the internal
control requirements into the form that the business unit representatives understood.
So it is clear that the selection and placement of SOX coordinators was a central
social control in the case of Nokia. But, equally important, social control was the job
design of most of the employees whose jobs were impacted by the controls. For
example, a buyer from the Sourcing department described her team as follows:
“I believe that the role of INS [Indirect Sourcing] at Nokia is not only, you know,
to reduce the prices and to create better contracts, but also to ensure that the
orders are SOX compliant. I always tell this to the buyers when I train them, that
this is your responsibility, this is one of your main responsibilities in creating an 
order. And people do take it seriously, because it becomes part of their job. So,
each and every day, when you create orders, and the number of orders you create
depending on your category can be from about five, six orders to fifty or sixty
orders per day, it’s part of each and every order for you to ensure that you comply 
with the SOX requirements that we have to comply with.” (Transactional buyer)
Providing necessary resources also enabled the creation of one set of global key
control activities: One crucial resource, which enabled the companywide SOX
implementation, was the enterprise resource planning system (SAP). Nokia had only
one global system in place, which had been made possible by its organic growth,
instead of growing, for example, through acquisitions. Most of the financial
transactions went through the same system, so it was much easier also to implement
the new controls.
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We transferred into one and only SAP very early and we have had one system,
where all information comes from. So in a way we have not had the kind of
problems where you have a subunit in Brazil or somewhere else, and when they
are dealing with their own systems and then only send out some consolidated
report to headquarter, you really don’t know what is happening over there. So
from the SOX implementation point of view, having only one SAP has been
extremely important issue. (Executive Vice President, Chief Financial Officer)
In conclusion, to create and implement internal control activities, Nokia applied
social controls by designing the SOX coordinator role and providing the organization
with enough resources. Finally, without a proper tone at the top, the exercise of
identifying, documenting and designing the individual controls for each financial
cycle would have been impossible.
Information and communication
Technical controls: intranet, training, financial cycle working groups and internal
controls status meetings
Social controls: necessary resources, tone at the top, informal communications,
physical arrangements
Training and communication are common ways to increase the likelihood that
employees act as expected. Training can provide useful information about what
actions are expected and how a person should perform his/her duties. Training can
also have positive motivational effects, because it may create a greater sense of
professionalism. Employees are also often more interested in performing well in jobs
they understand better. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 89.)
Training is a control element that can be applied both via technical and social
controls. Technically, an employee may be required to participate in a yearly Code
of Conduct training, and participation rates can be monitored by management. But
much of the training also happens on the job and via informal channels with no
predefined form. 
Nokia used formal training mechanisms (classroom and web-based training) to
communicate SOX requirements. When the SOX project was launched, extensive 
road shows and training programs occurred in which the core SOX experts travelled 
globally to provide face-to-face sessions for multiple organizational units. The local
managers were provided with the materials and tools to continue the training of their
organizations. The Internal Controls team also continued to offer regular training of
SOX and internal controls after the implementation phase. Thus, sufficient resources
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
were provided to enable smooth and in-depth communications about SOX and
internal controls.
Much learning occurs informally besides formal training (Merchant & Van der
Stede 2016, 89), for example, via mentoring, coaching or informal communications
and discussions. Nokia used informal training extensively. SOX was often
mentioned in informal discussions to enforce the message that it must be taken
seriously. In fact, the informal communications resulted in strong organizational
myths, as one finance director described:
”Now everybody’s agreed to take this (SOX) seriously, we have used
communications in a way that if we are not compliant with the SOX, some
terrible things will happen and CFO will go to jail, and he will take you with
him, if you are not like complying here.” (Director, Finance and Control)
Bussmann and Niemeczek (2019) reminds that sustained implementation of the
desired behaviors and values can be achieved with the help of training measures, but
it also must be mirrored in the leadership behavior at all levels of management. At
Nokia, the commitment of managers towards controls supported the message shared
in training and communications. Employees felt that the managers’ behaviors were
aligned with the message of the communications. Furthermore, many times the
Nokia employees perceived the formal training and communication methods also as
a place to share experiences and learn from others. For example, Internal Control
status meetings were also a forum to share instructions and experiences with unit
SOX coordinators and Nokia Internal Controls team. A lot of informal information 
sharing occurred in addition to the formal agenda. Being part of the SOX community
was important to many of the SOX coordinators, and the cooperation with this group 
in a way formed a social arrangement that people felt proud to be a member of.
Interestingly, the strong power of the word SOX also was visible in situations in
which SOX was used in communications as a way to drive certain initiatives, even
if those were not linked to the SOX program:
”I have noticed that this SOX is sometimes utilized in situations where the topic
doesn’t have anything to do with SOX, so people have noticed that it’s a very
efficient way of getting some requirements through.” (Head of Group Internal
Controls and Internal Audit II)
As a result of the training and communications, many employees received the
message that SOX was a mandatory requirement, and it was not an option not to
perform the controls as requested. Even though the message was sometimes
“intimidating”, the employee perceptions were still more positive than negative.
123 
 
 
      
    
   
 
    
 
   
  
 
  
   
    
    
    
    
  
    
  
    
   
  
    
   
   
     
  
   
      
  
     
    
  
  
 
  
  
     
Niina Ratsula
Many interviewees explained this perception via the culture – when there was a clear
message coming from the top, employees felt committed to succeed together to meet
the common goal.
Monitoring activities
Technical controls: deviation reporting, management testing, self-assessment
Social controls: employee rotation, necessary resources, tone at the top, physical
arrangements, social sanction
Intra-organizational transfers or employee rotations help transmit culture by
improving the socialization of employees throughout the organization, giving them
a better appreciation of the problems faced by different parts of the organization, and 
inhibiting the formation of incompatible goals and perspectives (Merchant & Van
der Stede 2016, 92). Employee rotation was an important way to perform the control
assessment (management testing of controls) in Nokia. Management testing was
organized as peer-to-peer testing. This meant that the employees were rotating within
the company to evaluate the controls performed by their peers.
The “testing teams” who were performing the control assessments included not
only specialists from the Internal Controls team but also controllers from other
business units. For example, a sales controller from Italy could attend the control
assessment session for Poland’s Sales Unit. The presence of a peer controller made
the local team more comfortable, and they also shared best practices through the
control assessment session. This increased the engagement with, and positive
perception of, internal controls and control assessment by the local teams. The
atmosphere was more engaging and relaxed in SOX testing sessions, compared to,
for example, the internal audit sessions. 
The employees were carefully selected to perform the management testing. The
person had to be not only independent (e.g., coming from another subsidiary) but
also competent to perform the testing to ensure the reliability of the testing result. 
The Finance & Control employees were the most familiar with the internal controls,
so it was quite natural to select the controllers to perform the testing.
“We set up a very heavy SOX internal control testing regime. All the testing was
done by controllers…and we were doing that because we felt that the controllers
were those who knew probably best what really happens. And we also were
using the controllers because by sending people from one place to another place,
we gained a lot of spin-off benefits around the best practice sharing, helping also
to build the F&C community.” (Vice President, Sales Unit Finance & Control)
124 
   
 
      
  
           
  
 
 
     
    
     
  
   
    
   
 
   
          
 
   
     
            
    
 
     
   
  
       
        
   
         
   
     
     
 
   
    
    
Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
And the controllers mostly took this task without complaints, because they felt
they were able to benefit from sharing best practices during the testing.
“For the person doing the testing it was maybe motivating to enhance the own
way of working when you can share the practices and see how your colleagues
exactly doing the same thing in other locations are doing their job. Of course this
was of interest to many of the controllers.” (Manager, Internal Controls)
The presence of a peer controller was also very important for the local team.
Having a peer present (in addition to the SOX coordinators or the IC team member,
who were often associated more closely to the auditors) made the local team more
comfortable, and they also shared best practices during the control assessment
sessions. One Senior internal controls specialist had had a rather bad experience
when she went alone to perform management testing in a local sales unit in Poland.
The next time she went there with a controller from another sales unit, and her
experience was very different:
“The first visit was a disaster, the local controller was very reluctant towards the
testing session. But next time when I went there, I had another local sales unit
controller testing with me, and I was trying to explain, that I have this controller
with me here now, because I want him to also learn what you are doing here in
Poland. So, the second time, the testing session went a bit smoother. It was easier
for the local controller, because it was not only a global internal controls team
doing the testing, but we had really a controller from the same kind of local sales
unit joining the session. (Senior Internal Control Specialist)
Both a controller and a SOX coordinator or a member of the IC team was
typically present in the testing session to ensure that the assessment was performed
and documented appropriately. It was rather straightforward to run the testing
sessions, because the testing procedures (“testing scripts”) were described in detail
in the control catalogs, so the actual flow of the sessions was very structured. 
Typically, 3-5 days were reserved to perform one management testing session in a
subunit. As a common practice, local management made it clear before the session
that everyone was expected to contribute on their part. Enough time and resources
were reserved for the testing, so the local units felt they were provided with the
necessary resources. These social elements of control enabled the testing sessions to
run smoothly most of the time.
Most of the interviewees who participated in the management testing sessions
described them positively. Most of the time, whenever there would be a testing
session coming up in a certain unit (for example local sales or manufacturing unit),
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the local management made it a priority and also made themselves available to
participate in the sessions. For employees, the tone at the top, and tone at the middle,
was clear. Management was usually always at the opening and closing meetings, and
they also gave their teams a clear message that everyone should prioritize and
contribute in any way they could to pass the management testing session. One SOX
coordinator explained that she always included the local F&C management on the e-
mail she sent to the local team prior to the management testing session to inform the
team about the testing. Her experience was that local management immediately
showed the team that it was a priority:
“Quite often, the [local] finance and control head is commenting that ‘okay, this
is important thing, please be prepared, please provide everything that the testers
will need, and please help them as much as you can,’ and at least I haven’t faced
so often situations, where the controller would say that ‘no, it’s not possible to
come here and do the testing, or I’m not participating, or we are not helping you,’
or anything like that.” (SOX coordinator)
Based on the interviews and observations at Nokia, it became clear that the
control assessment sessions played an important role in organizational life. In fact,
the sessions became important rituals in many business units, which can be viewed 
as a set of social arrangements, which are form of physical arrangements. In most of
the cases, both local managers and employees took these events seriously and really
put a lot of effort into making them successful. Once the testing was concluded, the
good results were celebrated together. In case there were many deviations noted
during the assessment, the teams made a great effort to fix the issues. There was a 
lot “succeeding together” spirit and teamwork occurring to achieve good results in 
the assessment.
“Very good thing related to this SOX exercise and to the whole program is this
community way of working. We have seen a lot of people and it’s a very good
example of the networking, it’s a very good example of the team-working. It’s
getting to know people from a different culture, getting a deep understanding of
the processes, understanding the differences between the processes and between
the countries... It’s been very eye opening and it’s been a privilege to work
within this organization.” (Director, SOX and Internal Controls, Sales and
Marketing)
Thus, the SOX testing sessions took on an important role in the social life of the
subunits across the organization. This also made social sanction a powerful tool to 
ensure compliance. Social sanction was exerted in many ways and on several
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organizational layers. For example, the progress and results of the control assessment
were monitored in detail in the SOX steering group, audit committee and different
management team meetings. This monitoring indicated which were the
organizational units and individuals who were accountable and responsible for the
control deviations identified through testing. No one wanted to be included on this
“black list”, which was a term mentioned by many interviewees. Being the one 
responsible for a control deviation meant that the whole team could not only lose
their bonuses but could also be seen in a questionable spotlight in the management
review. Conversely, when a certain team received good results from the control
assessment session, they were celebrated and highly appreciated by management.
Social sanction was a very powerful control, especially in countries such as China,
where the fear of “losing face” is embedded into the cultural norms. One SOX 
coordinator described the control testing session as follows:
“So first of all the testing session is a really big thing for them [employees in
China], and they really want to have the management involved in the opening
meeting, and in the closing meeting, and they really want us to explain the details
that why we are doing this and what we really want to see and what we are
looking for, and so on. And then if there are any failures so it’s not an easy thing
for them, because somehow they are losing their face they feel that they have
done really something wrong.” (SOX coordinator)
The control assessment procedures were taken very seriously in several subunits.
The SUs spent much effort to pass the control testing and to avoid any control
failures. Everyone knew that the results of the control assessments were reviewed at
a high level within the organization, and no one wanted to be on the top list of the
deviations:
“I know as a controller, that, for example, if I fail, if I’m not to do a good job in
SOX. SOX is one of those areas where the information goes to top management
very quickly, I mean top management in finance is reviewing those results, and
they see very soon that okay, ‘Turkey, red flag, what’s happening in Turkey’ so
I know that this is not the good area to make a lot of failures, so better to do good
work here, ha ha [laughs]. So maybe that’s enough motivation for me.”
(Business Controller, Local Sales Unit)
“Management team members were competing that oh, I'm on red, I don't want
to be on red, and then after the meeting they came and asked, what do I need to
do to get on green. So people realized that they don't want to be seen in red, if
Olli-Pekka [CEO] or Rick [CFO] sees it. What I learned there is that there was
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a competition on who is and isn’t in the SOX red list. If you present it the right
way to the management, people are so competitive that they start competing. 
And that helped a lot in the implementation.” (SOX Program Manager)
Table 8 summarizes the social controls that were identified in the field. Table 8
also shows the social controls that were applied to address specific internal control
components. This table is not all-inclusive, meaning that one could most likely find
every form of social control to address every single internal control component. 
Thus, this table and this chapter have only highlighted some examples of the social
controls found in the field. The purpose is to exemplify the interplay that can occur
between the social and technical controls.
Table 8. Social controls within the internal control system of Nokia
FORM OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL
DESCRIPTION
(MERCHANT & VAN 
DER STEDE 2016,
89-92)
SOCIAL CONTROLS 
IDENTIFIED IN NOKIA
INTERNAL
CONTROL
COMPONENT 
WHERE SOCIAL 
CONTROL WAS
APPLIED
TONE AT THE TOP Management can
shape culture by
setting a proper tone 
at the top. 
SOX compliance was 
supported by the top 
financial management, both 
in talk and in action. The 
strong management
commitment facilitated the 
implementation of technical
controls. Tone from the 
middle was also visible.
Control environment
Control activities
Information &
Communication
Monitoring activities
INFORMAL
COMMUNICATIONS
Training is a common 
way to increase the 
likelihood that
employees act as 
expected. Training
can provide useful
information about
what actions are 
expected and how
individuals should
perform their duties.
Nokia used informal
communications
extensively. SOX was often 
mentioned in informal
discussions to reinforce the
message that it needed to 
be taken seriously.
Strong organizational
myths resulted from the
informal communications,
such as “CFO and CEO will
go to jail if we don’t
comply.” Sometimes these
myths were misused to 
address non-SOX related
objectives.
Training and
communication
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Table 8. Social controls within the internal control system of Nokia [continued]
FORM OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL
DESCRIPTION
(MERCHANT & VAN 
DER STEDE 2016,
89-92)
Proper job design 
allows motivated and
qualified employees 
a high probability of
success. Necessary
resources to do a 
good job may include
information,
equipment, supplies,
staff support,
decision aids, or
freedom from
interruption.
SELECTION AND 
PLACEMENT OF 
EMPLOYEES
Finding the right
people to do a 
particular job and
giving them both a
good work
environment and the 
necessary resources 
can increase the
probability that a job 
will be done properly.
Nokia made a conscious
decision to minimize the 
use of external resources;
instead, it wanted to build 
the SOX capabilities in-
house. The Finance &
Control organization was
heavily resourced to meet
the SOX needs.
Control environment
Risk assessment
Control activities
Training and
communication
Monitoring activities
JOB DESIGN AND 
PROVIDING
NECESSARY 
RESOURCES
SOCIAL CONTROLS 
IDENTIFIED IN NOKIA
Nokia invested a lot in the 
SOX implementation. A
centralized "SOX team"
provided the necessary 
support to all units,
including information, tools,
instructions, staff support
and decision aids. SOX
coordinators had the 
opportunity to work closely
with the business units,
which motivated them.
Nokia nominated SOX
coordinators for each 
horizontal and business 
unit, whose task was to 
translate the SOX
requirements into business
terms and support their
implementation.
INTERNAL
CONTROL
COMPONENT 
WHERE SOCIAL 
CONTROL WAS
APPLIED
Control environment
Risk assessment
Control activities
Monitoring activities
GROUP REWARDS Group rewards are
incentives based on
collective 
achievement, which 
can encourage 
creation of peer
pressure on
individual employees 
to exert themselves 
for the good of the 
group.
SOX compliance was part
of the incentive plan for
several functions and units 
globally. Employees 
perceived a high level of
peer pressure to achieve 
the targets. The perception 
of social sanction was
strong in cases where
control deficiencies were
identified.
Control environment
Control activities
Monitoring activities
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Table 8. Social controls within the internal control system of Nokia [continued]
FORM OF SOCIAL 
CONTROL
DESCRIPTION
(MERCHANT & VAN 
DER STEDE 2016,
89-92)
SOCIAL CONTROLS 
IDENTIFIED IN NOKIA
INTERNAL
CONTROL
COMPONENT 
WHERE SOCIAL 
CONTROL WAS
APPLIED
EMPLOYEE 
ROTATION
Intra-organizational
transfers or
employee rotation 
help transmit culture 
by improving the 
socialization of
employees
throughout the 
organization, giving 
them a better
appreciation of the 
problems faced by
different parts of the 
organization, and 
inhibiting the 
formation of
incompatible goals 
and perspectives.
Employee rotation was 
utilized in the control
assessment sessions. In 
peer-to-peer control testing
the employees shared best
practices with the peers 
who worked within the 
same areas of business 
control in different
countries.
Monitoring activities
PHYSICAL 
ARRAGEMENTS
Physical
arrangements 
include office plans,
architecture and 
social arrangements.
The control assessment
sessions became
organizational rituals,
important social
arrangements, in which 
local units wanted to 
succeed and celebrate 
good results together. The 
SOX/Internal Control status 
meetings and SOX
Steering group also
became a social
arrangement in which either
social sanctions or rewards 
were exerted.
Monitoring activities
Information &
communication
3.2.3 Internal controls system (objectives of controls)
Previous chapters displayed how technical and social controls were used to build an
internal control system at Nokia. These different technical and social controls form
the first layer of the internal control design process. The second layer is formed by
the specific objectives that the different sets of controls have. In this study context,
controls can have either performance or compliance objectives. Performance
objectives may relate to achievement of organizational goals and creation of value,
whereas compliance objectives seek to ensure compliance with laws and regulations.
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
This second layer forms the internal control system, which contains all the elements
of the first layer.
COSO (2013) acknowledges the different roles of controls by identifying three
main objectives for internal control. The first objective, effectiveness and efficiency
of operations, is linked to performance. The other two objectives, reliability of
financial and non-financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, are linked to protecting value and ensuring compliance.
Traditionally, performance objectives have been associated with positive aims
of control whereas compliance objectives with negative. For example, Cunningham
(2004) refers to control objectives by using definitions of negative and positive aims
of controls. A positive controls’ purpose is to achieve the organizational objectives,
whereas a negative control’s purpose is to ensure compliance: “Compliance controls
are primarily intended to meet governmental policies, without that first priority of
achieving corporate objectives. Though particular governmental policies may be
written in positive terms, from the corporation’s viewpoint the goals are not
principally about meeting its objectives (a primary, positive aspiration) but about
meeting the government’s objectives with the corporation’s principal interest being
to avoid violating laws or exposing itself to liability (a negative objective)”
(Cunningham 2004, 275).
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 181) suggest that each control can manage
performance and/or compliance to different degrees. The two objectives of controls
(performance and compliance) are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are opposing
forces that coexist to create tension. They illustrate this with an example from their
field studies: “One of the organisations managed the performance of each unit as a
way to identify theft (performance management to achieve conformance/assurance)
and another was compliant with the industry’s guidelines and best practices as a way
of having a competitive advantage and saving costs (compliance management to
achieve performance).”
This study supports the idea suggested by Tessier and Otley (2012a): Nokia had
a vision to implement SOX controls not only to serve compliance objectives but also
to address performance objectives. When compared to the benchmark companies28, 
the number of controls in the SOX scope in Nokia was very reasonable, and each
control was designed to serve the business needs.
“When we benchmarked us with other companies, we did not go half as far as
others had gone. During the project we had a clear business approach; we were
looking not to only comply with SOX legislation literally, but along with 
Nokia paid visits to other global companies (see chapter 3.1.1.) to benchmark how they
had implemented SOX.
28 
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complying with it we wanted to check what fits to our business so that it (internal
controls) would serve our business purposes. And as the years have now elapsed,
it has been one of our focus areas, to each year seek for efficiencies to be able to
reduce the number of controls and to really only have the needed controls in 
place, which are then being followed and tested…Cause there is always a risk in
implementing this kind of things that things are being overshot and things turns
into bureaucracy.” (Senior Vice President, Group Controller)
Nokia’s top management wanted to develop an internal control system that
would serve the business needs of the company and harmonize the global processes.
This meant developing the internal processes at the same time when designing the
controls – and not just do the minimum for SOX compliance. 
“If our whole objective is purely compliance, then we need to do it the most cost-
effective way we can. But then, at the end of the day, what that means is that we
can put a tick in the box and sign a statement to the SEC that we are compliant.”
(Vice President, Sales Unit Finance and Control)
“I think the controls are important, not necessarily for compliance but for the
business. The biggest benefit would be the overall improvement to the
communication within the business. The business understanding itself.“ (Sales
and credit controller)
“I think that in general the business does an excellent job on the control side... I
think the business as a whole gets it now…The business needs to understand
what’s happening in itself. And internal controls enables us to do that. It’s less
about reporting things on the New York Stock Exchange and more about
understanding how the business works. And that we’re all working in the same
way and together to get to the end result. (Sales and credit controller)
At Nokia the internal control system was designed such that there was a clear
linkage to the business objectives. For example, there was a sales process related
control, according to which a credit check was to be performed for all new customers 
prior committing to any business transactions. From the sales manager perspective,
this control was not just about complying with internal credit policy, but this was
also a means to ensure that the customer has the ability to pay the invoice.
One of the learnings from the field is that once the controls are designed in
cooperation with the business, they are much more likely to add value to the
business. Thus, when designing the controls, one must keep in mind that “being 
compliant with the laws and regulations” might be a less appealing motivation to
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
perform controls than, for example, “the possibility of being able to manage the job 
well.” And if the controls are designed in a way that doing a good job goes hand in
hand with being compliant, the control is more likely to be adopted. Conversely, if
people feel that the compliance requirements are simply added on top of doing 
business as an isolated procedure, it might be more difficult to sell the control to
them.
3.2.4 Managerial intentions of controls
Managerial intentions refer to what managers are trying to achieve by implementing
controls. Tessier and Otley (2012a, 181) have assigned these intentions to three
categories:
1. Managers can decide what will be the consequences (rewarding and
punishing use) of the achievement (or non-achievement) of performance
and compliance requirements.
2. Managers can decide whether the control will be used in a way that
promotes creativity (enabling use) or in a way that ensures predictability
(constraining use). 
3. Managers can decide which controls will have the main focus of
promoting discussion and learning (interactive use) and which will be
looked at only if there is some deviance (diagnostic use).
Next we will reflect on how these different managerial intentions were identified
at Nokia.
Rewarding and punishing use of controls
While Simons (1995) suggests that compliance controls are managed using only
punishment (and not reward), Tessier and Otley (2012a, 173) argue that both control
objectives (performance and compliance) can be linked to reward and punishment.
As chapter 3.2.2. described in more detail, Nokia tied SOX compliance into
employee incentives.
“It was in a person’s incentives very clearly stated that they must succeed in
SOX.” (Process Development Manager, Group Internal Controls)
Thus, Nokia used both rewards and punishments to ensure SOX compliance.
These were visible not only in terms of material rewards and punishments, such as
monetary compensation or status upgrade but also in terms of social sanction being 
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applied, as described earlier. In fact, social controls played a significant role in
rewards and punishments at Nokia in the process of driving SOX compliance.
Enabling and constraining use of controls
The concept of a dual role for controls has gained importance in the literature
(Ahrens & Chapman 2004; Demski & Feltham 1976; Mundy 2010; Warren 1960;
Wouters & Wilderom 2008), where it is predominately described as competing roles
that create dynamic tension in an organization. That is, management control systems
are used to exert control over the attainment of organizational goals and also to
enable employees to search for opportunities and solve problems (Mundy 2010,
499). Tessier and Otley (2012a) call these roles enabling and coercive uses of
controls. 
According to Adler and Borys (1996, 62), enabling controls increase technical
efficiency through the writing of best practices, whereas coercive controls are meant
to “enforce compliance from employees assumed to be recalcitrant or irresponsible.”
Similarly, Ahrens and Chapman (2004) associated coercive controls with bad
outcomes, such as mistrust, resentment, and robotic management, and enabling
controls with positive outcomes, such as flexibility. However, Tessier and Otley 
(2012a) argue that controls themselves are neutral. Thus, whether the controls are 
seen as good or bad should be distinguished from the controls’ dual use (enabling 
and constraining). While the dual role of controls is a design attribute of MCS, the
quality of controls (good vs. bad) is not. According to Tessier and Otley (2012a,
174), the quality of controls refers to whether a control is effective, efficient,
economical, etc. (or not) and whether it has unwanted consequences, such as slowing
down innovation, causing dysfunctional behavior, etc. (or not). This is different from
the definition of the dual role described previously which views both roles as
desirable.
Most the internal controls are constraining by nature. Thus, the internal controls
used at Nokia (as in any company) were used to constrain employees from doing
things that could hurt the company objectives. Employees in the Finance & Control
function especially appreciated the controls, because the controls helped them
perform their job better: They often struggled with the sales and marketing teams
especially, who were driven by their sales incentives. As one Sales and Credit
controller explained the situation:
“If we didn’t have some of these controls in place, it’d be chaos. But your
marketing, your PR team, even your sales team, will probably say, “these are so
annoying, I want to open this [new customer account] and I want to open it now.”
Because they’ve gained a really good customer, and they’re going to be a really
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good customer. But because of the controls we have in place, I get to check that
customer out, I check the background, I ensure that they are really financially as
robust as we need them to be. And the sales team would prefer I didn’t, because
let’s just say that the salesman is targeted to sell, and he doesn’t really care what
happens to it once it’s sold.” (Sales and Credit Controller)
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 181) emphasized that constraining and enabling roles
are applicable to both compliance-related and performance-related controls. For
example, so called “Newspaper Test”29 is a control whose purpose is compliance,
because it ensures managers will respect the law and business codes of conduct, but
it is an enabling role, because it allows managers to be creative in their search for
business opportunities. A similar example at Nokia was a control in the Indirect
Purchasing cycle: there was a control that required an indirect purchase to be
negotiated by the sourcing organization in the cases where the purchase value was
above 200KEUR. However, there was an exception called “sourcing waver” – this
implied that, when managers would have a justified reason not to involve the
sourcing organization but to manage the purchasing activity by themselves, they had
to be able to defend this decision later, for example, if this question was asked in the
management testing session. Thus, Nokia used the control in both enabling and
constraining ways.
To conclude, when designing an effective internal control, it is not a question of
choosing between enabling and constraining uses of controls: Both uses are needed.
Interactive and diagnostic use of controls
Managers use interactive controls to involve themselves regularly and personally in
their subordinates’ decision activities (Simons 1995, 95). Interactive controls
facilitate and promote communication, focus attention (Adler & Chen 2011) and
promote learning (Ferreira & Otley 2009). At Nokia, the interactive use of controls
was demonstrated by closely monitoring the SOX program and control performance
in internal meetings and communications. Control practices and their assessment
were discussed intensively at various meetings to focus managers’ attention and
promote learning. 
“The Newspaper Test” refers to a control that guides employees, before making a
decision, to consider whether they could defend their decisions if they were made
public. This control does not give an absolute restriction as to what is accepted and 
what is not, but it rather relies on an individual’s ability to make decisions that aligned
with the company Code of Conduct.
29 
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“It [the importance of SOX] was very clearly communicated in all of the top
level F&C [Finance & Control] meetings. The Group Controller was taking this
seriously. And in all of the SOX steering group meetings all the unit F&C heads
were participating, so they got the message.” (Process Development Manager,
Group Internal Controls)
The interactive use of controls was also visible in the way the control
descriptions were constantly modified. The central SOX team would constantly ask
for feedback on the controls, and the SOX coordinators would help to modify the
controls and support the implementation of the changes. This way employees also
felt that they were able to participate in to the control development work.
“You know, some of the Nokia control points weren’t always applicable to us
[subunit] in the right way. And they were changed, for the [subunit] business,
very kindly by Nokia. And that enabled us then to get value added out of it.
Doing something just for the sake of doing it is a pointless exercise. The business
needs to have added value, whereas, you know, just putting a signature on a
document that is meaningless is a really pointless exercise.” (Sales and Credit
Controller)
Diagnostic controls represent controls that are only used when deviances from
the established targets are observed. Diagnostic use of controls was a crucial part of
the SOX program from the beginning, as the very core of SOX has the requirement
for management to assess and report on the internal control deficiencies and material
weaknesses within the control systems. The control deviations were identified via
control assessment and deviation reporting and monitored via internal reporting 
systems and management meetings, steering groups and audit committee. 
Following the first few years after the SOX program was established, the
intensity with which the controls were discussed interactively was reduced, and the
focus was more on the diagnostic use of controls.
3.2.5 Presentation of the controls
Presenting the controls acts as a bridge between managerial intentions and employee
perceptions and can influence how the controls are perceived (Tessier & Otley
2012a, 175). In this study, the presentation is the first step of the internal control
implementation: It’s about how the managers introduce the idea of the controls to 
employees. At Nokia, the SOX controls were presented not only as a legal
requirement but also as a way to improve the internal processes. In fact, for many 
corporate functions (such as finance, IT and sourcing), the SOX implementation
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project was actually a great opportunity to drive their own process development
initiatives, along with the SOX objectives. As the Head of Indirect Sourcing
explains:
“One of the challenges that we always had in the beginning is that there was no
mandate. So, there was no rule that said that, you know, if you have a purchase
order of a million or a hundred thousand or whatever, you have to go to
procurement to negotiate it; you can just do it yourself. And we had to sort of
sell ourselves into the organization. We had to convince marketing, that we can
add value. We had to convince IT that we can add value, we had to convince the
senior stakeholders, that we can negotiate the consultancy deals. So, we had to 
sell ourselves at every opportunity, and of course it was a bit tiring. So, when
Sarbanes and Oxley came, it actually made it so much easier for us, because 
basically then there was suddenly this control in place, that if there’s a deal of
over 200 000 euros, you have to go to indirect sourcing to let them negotiate the
deal. And then we either negotiated, or then we just give approval that okay, you
know, you can do this yourself, because we can’t add any value, or we are too
busy, or whatever. So, suddenly with Sarbanes and Oxley, we had a de facto
mandate.” (Head of Indirect Sourcing)
As the preceding quote demonstrates, some of the corporate functions saw SOX
as a useful tool that helped to enforce their own processes and procedures that the
business units were obligated to follow. Prior to the establishment of the SOX
legislation, Nokia had gone through several unsuccessful development projects
aimed at introducing new control practices and processes, such as an instruction to
use the central sourcing service when negotiating the contracts. However, only when
they became part of the SOX implementation project did those efforts to introduce
new controls become successful. SOX especially provided a mandate for many 
organizational functions (e.g., HR, IT, finance and sourcing) that they could use to
establish rules and procedures by simply referencing that they are part of the
requirements of the SOX legislation with which the company was obligated to
comply. As a result, such controls were followed much more obediently than before
SOX.
SOX gained a strong legitimacy in Nokia. Managers and leaders noticed that the
usage of the word “SOX” was a very efficient way to get some requirements through.
This also led to situations in which SOX was used as an excuse to get things done,
even in cases that had nothing to do with the requirements of the legislation itself.
When a certain task was introduced as a “SOX requirement,” it was considered as
“a must do,” and most people would perform the task without questioning. For
example, a manager might have told his team that they could not commit to a certain
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expenditure because of SOX. However, SOX controls did not include provisions on
what kind of activities could the company money be used for; it only appeared as
requirements on how the money spent should be approved and entered into the
company books and records. One SOX coordinator commented this as follows:
“You could use SOX to force things, but there is no guarantee that you use it to
enforce the right things…Some things are not so fast and flexible, not only
because of SOX requirements but because the way people use them to do things. 
So if you are a control-minded person, it gives you the stick that you can use:
you can use it (SOX) as an excuse, if certain things are not going as they should,
you can sort of say that okay, but because we have all these SOX requirements,
so we can’t, you know, do this and that, and it’s been delayed, and we have to
ask the approval, and the guy haven’t given it, and bla bla bla..” (Director,
Treasury Finance & Control)
“I think SOX was used wrongly to little bit like scare the people especially on
those early times. It was a strong word, so can justify many things. Maybe the
concrete example of misusing the SOX was that when you have many
development project for competing of the resources, you have like 15 projects
you want to do this year to develop this and this and that, but you only can do
10, so there was this type of the category ‘this is SOX Must do,’ so they became
always number one and two and three on the list. And sometimes the reasoning
was really not the SOX, but somebody just wanted to put the SOX there as
reasoning, so nobody dared to be against you, because then you would go to jail
with the CFO.” (Local Sales Unit Controller)
“Many times people used SOX as an excuse, to easily drive certain
matters…Maybe I was sometimes guilty of doing that myself, too..It was like
when you raised up the “SOX-flag,” the resistance was gone… So, SOX was
used to drive matters which would have not gone through if SOX would have
not been used there.” (Vice President, Finance & Control, Manufacturing and
Logistics (previously Head of Shared Accounting Services)).
As just described, the presentation of controls affected how the controls were 
perceived in Nokia’s case. For example, controls related to using the centralized
sourcing service were not followed in the past when they were introduced as an 
internal compliance procedure. However, the same controls were adopted when
introduced as SOX controls. “SOX compliance” was a powerful way to present
almost any control- related idea in the organization. To sum up, in Nokia’s case the
controls were presented as mandatory compliance requirements.
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3.2.6 Employee perceptions of controls
“Nokia was used to working in a way that you are allowed to challenge just about
everything. And now looking back, it is surprising how little the “internal control
exercise” was being challenged. It was taken like “OK, this is now a situation
that this will not be challenged, but this is simply a “must do.” (Vice President,
Finance & Control, Manufacturing and Logistics, previously Head of Shared
Accounting Services).
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 175) suggest that employee perceptions can be
different depending on how the controls are presented. According to them, for
example, if an organization has a culture of “no red tape”30, the controls are more
likely to be perceived positively, if they are presented as a way to improve
performance rather than as a way to ensure compliance. At Nokia, the controls were
presented as a way to ensure compliance. As the previous multiple examples
demonstrate, there was a strong “SOX compliance” tone in the presentation of
controls. However, the resistance towards the controls was rather low and employees
mostly perceived the controls with positive attitude.
A prior study suggests that employee perceptions of controls with a performance
objective tend to be more positive than when the controls have a compliance
objective (Cunningham 2004). As chapter 3.2.2. discussed, the SOX controls in
Nokia had both performance and compliance objectives. However, there was only a
very limited negative perception among employees towards the controls. In fact,
most perceptions were either neutral or positive. Thus, the interesting question is: 
why did some employees have positive and some neutral or negative perceptions?
Next we will take a closer look at these various employee perceptions.
Positive perceptions
The key driver behind the positive perceptions was not just related to how the
controls were presented (all SOX controls were presented primarily as a means to
ensure compliance). Instead, what was important in this case was also how the 
controls were designed. First, the controls that were designed to meet the business
objectives along with the compliance objectives were mostly viewed positively. An 
employee had to understand how performing the control would relate to the business
In “No red tape” culture excessive regulation or rigid conformity to formal rules is
considered redundant or bureaucratic and hinders or prevents action or decision
making.
30 
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process, such as selling the product to a customer, purchasing goods or services for
the company, or optimizing the supply chain:
“Some SOX controls, which I feel are really good ones, are the ones we are
analyzing our business, and we are periodically analyzing that how our business
area is developing and how we could change some things and how we could
easily do something with a much lower price, or something like that, so.. maybe
that kind of thing, when they [people working in supply chain organization] are
analyzing some SOX controls or performing the controls, so maybe they can
also say, that ‘I  really get some good ideas how to do things better when I was
performing this control.” (Senior Internal Control Specialist)
Second, employees who viewed the controls positively also better understood
the content of the controls and why those needed to be performed. Nokia made a big
effort to translate the control requirements into practical guidelines. In addition to
the official control catalogs, there were many training materials, new employee 
induction sessions, practical handbooks and job descriptions that helped employees
to understand in detail what they were supposed to do. 
“We have intranet online training available for buyers which they can reach out
to anytime.” (Transactional buyer)
The Nokia culture was open for questions, and senior managers took the time to
support employees, took the controls seriously and led by example. When someone
resisted or would not perform a control, those cases were immediately escalated to
senior management. An important point was also the fact that it seemed important to
Nokia that the controls “make sense” to the employees. The control descriptions
were constantly changed based on employee feedback. Employees felt that that they
were also able to participate into the control design. Especially in the budget
literature, it has already been suggested that participation affects attitude and
motivation (see the summary of these studies by Shields and Shields (1998)).
Positive perceptions were linked also in situations where employees felt that the
controls helped them to perform better. At Nokia many employees recognized that
writing down the job descriptions and tasks gave conformity that the necessary tasks
were being done. This was especially seen as important when new employees were
joining the team. As the employees explained:
“This really helps to have clear instructions. If the person is changing to other
job and new (person) is coming, they can give those instructions and it will be
easy for the newcomer perform his duties.” (IT SOX Coordinator)
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“After SOX we have increased writing down instructions. Five or ten years ago 
a new employee would not have been given this clear and precise job
description…When a new employee enters a job, she must be given clear
instructions instead of saying that “just start doing as I instructed you yesterday.”
(Accountant 1, Shared Accounting Services)
Third, it seems that performing well with the controls was very important for the
employees who had strong emotional ties to the controls. The social controls played 
a significant role in creating these emotional ties. People were motivated by the
group rewards, but also there was a fear of ending up on a “black list.” Aiming to 
achieve a company-wide target together gave the employees a sense of belonging 
and they felt their job was meaningful and important. Based on the observations and
interviews, it became clear that for many people in Nokia, the SOX controls were
not just about compliance. Instead, people felt proud on the way they were able to
contribute and add value to the corporate initiatives that were monitored on a group
level by senior management. People seemingly felt proud when they could show
their knowledge on SOX and how their work was linked to SOX compliance.
Neutral perceptions
Negative or positive perceptions usually occurred when an employee had emotional
ties to the controls. Some perceptions were also neutral. Employees followed the
controls, because they were a “mandatory requirement.” In fact, as many
interviewees explained, when a certain requirement was introduced as a SOX
requirement at Nokia, it was easy to get the buy-in, and very few people would resist.
Indeed, in a way, “compliance with SOX” became a norm31 in the organization.
People followed the internal control requirements and in many case those became
part of the normal business processes. 
“I think we’ve, a lot of what we did is we changed the mindset of the people in
the company…Now we’ve come to a point where everybody’s been
brainwashed and educated on SOX, and that we need to have approvals and POs
[Purchase Orders], everything in place before we do something. Same with the
approval rights and all these things. People are now used to it.” (Business
Controller, Product Design)
Organizational norms define appropriate attitudes and behaviors that guide its
members’ attitudes and behaviors (O’Reilly & Chatman 1996, 166), forming part of the
organizational culture.
31 
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“I think the SOX controls are part of the everyday life at Nokia. People don’t
question them, or see them isolated from the daily business activities.” (SOX
Coordinator)
Negative perceptions
Employee perceptions of the controls were mainly positive or neutral. However, in
a global multinational company, it is not possible practically to face no resistance.
According to Merchant and Van der Stede (2016), controls such as pre-action
reviews can produce negative attitudes. Thus, it was no surprise that some employees
experienced SOX controls with a negative tone. But what was behind the negative
attitudes towards the controls? Two key factors can be identified.
First, the employees who had negative perceptions typically did not understand
why they needed to perform the control or simply did not see a reason why they
should perform it. Some employees in the IT department, for example, who had been
working for the company for 20 years, did not see the purpose of changing their way 
of working, because “things were working fine the way they had been always done.” 
Interestingly, even though there were some employees with a negative perception,
they did perform the controls despite their emotions. This was due to the social
controls, meaning that any non-compliance was easily escalated to top management, 
who took compliance seriously.
“If our big managers [IT senior management], if they don’t support, so nothing
happens. At the beginning, because there were a lot of change resistance and
everybody was kind of ‘arrgh, SOX, this is horrible,’ and still there are some
change resistance, but at the time we needed a lot of escalation power. And also
today, if there are some difficult areas, so just to go to our unit heads, so they are
just saying that ‘do it,’ and, so that is really needed, so.. Power is needed and
senior management support, really, if that is not in place, so no successful story.”
(Senior Development manager / SOX coordinator for IT)
Second, if the social controls were not systematically applied in the technical
controls' implementation among the employees, they were more likely to have a
negative perception. In other words, the likelihood for a negative perception was
higher if there was a lack of social pressure, employee rotation, informal training or
tone from the top.
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Neglectful perceptions
According to Berlo (1960), employees’ individual attributes, such as the socio-
cultural environment in which they evolve, influence how they perceive controls. 
Indeed, there were also some employees who perceived the controls as undesirable
because of local circumstances. For example, some employees in Mexico
experienced that the SOX controls did not fit into the requirements presented by the
local business partners.
“In Mexico, I would say that it was something totally different than in other
countries. They really have only one or two big [local business partners] and we
are working only with them. They are actually managing the whole market in
Mexico, and actually they are saying to us, that what they want us to do. Even if
Nokia has a big market share in Mexico, so still actually the [local business
partners] are so strong, so they are actually saying how we can operate there, in
that market area…So when we were doing the testing, we noticed, that they are
not following the global processes. Even if we have SOX and the controls there,
and we are instructing that you need to work this way, but it’s not just possible.”
(Senior Internal Controls Specialist)
As that quote demonstrates, there were some very strong local contexts where
the employees felt that following the global controls were not an option if they
wanted to do business in that particular market. As was the case in that example, the
internal controls related to contract creation, pricing and credit limits were designed 
in such a way that the local business partners did not accept the terms. Thus, the
salesmen saw following the controls as a trade-off of doing business. In fact, their
perception was neglectful towards the controls, meaning that they knew what was
required by the SOX controls, but they did not comply with the controls. This was
different than in the cases where the perception was neutral or negative, because in
those cases the employee usually did perform the controls even though their
perception was not positive.
Another example of a neglectful perception would be a salesman working in a
market with high pressure to meet customer demands. One Sales and Credit
Controller demonstrated the situation as follows:
“He (salesman) wants to go off and do his own thing in his own way and without
any control on him. He wants to spend our money without having to be
questioned about it… The salesman is targeted to sell, and he doesn’t really care
what happens to it [the business deal] once it’s sold. So his main priority isn’t
the business as a whole. I think internal controls can take on the business as a
whole. “(Sales and Credit Controller)
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To summarize, in the case of Nokia, employee perceptions were positive towards
the controls in cases where 1) controls were designed to meet both the compliance 
and performance objectives; 2) the controls made sense to the employees; and 3)
employees had emotional ties to the controls, facilitated by the social controls.
However, employee perceptions were neutral in cases where they had no strong
emotional ties to the controls but there were insufficient grounds for not complying.
Furthermore, employee perceptions were negative towards the controls in cases
where 1) employees did not understand the controls or did not see a reason to comply 
or 2) social controls did not facilitate the implementation of technical control.
Finally, there were also employees who were neglectful of the controls. For them the
local circumstances did not support complying with the controls or there was strong
friction between the compliance and performance objectives of controls. This led to
them ignoring the controls as compliance was seen as a trade-off of doing business.
The following table summarizes the key explanations for different types of
employee perceptions at Nokia and whether or not they performed the controls. 
Table 9. Employee perceptions of internal controls and control performance
EMPLOYEE 
PERCEPTIONS
POSITIVE NEUTRAL NEGATIVE NEGLECTFUL
EXPLANATION
FOR THE 
PERCEPTIONS
Perceptions were 
positive when 1)
controls were 
designed to meet
both the 
compliance and 
performance
objectives; 2) the
controls made 
sense to the
employees; and 3)
employees had
emotional ties to
the controls,
resulting from the 
application of
social control.
Perceptions were 
neutral in cases 
when employees
did not have
strong emotional
ties to the controls 
but there were
insufficient
grounds to not
comply.
Perceptions 
were negative
towards the
controls in cases
where 1)
employees did 
not understand 
the controls or
did not see a 
reason to
comply, or 2)
social controls 
did not facilitate 
the
implementation 
of technical
control.
Perceptions were 
neglectful in 
cases where 
local
circumstances
did not support
complying with
the controls or
there was a 
strong friction 
between the
compliance and 
performance
objectives of
controls.
CONTROL
PERFORMANCE
Employees
performed the 
controls as they 
saw them as
useful or they 
wanted to 
“succeed
together.”
Employees
performed the 
controls but did 
not have strong 
emotions towards
them. They did it
because 
“everyone had to 
comply.” SOX 
became a norm.
Employees
performed the 
controls, even 
though they
experienced 
negative 
emotions and
change 
resistance
towards the
controls.
Employees did 
not perform the
controls and 
simply ignored 
them.
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3.3 Display and discussion of the key results
3.3.1 Summary of key findings
One of the core questions underlying this study setting is the question of how to
design and implement an internal control system. The current study around the topic
overlaps with several different academic fields, including management accounting,
general management control research and organization theory, which all include
theoretical concepts that relate to how internal control systems should be designed.
Previous literature suggest that controls must be interactive, balanced, dynamic and
adaptive, cost effective and embedded in the daily operations rather than
superimposed or loosely coupled (see, e.g., Cardinal, Sitkin and Long 2004;
Chapman 2003; COSO 2007; Picket 2001, 21; Simons 1991). 
Oliviero (2002) and Picket (2001) have suggested that firms must invest in
control competence so that internal controls may be better designed and managed
throughout the organization. Arwinge (2010, 139) concludes that the knowledge and
skills required by an internal control architect are significant, and the task of
appropriately designing a system of internal control should not be underestimated.
The current literature has not yet profoundly addressed how firms design and 
implement their internal control systems and how those controls are perceived by the
organization. 
The design of the internal control is contingent upon a number of factors internal
and external to the firm and controls should thus be based on the specific
circumstances of the firm. Jokipii (2006) studied the internal control structure and
internal control effectiveness through the contingency characteristics that describe
the organizational context. Her results state that prospector strategy and high-
perceived environmental uncertainty do matter more in internal control than other
contingency characteristics, such as organization structure and size. However,
Woods (2009, 80) found that control systems were contingent on organizational size:
Large-scale operations tended to have more formalized controls, characterized by a
tendency to have more documented control systems.
At the core of this study has been the assumption that design of internal control
does not just cover the technical controls or controls over financial reporting. Instead,
it is crucial that organizations consider the social controls' design and impact. It is
also not enough to design the internal control from the auditors’ and accountants’
perspective. Instead, strong focus should be on the perspective of those who
ultimately are responsible for maintaining the controls – the business management.
This study has looked for the micro-level factors within the implementation of a
system of internal controls under a legislative requirement. In more detail, the
purpose of this study is to understand how can an organization design an internal 
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Niina Ratsula
control system (comprising internal control components, control types, control
objectives and managerial intentions) and successfully implement it to the
organization (presentation of controls, employee perceptions of controls and, finally,
control performance). The aim has been to understand the interrelationships between 
the technical and social controls within the design and implementation process and
refine a framework to address these multiple aspects.
One of this study's key findings is that the social controls can play a significant
role in implementing technical controls. This study suggests that these two control
types should not be looked isolated, because their continuous interplay will affect
how the controls are perceived and performed. In this case study, Nokia made a 
conscious decision at the beginning of the project to avoid SOX compliance
becoming a “tick the box” exercise. In doing so, Nokia applied a variety of social
controls to overcome the potential difficulties, such as resistance or ceremonial 
adaption of control, in the technical control implementation. 
The social controls at Nokia – the tone at the top, group rewards, informal
communications, social sanction, job design, providing necessary resources,
employee rotation and physical arrangements – facilitated the technical control
requirements’ implementation. Compliance with the SOX controls became
embedded in the company culture within the Finance & Control community, that is,
it was built on shared traditions, norms, beliefs, values, ideologies, attitudes and
ways of behaving (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 92). Employees shared a 
common understanding that compliance was something to pursue and commit to.
Employees had strong emotional ties to the controls and that helped them to make
sense out of the controls. These emotions included strong commitment and loyalty
and a strong respect towards superiors within Nokia. 
A prior study (Scapens 2006) suggests that if the control system is initially more
open to design and creation, later on it will be more or less taken for granted among
the many users and, therefore, more difficult to change. This was not the case in
Nokia. Due to the strong culture and strong application of social control, Nokia was
able to change the control style from an informal to a more formal internal control
without significant change resistance and inertia. SOX coordinators had a key role
in this positive change: they acted successfully as mediators between the horizontal
and business units and the central SOX team. This decreased the change resistance,
because the SOX coordinators were able to adapt the HQ requirements to the
business units’ processes.
Previous research has not addressed the issue of how management should
implement internal controls for them to become effective. In this study’s view, this
is a question about social control: A well-functioning system of internal control is
not about setting up technical controls and expecting that employees will blindly
comply. Instead, it is a matter of how managers apply the social controls. Leadership
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involves multiple elements of social control; how the leaders demonstrate example,
how they communicate, allocate resources and apply social rewards or sanction. This
study highlights the importance of the role of tone at the top and middle management
in influencing internal control practices and recognizing the importance of
employee’s attitudes and emotions. This study finds that employees are more likely
to perform the controls when they find them meaningful: they must feel on a personal
level that compliance matters. In Nokia’s case, a strong “succeeding together”
attitude toward a clear goal that was a top management priority turned the “additional
burden” into a feeling of being part of something important. Employees felt that their
personal input at work made a difference. They experienced strong emotions toward
the controls, and they performed them as a result. On the contrary, employees who
did not have strong emotions, i.e., felt neglectful, were less likely to perform the
controls. Perceptions were neglectful in cases where local circumstances did not
support complying with the controls or if there was strong friction between the
compliance and performance objectives of the controls.
In this study the empirical evidence was reflected through three existing fields
of literature. First, the existing literature around the comprehensive view of internal
control (see, e.g., COSO 2013) was used to analyze the concept of internal control
from a holistic perspective. Second, these components of internal control were
reflected through the concepts of technical and social control and the interrelations
between these elements were studied. Here Merchant and Van der Stede’s (2016)
control definitions were used as the primary theoretical concepts. Third, the
framework developed by Tessier and Otley (2012a) was used to explain how the
holistic system of internal control was designed and implemented. This study added
the components of internal control and control performance by the employees to the
framework. The decisions made by the management to design the internal control
system were at the core of this study’s analysis, along with how the employees
perceived and performed the controls presented by management. A refined
framework was developed to explain the research findings. This is illustrated in 
Figure 13.
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Figure 13. Refined framework for designing and implementing a system of internal control (Based
on the frameworks by Simons (1995) Tessier and Otley (2012a) and COSO (2013))
3.3.2 Interplay between technical and social control in IC 
design
The internal control (IC) components – control environment, risk assessment, control
activities, information and communication and monitoring activities – were 
identified to understand how Nokia designed its system of IC and translated it in
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
practice into the context of a SOX compliance program. This was done by first listing 
the technical SOX controls designed by Nokia. Second, the social controls that Nokia
used to introduce these technical controls were identified. This study’s findings
suggest that managers can use both technical and social controls in the design of any
of the five IC components, which are all interlinked. These sets of controls form the
first layer of an IC design framework.
The arrows between technical and social controls illustrate that these control
types are in constant interaction with each other. Both technical and social controls
are applied in all of the IC elements; together, they form an effective system of
internal control. Social control elements, such as tone at the top, physical
arrangements and informal communications, affect the internal control system as
whole; thus, it is not even possible to study them isolated from the complete system
of internal control. 
The second level of the framework comprises different control systems that have
a specific objective. Management control systems are defined as “systems, rules,
practices, values and other activities management put in place in order to direct
employee behavior” (Malmi & Brown 2008, 290). As such, the control systems are 
sets of social and technical controls. Different control systems have specific
objectives, performance and compliance being the two main objectives. In their
framework, Tessier and Otley (2012a) identified four control systems (strategic
performance, operational performance, strategic boundaries (compliance) and
operational boundaries (compliance). In internal control the emphasis is on 
operational objectives. The framework was modified to consider IC system as scope
of analysis, while recognizing that an IC system may include the same elements as
the control systems identified by Tessier and Otley.
Tessier and Otley (2012a, 181) suggest that each control can manage
performance and/or compliance to different degrees. Whereas traditional literature
has put internal controls strictly in the box of technical controls with compliance
objectives, this study recognizes that a system of internal controls comprises both
technical and social controls and can have both performance and compliance
objectives. This is line with the practical literature (COSO 2013) that suggests that
internal control has three main objectives. The first objective, effectiveness and
efficiency of operations, is linked to performance. The other two objectives,
reliability of financial reporting and compliance with applicable laws and
regulations, are linked to protecting value and ensuring compliance. Each control
can manage performance and/or compliance to different degrees. The objectives of
controls (performance and compliance) are not mutually exclusive; rather, they are
opposing forces that coexist to create tension. 
Nokia did not only want to comply with regulatory requirements, but it also
wanted to design the controls to meet the business needs and to facilitate the 
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harmonization of global financial processes, such as purchasing, sales, HR,
accounting and manufacturing. Thus, this study’s findings suggest that internal
controls can be designed to include both compliance and performance objectives to
ensure they become embedded in the daily activities of organizational life. When
technical controls are designed to serve only a compliance objective, they are more
likely to encounter resistance to their implementation. Yet, internal control can
simultaneously have a performance and compliance objective: For example, a
control that demands a sales manager to ensure proper due diligence check when
selecting a new sales agent can lead to better business performance (when dealing
with a reliable and reputable partner) and, at the same time, mitigate the compliance
risk (by limiting the risk of corruption and fulfilling the SOX requirements). When 
designing new controls, it is worth considering both the compliance and performance
objectives to increase the possibility of gaining positive employee perceptions. 
The third part of the internal control design framework represents managerial
intentions, emphasizing the different choices managers can make regarding the
internal control system. Managers can decide what will be the consequences (i.e.,
rewards/punishments) of the achievement (or nonachievement) of performance and
compliance requirements. They can also decide whether the control will be used in
a way that promotes creativity (enabling) or in a way that ensures predictability
(constraining). Lastly, managers can decide which controls will have the main focus
of promoting discussion and learning (interactive use) and which will be looked at
only if there is some deviance (diagnostic use).
Managers can use the controls in multiple ways to successfully implement a
system of IC. Internal controls can be managed using both rewards and punishments.
Compliance controls have traditionally been associated with punishments. For
example, Simons (1995) argued that organizations reward performance, punish
nonperformance and punish noncompliance but do not reward compliance.
However, this study suggests that organizations can include compliance objectives
in the performance appraisal process and reward employees on attaining both 
compliance and performance objectives. 
Internal controls can be used simultaneously in either enabling or coercive ways.
Internal controls, such as approval processes, have traditionally been considered as
rather coercive forms of controls. However, internal controls can also be used in
ways that promotes creativity, as the previous examples of the Newspaper Test and
the Purchase Waiver (see chapter 3.2.4) demonstrated. Furthermore, diagnostic use
of internal controls is needed to keep track of control deviations. Internal controls
can also be used interactively to ensure they are aligned with the current business
processes.
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Design and implementation of internal control system at Nokia
These three different layers form the internal control design. Ultimately, they
are all within the boundaries of the same box. This means that the technical and
social controls are all present and interacting with each other in all three layers.
3.3.3 Interplay between technical and social control in IC
implementation
Once managers have designed the system of IC, they make decisions on how to
present the controls, which, together with the control design, affect employee
perceptions of the controls. This study’s framework jointly calls the presentation of
the controls, the employee perceptions and the performance of controls the internal
control implementation. This chapter will specifically address the second research 
question: How does the presentation of controls impact the employee perception and
performance of the controls?
The Tessier & Otley (2012a) framework originally presented the “presentation 
of controls” outside the boundaries of the first three layers (in this study’s context,
the “internal control design”). Hence, their view separates the presentation of
controls from the layers where the technical and social controls interact. This study 
recognized the role of social control as being a key ingredient of the technical
controls’ presentation. Thus, the technical and social control were added to the layer
as well (see Figure 13).
This study suggests that the presentation of controls as “mandatory compliance
requirements” can be widely accepted and adopted when there are strong social
controls supporting this presentation, such as tone from the top, group rewards,
training and informal communication. At Nokia, technical controls were accepted
and widely adopted when they were presented as a mandatory compliance
requirement. As a result, the “SOX mandate” was also used to drive other initiatives
outside of SOX, due to its strong power within Nokia. 
Based on the view of this study, a well-functioning system of internal control
does not result out of enforcing a set of technical controls and expecting that
employees will blindly comply. Instead, it is a matter of how the managers apply the
social controls. If we can understand how we can make employees view the controls
as meaningful, they are more likely to comply. Even if the controls would be
presented with a heavy focus on compliance.
Having said that, we must also acknowledge that not only can social controls
facilitate the adoption of technical controls, but they can also facilitate the
ceremonial adoption or even circumvention of the controls, if applied wrongly. The
whole system of internal control can be jeopardized if managers use social control
to foster unethical behavior or to create fear. In fact, some Nokia interviewees
mentioned that SOX was used in a way to scare people: “If you don’t comply, the
151 
 
 
      
        
  
 
 
  
    
 
     
    
   
      
     
 
  
      
   
 
   
  
    
    
  
    
  
  
     
    
  
  
     
         
 
   
    
   
 
  
 
Niina Ratsula
CFO will go to jail and he will take you with him.” One must pay careful attention
to how employees perceive the message. If a strong tone at the top emphasize that
“everyone must comply,” top managers must avoid simultaneously creating a culture
in which employees start to avoid bringing compliance issues to management
attention. 
Another scenario of misusing the power of social control is when managers
“real” message is conflicting with the control objective. For example, managers may
ask the employees to complete the mandatory ethics training (technical control), but
at the same time deliver an unwritten message (social control) that what matters are
the business results, not how the results are actually achieved. In this situation the
employee more likely will ceremonially complete the technical control (ethics
training) but continue using unethical means to reach the business deal, if he believes 
that the business results matter more than ethical behavior.
This study’s evidence also suggests that the implementation’s success was
closely related to the role of social control in the organizational unit under scrutiny.
In the cases where employees bought into the idea of social control, they were more
likely to perform the technical controls. Social controls appeal to the emotional and
nonrational elements within employees (Ray 1986, 288). By acknowledging this
nonrational element of social control, it can be considered that whether an individual
will comply with a control requirement or not is not always a result of rational
decision making. There might be some nonrational elements involved in their
decision to comply or not to comply, i.e., to perform the control or not. Previous
literature suggests that positive emotions play a transformational effect, whereas 
negative emotions have an influential effect upon decision making (Babin & Babin
1996; Bagozzi et al. 2003; Khodayari & Hanzaee 2011; Perugini & Conner 2000;
Schlösser et al. 2013). These self-conscious emotions and neutralization techniques
(Sykes & Matza 1957) provide an explanation of why people do not always act
rationally. In other words, employees do not always follow the controls as a result of
a rational decision making; instead, employees’ emotions affect how they decide to
act. These emotions are tied with the employee perceptions of the controls.
Prior studies have suggested that employee perceptions are negative towards
controls with a compliance objective. For example, Cunningham (2004) suggests
that perception of controls with performance objective tends to be more positive than 
perception of controls with compliance objectives. Adler and Borys (1996, 61) also 
argue that employees’ attitudes are positive when formalization enables them “to 
better master their tasks,” and will be negative when it “functions as a means by
which management attempts to coerce employees’ effort and compliance.”
This study challenges this view by suggesting that employee perceptions can be
positive towards controls with compliance objectives and in the situation when 
formalization aims to coerce employees. This can happen when the coercive control
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is accompanied by the shared understanding that compliance with the controls is
important and something to reach for. At Nokia, when social controls were applied
to coerce employees, the perceptions were positive in most cases or at least neutral.
This is similar to the ideas suggested by Kraus et al. (2017) who found that managers
were able to avoid resistance to the implementation of formal controls by using
“ideological talk” as a form of social control. In their case, “through the interplay
with the predominant ideological control in place, the formal management control 
system became vested with symbolic significance.”
But why in this case study did the presented mandatory compliance requirements
gain a positive perception from most of the employees? Why were the employees
motivated to add to their workload for compliance purposes? This can be explained 
partly with organizational culture aspect. A strong “succeeding together” attitude
towards a clear goal that was a top management priority turned the “additional
burden” into a feeling of being part of something important. Employees felt their
personal input at work made a difference. Employees experienced strong emotions
towards the controls, which were affected as a result of complying with the controls. 
In cases where employees did not have strong emotions, i.e., they felt neglectful, 
they more likely did not perform the controls.
This study shares Tessier and Otley’s (2012a) view by suggesting that employee
perceptions are external to the design and presentation of control systems. While the
design of internal control systems and the way they are presented do influence how
controls are perceived, employees’ individual attributes, such as the socio-cultural 
environment in which they evolve, also play a role, as along with their level of
knowledge regarding the controls (Berlo 1960) and how they feel about the controls.
In addition to this, the ignorance of the controls may also be affected by a local
culture in which following the controls are seen as a trade-off of doing business. 
While the limited view of IC has clearly distinguished internal controls as
separate checks and balances, this study suggests that, in fact, the internal controls
work best when they are embedded in daily actions (i.e., other management control
practices). This has a clear connection to employee perceptions: an employee is less
likely to perceive the control positively if it is introduced as something additional
and separate, especially if the control is introduced primarily to prevent wrongdoing.
Instead, if the controls make sense to employees and helps them perform theirs job
better, their perceptions are more likely to be positive.
This study found that much of the social control occurred via informal
communications. SOX was strongly present in the daily discussions of both 
employees and management. Management sent the message via this informal
communication that SOX was a priority. Some rather strong words were used in
some communications, and some people described that the SOX message also
included elements of fear: “No one would dare not to comply with SOX.” This fear
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was one factor that fostered the control implementation in this case study. However,
shared emotions, such as fear, have also been found to harm organizational processes
and outcomes, for example innovation (Vuori & Huy 2015, 1). Thus, managers must
also be cautious when selecting the words they use to communicate. For example, in
the case of Enron and Lehman Brothers, management was famous for the aggressive
language they used to engage people in meeting business objectives. If the managers
create fear – by the way they talk and act – it might result in employees doing
“whatever it takes” to reach compliance technically and not being willing to openly
discuss potential issues concerning noncompliance.
Vuori and Huy (2015, 1) conducted a study of Nokia to understand its rapid
downfall over the 2005–2010 period from its position as a world-dominant and 
innovative technology organization. They found that top and middle managers’
shared emotions during the smartphone innovation process caused cycles of
behaviors that harmed both the process and its outcome. They found that middle
managers’ internally focused fear reduced their tendency to share negative 
information with top managers, leading top managers to develop an overly optimistic
perception of their organization’s technological capabilities and neglect long-term
investments in developing innovation. In their case the fear resulted as a failure to
openly share information about bad news. This raises a question could the fear found
in the study of Nokia lead into a situation where employees start hiding control
failures and are not willing to speak up about potential concerns regarding internal
controls? No evidence was found of this kind of behavior in this case study. The fear
of failure was in this case a factor that supported achieving the compliance. This 
study suggests that emotions matter in compliance and social control is the key
mechanism to affect those emotions. However, it should be noted that there might
be a thin line between motivation (to perform the controls) and desperation (to avoid
controls failure). Too aggressive social control may create too strong fear that
ultimately turns against the organization’s objectives. Thus, managers must be
careful when considering how to apply the social control.  
Alvesson and Kärreman (2004, 423) emphasized the interface between social
and technical forms of control and argued for a more symbolic, meaning-focusing
view of bureaucratic and output measurement controls. This study’s key finding is
that social controls are indeed needed for a global implementation of technical 
controls. Employees are more likely to have positive perceptions of technical
controls when they have an emotional tie to the control system. Furthermore, this
emotional tie can be significantly strengthened via the application of social controls,
such as tone at the top, job design, informal communication and group rewards. 
It is worth acknowledging that not all social controls are consciously designed.
For example, the unofficial competition for “being on the green in SOX management
testings” was a result of the strong tone at the top and many other ingredients of an
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internal control system. Both of these consciously and unconsciously designed social
controls resulted in SOX compliance becoming part of the norms and traditions
within the organizational culture.
3.3.4 Refined framework
As previously illustrated, the Tessier and Otley (2012a) framework was used to
explain the case study findings (see Figure 13). Whereas the framework was
originally applied to discuss the various levels of management control systems, it 
was used in this study to explain the design and implementation of the internal
control system in a case study setting. The five COSO (2013) elements were added 
to the framework and linked to the concept of technical and social control. In the
core of this study was the aim to understand and explain the interplay between 
technical and social control.
The framework was refined with the following dimensions:
1. The internal control components – control environment, risk assessment,
control activities, information and communication, and monitoring
activities – were added to the framework’s first layer. All five of these
elements can take the form of a technical or social control. This case study
has demonstrated that these elements are interlinked and connected to 
each other. The arrows between the technical and social controls illustrate
their connection. For example, a code of conduct is an element of internal
control that can be fostered via both technical and social controls. It can
be addressed from a technical perspective via written guidelines,
mandatory trainings and certifications that employees must sign. It can be
viewed from a social perspective through the tone at the top –
management promoting ethical business conduct in both talk and in
action. To be effective, both elements – social and technical – are needed
and they impact one another. 
2. The different elements of the framework were distinguished as “internal
control design” and “internal control implementation.” The Tessier &
Otley (2012a) framework originally presented the “presentation of
controls” outside the boundaries of the first three layers (in this study’s
context, the “internal control design”). This study recognized the role of
social control as being a key ingredient of the technical controls’
presentation. Thus, the technical and social control were added to the
presentation layer as well. 
3. This study has recognized that in addition to positive, negative and neutral
perceptions, employee perceptions can also be neglectful. The difference 
155 
 
 
      
      
 
      
   
 
        
  
   
     
         
  
 
    
 
 
    
   
    
  
 
Niina Ratsula
between a neutral and neglectful attitude is that in the latter, the employee
simply ignored the controls, whereas in the first, the employee performs
the control.
4. The framework was further developed by suggesting that based on
employee perceptions, they can either perform the desired controls or
ignore them by not performing them.
A prior study has identified but not yet comprehensively addressed the need to
see management control systems holistically by acknowledging the interplay
between social and technical controls. Simons’ (1995) Levers of Control framework
has been useful to study the management control systems, but it has also been
criticized for not taking into account the interactions between the different levers and
by treating employees as passive actors. This study has brought together the
incoherent study around internal control and the interactions between different levers
of control. It has also recognized that internal control and management control
overlap: many management controls can also be defined as internal controls. In fact,
internal control system works best when it’s part of the management control system,
instead of being viewed as isolated checks and balances. This study will contribute
to both the internal control and management control literature. These contributions 
are addressed in more detail in the concluding chapter.
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4 Conclusions
4.1 Theoretical contributions
Prior literature has called for more case studies to learn how firms design, apply and
oversee their systems of internal control (Arwinge 2010). This study answers this 
call and is among the first to research internal controls through a case study (see also 
Arwinge 2014; Pfister 2009) by addressing the interactions between the technical
and social controls within an internal control system. The objective of this study has
been to address the following two questions:
RQ1 How do social and technical control interplay in the design and
implementation of an internal control system?
RQ2 How does the presentation of internal controls impact employee
perceptions and performance of internal controls? 
The first question is about the actions taken by management regarding the control
system design and presentation of controls. The focus of the study is in
understanding the interplay between technical and social controls within these
processes. The second question is about how the controls are perceived by
employees, which impacts their attitudes and, ultimately, the implementation’s
success. The important difference between these two questions is that the employee
perceptions are outside of management’s influence. Separating the managers’
intention and employee perceptions allows us to emphasize that these two groups of
individuals’ views of controls might deviate from each other’s. This study will
propose some refinements to the existing control framework literature while
answering these two questions. Next, the research findings will be discussed from
the theoretical, managerial and legislative perspectives.
This study contributes to the literature on both management control and internal
control systems, bringing these two concepts closer together. It looks at the internal 
control system holistically, instead of circumscribing only certain aspects of control.
This study increases our understanding of how the internal control system functions
as a whole and how its different elements interact. Prior research has mainly focused 
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on examining only particular internal control components, such as the control
environment (D’Aquila 1998; Patelli & Pedrini 2015; Ziegenfuss 2001), control
activities (Barra 2010), communication (Hooks et al. 1994) or risk assessment (Mills 
1997). However, an effective system of internal control builds on the combination 
of all five intertwined components, so all five components and their interaction were
evaluated. Thus, this study will contribute to the literature on the comprehensive
view of internal control (see also Arwinge 2010; Pfister 2009).
The management control literature has previously considered internal control to
be mostly focused on ensuring that accounting records and information systems are
reliable (Simons 1995, 181) and has suggested that internal controls are mainly 
action controls, such as physical or administrative behavioral constraints (Merchant
& Van der Stede 2016, 87), whereas this study widens the view and brings the
definition of internal control closer to the concept of management control. For
example, Simons (1995, 42) has listed codes of conduct as being the most basic form
of a boundary system, and Merchant and Van der Stede (2016) have suggested that
tone at the top is a typical element of a social control. Both Simons and Merchant et
al. clearly have distinguished these definitions from the concept of internal control.
However, based on this study’s conclusions, code of conduct, tone at the top and the
commitment to ethical standards comprise the basic foundation for effective internal
control. This view has already been present for decades in the practical literature
(COSO 1994, 2013). To conclude, many features provided by the wider definition 
of internal control could be viewed as important components of any management
control system. This study suggests that to be effective, internal control should be
part of management control, instead of checks and balances which are isolated from
the other management control practices. Internal controls work best when they are 
embedded in daily actions, i.e. in other management control practices and business
processes. Employees are less likely to perceive the controls positively if they are
introduced as additional duties without a clear connection to the daily work. Instead,
if the controls make sense to the employees and helps them to make their job better,
their perceptions will more likely be positive.
Prior studies have suggested that the level of interaction between technical and
social controls is important and requires more attention. For example, Alvesson and
Kärreman (2004) found that social and technical controls are tied rather than being
substitutes as Ouchi (1979, 1980) argued. According to Alvesson and Kärreman
(2004), technical controls communicate ideals and have a strong symbolical content
(social aspect), but they are also influenced by the organization’s beliefs and
behavioral norms. Moreover, Bartunek (1984) described how social controls
influence technical controls, and Abernethy and Chua (1996) suggest that technical
controls can help rationalize social components of the control package. This study 
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sheds light on the interaction between technical and social control in the context of
internal control. 
This study has recognized that internal control is not just about manual checks
and procedures, such as signing off documents or securing assets with physical locks.
Equally as important is how people conduct internal control – how they design,
implement, maintain and monitor control as part of their day-to-day activities (c.f.
Pfister 2009, 22) – and how they apply social control, which is not always formally
designed or documented. Thus, internal control comprises both technical and social
control, which are interlinked and should not even be evaluated separately when
assessing the effectiveness of internal control. Interestingly, previous research has 
not addressed the issue of how management should implement internal controls for
them to become effective. In this study’s view, this is a question about social control:
A well-functioning system of internal control does not result from enforcing a set of
technical controls and expecting that employees will blindly comply. Instead, it is a
matter of how managers apply the social controls. Employees are more likely to
comply if they find the controls meaningful. Managers must understand these
employee perceptions and emotions and apply social controls to address them.
Thus, a crucial element in effective internal control is the focus on social control.
Prior studies have suggested that leadership has a strong impact on unethical
financial reporting (see, e.g., Mihajlov & Miller 2012; Tourish & Vatcha 2005).
Hence, leadership traits can craft an environment characterized by either integrity or
unethical practices (Patelli & Pedrini 2015). Leadership involves multiple elements
of social control; how the leaders demonstrate example, how they communicate,
allocate resources and apply social rewards or sanction. This study highlights the
importance of the role of tone at the top in influencing internal control practices,
providing more support for the idea that social control matters. 
Whereas the limited view of internal control has suggested that internal controls
are mainly checks and balances performed by accounting professionals (Simons
1995), this study emphasizes the role of internal controls as a holistic process. The
most crucial elements of internal control are not the individual technical controls,
such as approval procedures and system restrictions but, instead, the human 
interactions. This study’s evidence suggest that an effective internal control system
design consists of all of the five internal control elements – control environment, risk
assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring 
activities. Furthermore, the technical controls performed by the accounting 
professionals (c.f. Simons 1995) are not enough to ensure an adequate design for
internal control; internal control is also a responsibility of any employee within an
organization. Managers have a variety of social controls available to engage
employees to consider themselves accountable for the controls. These social controls
may take the form of informal communications, physical arrangements, tone at the
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top, and so on. Based on this study’s findings, it can be concluded that if the social
controls do not support the idea of the technical controls, it is more likely that the
internal control system will not provide the intended benefits, such as helping to meet
the operations, reporting and compliance objectives.
The SOX project in this case setting meant a significant change from an informal
to a more formalized control environment. Previous research has suggested that
changes in control style from informal to formal can lead to dysfunctional behavior
and distrust of the management (Johansson & Baldvinsdottir 2003). At Nokia, even
though there was some change resistance, the introduction of formal controls created
a very limited amount of dysfunction in the organization or distrust of the 
management. This finding is interesting, as previously at Nokia it had been natural
for people to challenge additional requirements and potential changes introduced by
headquarters.
Furthermore, the findings of this study also suggest that technical controls are
more likely to encounter resistance in their implementation when they are designed
to serve only a compliance objective. Hence, there is a better chance that they will
become embedded in the daily activities of organizational life when the controls are 
designed to include both compliance and performance objectives. Controls can also
be managed using both punishments and rewards. 
This study argues that a control can have performance and compliance objectives
simultaneously and that employee perceptions of such controls can be positive.
Employee perceptions are not only a result of the presentation of the controls; the
control design can also have a significant effect. Adding on to the previous literature,
this study suggest that employee perceptions can also be neglectful, in addition to
positive, negative or neutral (Tessier & Otley 2012a). A neglectful perception often
leads to employees not performing the control, whereas in cases when their
perceptions are negative, employees might still perform the control. In this study, it
seems that the employees who bought into the idea of social controls were the ones
who performed the controls. Conversely, the employees who ignored the controls
were unaffected by the social controls. This supports the view that internal controls
should not be viewed as purely technical controls (Simons 1995), because the control
systems’ effectiveness depend on the application of social control. Controls can be
deployed via automated system-based controls, which might not need the efforts of
the social control. However, a human will always be a central factor in the internal
control system. It is all about the people at the end of the day. 
Scapens (2006) suggests that if the control system is initially more open to design 
and creation, later on it will be more or less taken for granted among the many users, 
and therefore more difficult to change. This explains why many organizations have
failed in their technical control implementation projects. Thus, this case study’s
preliminary assumption could have been that the introduction of new technical
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control requirements would create change resistance and inertia and that the control
system would be rather difficult to change. However, this is not what happened in 
Nokia. In fact, one of the underlying reasons for the successful change was the
corporate culture, and its underlying values and beliefs. Ultimately, employees
perceived the controls as being part of the institutionalized environment, part of
“how things are done here.” Very few employees felt that the controls were “targeted
for individuals,” where avoiding the controls would have been an option.
Successful change also requires strong leaders (e.g., Kasurinen 2002, 331). Tone
at the top is one of the profound elements of a comprehensive internal control system.
While not ignoring the role of top management, this study also emphasizes the tone
at the middle. Top management might be very distant from the shop floor level,
especially in global and fragmented organizations, and that is when the role of the
local managers becomes more crucial. If they do not demonstrate the importance of
the controls through their daily actions, it is more likely that the employees next in
line in the chain of command are not engaged to implement and follow the controls,
even though there might be very a strong tone at the top in HQ.
Thus, this study suggests that support from middle management is also a key
factor in a control system implementation project. The actions of top management in
global companies may not be visible in all levels of the organization. Instead, the
example shown by middle management might play a much more critical role. For
example, employees at a certain factory might see the factory manager as a much
greater authority than the company CEO whom they have never personally met. In 
this case study, all subunits that had been successful in implementing the internal
control requirements had middle management representatives who were committed
to build strong internal controls and demonstrated a great example. To conclude, the
success of implementing effective control systems very much depends on the actions
of middle management, i.e., on the “tone from the middle.”
This study answers calls for research that explores the different elements of
control systems and their interrelations (Chenhall 2003; Malmi & Brown 2008). It
adds to the management control literature by looking at the holistic perspective on
control systems and considering both technical and social controls as part of the
control package. Until today, only a limited amount of study has been conducted
covering both of these control types (see, e.g., Abernethy & Stoelwinder 1995;
Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Ditillo 2003). This study is also one of the first ones to
integrate the concept of internal control into the concept of management control.
This empirical analysis, with its focus on how the internal controls are designed,
presented to and perceived by employees, has provided new insights into how
different types of controls can interact. Specifically, this research has sought to
address the interplay between control system rational design and socially constructed
realities (Berry et al. 2009). This study adds on to the existing literature by 
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considering how employee perceptions of controls impact performance of control,
i.e., employees can either perform or not perform the controls presented by 
management. Thus, this study answers calls to further study what affects employee
perceptions of controls (Adler & Borys 1996) and the impact of these perceptions on
organizational performance (Tessier & Otley 2012a, 182). Finally, this study makes
an important contribution to the literature around internal control by strengthening
the comprehensive definition of internal control and bringing internal control closer
to the concept of management control.
4.2 Managerial and legislative implications
Legal compliance and internal control requirements are often seen as additional
technical controls that must be integrated into companies’ operations. Technical
controls, such as system controls, approval policies, procedural checks and
mandatory training programs, are often easier to design than the social controls. This
is because social controls, to be effective, must be applied systematically and in line
with the written rules for a long period of time to see their effects. The effects of
social controls are also more difficult to evaluate or study, because they cannot be 
seen as a “tick the box” exercise.
However, this study shows that social controls can play a significant role in the
design and implementation of technical controls. The difficulties in implementing
new technical controls can be minimized via systematic application of the social
controls. Tone at the top, group rewards, informal communications, job design,
employee selection and rotation can facilitate the implementation of the new
technical controls’ compliance and/or performance objectives. Instead of being
interpreted negatively, compliance can become embedded in organizational norms,
traditions and belief systems with a positive meaning. We need strong leaders, tone
at the top and conscious decisions to invest in the time, people and resources required
to build an effective internal control system to make this happen. This study delivers
important message to business leaders: emotions matter. Whether it’s about 
implementing controls, business strategy or innovation, we should not ignore the
power of emotions. Especially during the era of technology and artificial
intelligence, people are still an integral part of the organizational processes. The most
powerful way to lead and manage people is by impacting their emotions. This is done
through a systematic and authentic application of social control.
A recent example of an organization that failed in compliance is the case of Wells
Fargo, a U.S.-based bank. Wells Fargo was slapped with a $185 million fine in 2016
for “widespread illegal” sales practices that included opening as many as two million
deposit and credit-card accounts without customers’ knowledge (Glazer 2016). As a 
financial institution, the company had stringent technical controls in place,
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accompanied by risk management processes, compliance and internal audit
functions. However, the company failed because of the lack of a decent social
control. In this case, misconduct was widespread in the retail unit, even though Wells
Fargo had control systems that were overseen by its board of directors. So, what went
wrong? An investigation commissioned by the board found that a warped corporate
culture, a decentralized organizational structure, and poor leadership were to blame
(Healy and Serafeim 2019). This case is not the first or the last example of an
organization that fails in compliance because of the lack of ethical leadership, but it
gives us a concrete reminder of why the social controls matter.
Managers have a variety of options to choose from, when designing an internal
control system. These options are not mutually exclusive: Social and technical
controls can serve both compliance and performance objectives. Internal controls 
can be used interactively to ensure they are aligned with current business processes.
Diagnostic use of internal control is needed to keep track of the control deviations.
An effective internal control can be used both to enable and to coerce employees.
For example, a code of conduct may provide guidance on the business conduct
boundaries but simultaneously provide freedom for employees to use their own 
judgment in making decisions that are for the good for the company. Internal controls
can also be managed using both punishments and rewards. While social sanction can 
be a powerful tool for managing compliance, managers can reward compliance both
in monetary terms and through social appreciation.
Once an internal control system is designed, managers can decide how to present
the controls. Presentation of controls is determined by the question of how to
communicate the control requirements to employees, that is, what channels, forms
and language should be used? The SOX exercise could be “sold” to the company in
multiple ways – as a quality program, an audit program or a process improvement
program. In this case study, the way to introduce SOX was as a compliance exercise.
The primary message was that “this is a compliance matter and we have no other
option than just to comply”. As a result, SOX gained a strong legitimacy within the
organization, and in fact the whole word SOX received a symbolic meaning. It was
enough to say the word, and people knew it was a priority. As a side effect, “SOX 
mandate” was also used to drive other initiatives outside of SOX due to its strong 
power within Nokia. Thus, the way the controls are presented can lead into many 
intentional but also unintentional consequences.
After managers have designed a comprehensive internal control system, they
must remember that the employees might not perceive it the same way they do. To
enable successful change, managers must understand how to impact employee
perceptions, which is not always in the hands of management. What is certain is that 
the social controls play a significant role here. Application of social controls is
indeed needed to successfully implement new technical controls. Employees must
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also accept the idea of those social controls; otherwise, a risk exists that employees 
do not perform the controls and simply ignore them. This case study found that when 
control implementation was unsuccessful, social control was not utilized to drive
compliance. This leads to the conclusion that powerful use of social control affects
control performance, and the lack of it can, in fact, be the root cause for control
failures.
To summarize, this study will add on to the previous literature by bringing new
evidence of the importance of social controls as a counterpart to the technical
controls. What is challenging – from both practical and theoretical viewpoints – is 
the difficulty of capturing the whole variety of social controls, because they are not
always consciously designed or documented. Ultimately, social controls are about
people. This study suggests that employee perceptions of controls are linked to their
emotions. Hence, selling the idea of the controls to employees can be successful
when taking into consideration their emotions: Managers can consider different
options to facilitate positive perceptions towards controls.
And what about the role of SOX? What role did a “mandatory legal compliance
requirement” play in the design and implementation of internal control? In the case
of this study, the legislation played a key role. The fact that this was a legislative
requirement was the key reason why the project gained management attention in the
first place. However, a key learning is that legal compliance could easily become
only ceremonial if it is not supported by social controls and a healthy organizational
culture. The initial purpose of SOX was to prevent and detect financial accounting 
fraud, so the role of social control must indeed be taken into consideration when
preparing for SOX compliance. Otherwise, an organization can easily end up in 
“technical compliance” only without having a culture that guides the everyday
actions. 
This study has built a bridge between management control and internal control
systems. By understanding the overlap between these concepts and related 
frameworks, such as LOC or COSO, companies can leverage internal control to
implement a strategic control system. Such an expansion means that efforts invested
in complying with SOX requirements are beneficial beyond protecting the company 
from fraud, financial misreporting, legal liabilities, and misappropriation of assets.
When considering the study from the regulators’ and prosecutors’ point of view,
the key learning is that legislations around internal controls are indeed needed. Well-
functioning internal controls are in key role in the fight against fraud, corruption and
irresponsible employee behavior. However, those legislations should not be enforced
by purely focusing on the technical side of compliance. The social side of the control
systems in place should matter, too. Luckily, we already have evidence that culture
is becoming a key topic to consider by the authorities, too. Notably, the most recent
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DOJ guidance32 on evaluating corporate-compliance programs does not recommend
that companies adopt a specific set of policies or procedures. Rather, it instructs
prosecutors to assess whether a company has “incorporated the culture of compliance
into its day-to-day operations.” And compared to the previous guidance from 2017, 
this new guidance places significantly more weight on company ethics and the “tone
set at the top” in determining whether a compliance program is comprehensive and
effective. For example, the new guidance states that “As a threshold matter,
prosecutors should examine whether the company has a code of conduct that sets
forth, among other things, the company’s commitment to full compliance with
relevant federal laws that is accessible and applicable to all company employees.” In
the past few years, the Department has repeatedly expressed in various speeches and
written statements that “compliance is a culture, not just a policy.”
To summarize, this study aimed to gain more understanding of the
implementation of internal controls and shed light on the factors that lie beyond
formal SOX compliance. These study results can help organizations gain more out
of an improved system of internal control rather than just being SOX compliant on 
paper. Furthermore, these study findings can help companies to better understand
how to foster a culture of compliance while implementing formal compliance
policies and procedures. This study provides useful insights for companies who are
in a process of implementing systems of internal control, for example, due to listing
on the New York Stock Exchange and thus being subject to SOX legislation. Also
companies in a process of building Ethics & Compliance programs with a focus on 
anti-bribery, anti-trust or privacy issues, can benefit from these study’s findings. 
4.3 Evaluation of the study and future research
opportunities
It is important to assess the validity and reliability of any reported research findings.
Various ways are available to evaluate qualitative research. The common objects of
measurement are the study’s validity and reliability. Neither of these measures 
should be compromised in the conduct or reporting of field research (McKinnon 
1988, 53). Validity is concerned with the question of whether researchers are
studying the phenomenon they purport to be studying (McKinnon 1988, 36). In a
qualitative study, researchers should be able to demonstrate that their findings are
32 In April 2019, the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued new
guidance on how it will evaluate corporate-compliance programs when deciding
charges and negotiating settlements. It is the department’s most detailed guidance on
the evaluation of corporate-compliance programs to date. As such, companies
developing compliance programs should consider the new guidance a vital resource.
(U.S. Department of Justice Criminal Division 2019)
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based on valid observations or interview responses, not, for example, on responses
that have occurred in untypical situations (Koskinen, Alasuutari, and Peltonen 2005).
Validity can be impaired if a researcher has designed or conducted the study such
that the researcher is unintentionally studying either more than or less than the
claimed phenomenon (McKinnon 1988, 36). Reliability instead, is concerned with
whether or not the researchers are obtaining data on which they can rely. Reliability
can be impaired if the data are not independent of the “accidental circumstances”
under which they were gathered (Kirk & Miller 1986, 20). 
Field studies face different specific threats to validity and reliability and may use
different strategies and tactics to minimize these threats. The validity and reliability
of this study are interlinked; that is, tactics that support increasing the study’s validity
may also increase its reliability. McKinnon (1988, 37) has listed four main types of
threats: observer-caused effects, observer bias, data access limitations and
complexities and limitations of the human mind. These threats are all valid in this
study, and must be considered.
Observer-caused effects may occur as reactive effects to the observer’s presence
in the phenomenon under study (McCall & Simmons 1969, 78). Case study methods
are typically criticized because of the researcher’s presence in the setting: it may
cause the participants to change their behavior and conversations. As a result, the 
researcher is not observing the natural setting but rather one that is disturbed by their
presence. The risk for observer-caused effects is especially high if the participants
perceive the researcher’s role as a “management spy” (McKinnon 1988, 37). The
researcher was very much aware of this threat during her time in the field, especially
during the interviews. Strategies to overcome this threat included designing and 
applying the interview questions diligently, employing follow-up and clarifying
questions in the interviews, taking notes during the interviews, and observing the
interviewees’ nonverbal communications. The researcher used observation to reflect
on whether the “real life” during the unofficial discussions, control testing sessions,
and team meetings aligned with the responses provided during the interviews. 
Observer bias may be caused by a tendency to observe the phenomenon in a
manner that differs from the truth, i.e., the researcher’s selective perception and
interpretation. This bias is such that it is a problem of management rather than of
elimination (McKinnon 1988, 38). The potential for observer bias is present not only 
in the process of observing actions and behavior but also in the researcher’s casual
conversations or formal interviews and in data analysis. Thus, in this study, the
researcher accepted the existence of observer bias and aimed to overcome it during
all phases of the research. This was done, for example, by appointing a coach for the
researcher from the case company. The researcher tested her study findings and
observations by discussing her study with her coach from Nokia to validate them and 
discuss potential variations in perceptions. The researcher also reflected on her
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research findings with a research colleague who had also used the same case
company in his research. 
Data access limitations may result from a limited time in the field or limited
access to documents, events, or people. One of the most frequently cited
requirements of good field research is that the researcher spends a substantial length
of time in the research setting. The longer the period of interaction, the larger the
number of events for the data set for analysis (McKinnon 1988, 40). The researcher
ultimately spent time in the field for 4 years and 7 months. During this time, she 
conducted 45 interviews, took 11 field diaries, and observed the study setting during 
interviews and within her daily duties in control assessment, internal meetings,
trainings, and workshops. Spending time in the field as an employee and conducting
data triangulation enabled her to cross-check the data gathered via different methods.
Complexities and limitations of the human mind was a natural threat in this study. 
These can occur if the research subjects attempt to mislead the researcher either
intentionally by being deceitful or unintentionally by forgetting things. The
researcher was very aware of these threats and considered her own behavior and that
of the interviewees while in the setting. Employing probing questions, using data
triangulation, and asking the same questions from multiple informants helped to
manage this risk. 
One evident challenge of this study is also the long period between gathering
empirical data and reporting the results. Most of the empirical analysis took place 
rather soon after the data were gathered in 2012. Due to personal reasons, the study 
progress was very slow during 2013–2017. However, the researcher felt comfortable
finalizing the study, as the field notes were carefully documented, and all interviews
had been recorded accordingly. In addition, after each interview, the researcher made 
notes and incorporated them in the data analysis. Naturally, there is a chance that the 
researcher’s interpretation of the research data can change over time. However, as 
time went on in this case, the key findings only became clearer in the researcher’s 
interpretation.
Lukka and Modell (2010, 462) suggest that validation in interpretive
management accounting research is about convincing readers of the authenticity of
the research findings while simultaneously ensuring that explanations are deemed
plausible. According to them, authenticity is largely a matter of preserving the emic33 
qualities of research accounts, whereas plausibility is intimately linked to the process
of abductive reasoning, whereby different theories are applied to advance thick
explanations.
emic perspective is that of a native insider, in contrast to the more detached and neutral
etic (outsider) perspective.
33 
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One of the challenges of this study is the potential generalizability of its research
results across companies, industries, organizations, regulatory structures and 
cultures (Kinney 2000, 88). The internal control concept is complex itself, so the
results of the research might also reflect this inherent complexity, especially in a case
study that studied only one organization.
While this study explicitly considers the views of managers and their attempts to
manage their control system and the employee perceptions, one of the limitations is
that it does not consider the employees’ contributions to the control system’s design.
This criticism has already been presented to the original Simons’ (1995) framework
(see, e.g., Tessier & Otley 2012a, 182), which considered employees as passive
actors. This study presented illustrations of how employees may perceive the
controls presented by their managers and whether the employees perform the
controls or not as a result of this perception. The next step for future research could
be to analyze how the controls are then reformed as a result of the employee 
perceptions. In other words, it would be beneficial to further study the interrelations
between technical and social control: For example, in the cases when employee
perceptions were negative or neglectful, how did the managers react to these
perceptions? How could managers apply the social control to make it more likely
that employee perceptions will change towards more positive, or at least neutral,
perceptions? As the results of this study suggest that employees’ emotional ties
towards controls matter in the success of their implementation, it would be
interesting to study the emotions in more detail. 
Another suggestion for future research is that the framework developed in this
study could be tested in other types of control implementation projects in which a
legislative force plays a key role, such as IFRS implementation, an anti-bribery 
compliance program, or privacy compliance program implementation. Conversely,
it would be interesting to repeat this study setting of designing and implementing a
system of internal control but in a non-SOX context where the adoption of the
controls does not stem from legal requirements. The same framework could also be
applied to address the design and implementation of any other control system.
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5 Abbreviations
Key terminology referred in this study
20-F A form filed by a company with the SEC which is completed and 
submitted by foreign companies which have shares traded on a US
exchange.
COSO Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission
CRSP Center for Research in Security Prices 
IC Internal Control
ICR Internal Control Reporting
LOC Simons’ Levers of Control framework (1995)
Material
weakness A deficiency, or a combination of deficiencies, in internal control over
financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a
material misstatement of the company's annual or interim financial 
statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis.” 
(PCAOB 2007).
NYSE The New York Stock Exchange
PCAOB Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
SEC U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
Case company related abbreviations
F&C Finance & Control
FSP Financial Services Platform
GLAD Global Summary of Aggregated Defects
HQ Headquarter
HR Human Resources
IIP Invest In People
INS Indirect Sourcing
SU Subunit 
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7 Appendices
Appendix 1. Definitions of key control concepts 
This study involves a variety of control concepts, partly overlapping with each other, so below are
listed the key control definitions relevant in this study.
CONTROL
DESIGN
Control design is formed by three layers: selecting a set of technical and 
social controls, determining the objectives of controls and defining the 
managerial intention of controls.
CONTROL
SYSTEM
Organizations’ control systems consist of a set of different forms of control that
are in systemic interaction with each other. Many studies focus only on certain
types of controls, such as accounting controls.
INTERNAL
CONTROL
Recent literature has differentiated the view of internal control as a limited
view and a more comprehensive view (see, e.g., Pfister 2009, 17). The
limited view links internal control closely to the accounting records and views 
internal controls as the “detailed, procedural checks and balances” (Simons 
1995, 84). With the more recent, broader definitions, internal control has
significantly expanded its domains into general management control and
corporate governance (Arwinge 2010, 109), placing more emphasis on a 
holistic approach to internal control, emphasizing operational effectiveness
and efficiency and compliance with laws, regulation, and internal policies.
Thus, today internal control forms an integral part of organizational
governance.
This study defines internal control with the comprehensive view, as chapter
2.2.2 explained. It is recognized that the concept of internal control overlaps 
with the concept of management control, and many organizational aspects 
can be classified into both of these control systems. However, it is also 
recognized the differences between these concepts, as chapter 2.3 explained.
INTERNAL
CONTROL
COMPONENT
The term internal control component is used to describe the five elements of
internal control system: control environment, risk assessment, control
activities, information and communication, and monitoring activities (COSO
framework of 2013)
INTERNAL
CONTROL
SYSTEM
Internal control system consists of a set of technical and social controls. It
includes all of the internal control components.
MANAGEMENT
CONTROL
Management control focuses on execution and involves addressing general
questions, such as “are our employees likely to behave appropriately?”.
Managers addressing management control issues primarily have an internal
focus; they reflect on how they can influence employee behavior in desired
ways (Merchant & Van der Stede 2016, 9).
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The optimal implementation of management control systems (MCS) can allow
managers to influence employee behavior in desirable ways that will increase
the probability of the organization achieving its objectives (Merchant and Van 
Niina Ratsula
MANAGEMENT
CONTROL
SYSTEMS
der Stede, 2007). MCSes constitute both social and technical controls.
RESULTS 
CONTROLS,
ACTION 
CONTROLS,
PERSONNEL 
CONTROLS
AND
CULTURAL
CONTROLS
Merchant and Van der Stede (2016) distinguish four categories of control:
action controls, results controls, personnel controls and cultural controls. 
Action, personnel and cultural controls define for individuals and groups what
is are desirable and undesirable actions for the organization. Results controls 
are based on monitoring the actions taken. Results controls do not determine
the actions employees should take but focus their attention on the results to
be achieved and, hence, motivate them to take appropriate actions they 
believe will generate the desired results. In this study results and action 
controls as classified as technical controls.
By contrast, informal or softer (personnel and cultural) controls do not usually
have predefined forms and may occur spontaneously. Personnel controls 
seek to increase the likelihood of employees’ self-monitoring, whereas cultural
controls are used to encourage mutual monitoring. An organization’s culture is 
based on shared traditions, norms, beliefs, values, ideologies, attitudes, and 
ways of behaving; thus, it creates a powerful group pressure on individuals 
who do not act compliantly. (Merchant & Van der Stede 2007). This study 
classifies personnel and cultural controls as social controls.
control system and, thus, are the easiest to research.
SOCIAL 
CONTROLS
Social controls represent the manageable aspect of organizational culture
(Malmi & Brown 2008, Merchant & Van der Stede 2007) and include all the 
“efforts to persuade people to adapt to certain values, norms and ideas about
what is good, important, praiseworthy, etc. in terms of work and organizational
life” (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004, 426). Social controls appeal to the
emotional, nonrational, affective elements within employees (Ray 1986, 288)
and consist of values, beliefs, norms (Alvesson & Kärreman 2004; Simons
1995) and symbols (Malmi & Brown 2008; Schein 1992).
Social controls consist of the personnel and cultural controls, as defined by 
Merchant and Van der Stede (2016).
STRATEGIC 
MANAGEMENT
CONTROL
Strategic management control involves managers addressing questions such 
as “is our strategy still valid, and if not, how it should be changed?”. Strategic 
management control deals with issues external to the organization (they 
examine an industry and their organization’s place in it) (Merchant & Van der
Stede 2016, 9).
TECHNICAL
CONTROL
Technical controls are based on procedures, policies, rules and standards that
specify how tasks are to be performed and how individuals and groups are 
organized (Malmi & Brown 2008; Simons 1995; Tessier & Otley 2012a).
Technical controls are embedded in the technology of work and govern day-
to-day activities. These are the more visible, objective components of the 
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Appendices
Appendix 2: List of the interviewees
POSITION OF THE 
INTERVIEWEE IN CASE 
COMPANY
INTERVIEWEE 
GROUP*
DATE OF THE 
INTERVIEW
LENGTH OF THE
INTERVIEW / MIN
1 SOX Program Manager, Head of
Group Internal Controls I
1 26.10.2009 120
2 Head of Accounting and Reporting
Development
2 16.12.2009 80
3 External Auditor 1 2.2.2010 63
4 Process Development Manager,
Group Internal Controls
1 4.2.2010 70
5 Internal control Manager, Sales 
and Marketing, / SOX Coordinator
for Revenue cycle (Previously 
External auditor)
1 17.2.2010 76
6 SOX Program Manager, Head of
Group Internal Controls I
1 15.3.2010 100
7 SOX Project Manager, Internal
Controls Manager for Human 
Resources
1 18.3.2010 60
8 Director, SOX and Internal
Controls, Sales and Marketing
1 19.3.2010 63
9 Director, Treasury Finance and
Control
2 19.3.2010 77
10 SOX Coordinator for Accounting
and Reporting cycle
1 23.3.2010 83
11 Senior Development Manager /
SOX Coordinator for IT
1 25.3.2010 65
12 Head of Group Internal Controls
and Internal Audit II34 
1 26.5.2010 56
13 Accounting Process Owner, SAP
Authorizations
3 19.8.2010 74
14 Head of Internal Audit I 1 24.8.2010 87
34 The Internal Audit and Internal Control teams were merged in 2010, after which the
roles for Head of Internal Audit and Head of Internal Control were combined
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Appendix 2: List of the interviewees [continued]
POSITION OF THE 
INTERVIEWEE IN CASE 
COMPANY
INTERVIEWEE 
GROUP*
DATE OF THE 
INTERVIEW
LENGTH OF THE 
INTERVIEW / MIN
15 Partner, External Auditor 1 3.9.2010 44
16 Business Case Controller 3 9.9.2010 59
17 Manager Internal Controls,
Manufacturing and Logistics, SOX
Coordinator for Make cycle
1 23.9.2010 67
18 Subcontracting Manager 2 24.9.2010 85
19 Business Controller, Product
Design
2 1.10.2010 60
20 Coordinator, Indirect Sourcing 3 13.10.2010 68
21 Manager, Purchasing Process 
Development and Strategy, Indirect
Sourcing
2 14.10.2010 67
22 Business Controller, R&D 3 26.10.2010 78
23 Subcontracting Coordinator, Direct
Sourcing
3 26.10.2010 89
24 Internal Audit Manager 1 1.12.2010 74
25 Vice President, Finance and 
Control, Manufacturing and 
Logistics (previously Head of
Shared Accounting Services)
2 1.12.2010 56
26 Senior Vice President, Group
Controller
2 15.12.2010 20
27 Senior Internal Controls Specialist 1 15.12.2010 62
28 Purchasing Manager, Indirect
Sourcing
2 19.1.2011 56
29 Transactional Hardware Buyer,
Indirect Sourcing Europe
3 16.2.2011 50
30 Vice President, Head of Indirect
Sourcing
2 21.6.2011 35
31 Senior Internal Auditor 1 16.8.2011 38
32 Internal Control Specialist, Shared 
Accounting Services
1 16.8.2011 56
33 Senior Internal Auditor 1 18.8.2011 32
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Appendix 2: List of the interviewees [continued]
POSITION OF THE 
INTERVIEWEE IN CASE 
COMPANY
INTERVIEWEE 
GROUP*
DATE OF THE 
INTERVIEW
LENGTH OF THE 
INTERVIEW / MIN
34 Accountant 1, Shared Accounting 
Services
3 19.8.2011 28
35 Director, Manufacturing and 
Logistics, Finance and Control
2 19.8.2011 56
36 Business Controller, Local Sales
Unit
2 31.8.2011 56
37 Financial Concept Owner, IT
Finance and control
3 2.9.2011 31
38 Executive Vice President, Chief
Financial Officer
2 2.9.2011 27
39 Accountant 2, Shared Accounting 
Services
3 14.9.2011 20
40 Vice President, Finance and 
Control, Sales
2 19.9.2011 32
41 Senior Internal Control Specialist 1 19.9.2011 59
42 Accountant 3, Shared Accounting 
Services
3 21.9.2011 53
43 Purchasing Manager, Indirect
Sourcing
2 22.9.2011 54
44 Sales and Credit Controller 2 27.1.2012 41
45 SOX Coordinator, Risk
Management
1 21.2.2012 28
Total lenght: 2655
(44h 15min)
Average 
lenght:
59
* Interviewee groups (defined in more detail in chapter 1.4.3): 
1) SOX community (N=20) 
2) Managers (N=15) 
3) Employees (N=10) 
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Appendix 3: Theme interview guide Example (SOX COMMUNITY & MANAGERS)
Interviewees received a list of theme interview topics two days before the interview. This example 
demonstrates the most common questions covered during the interviews, as there were variations 
between the interviews. Follow-up questions were presented during each interview in addition to
the questions covered by the guide.
Background
What is your professional background?
How is your role related to internal controls and SOX compliance?
Internal controls and SOX compliance
How would you describe in general internal controls in Nokia?
How would you describe the SOX Program?
Based on your understanding, to which extent were the internal controls in place prior SOX and 
how were those documented?
How would you describe the internal control governance model in Nokia? How has it evolved 
during the time line before SOX – during SOX implementation – during SOX compliance?
What is the role of internal audit / external audit in SOX compliance?
What are the key activities performed in Nokia to ensure SOX compliance? How have these
evolved during the past few years?
What are the internal control areas (e.g. processes, organizations etc) that have been developed /
enhanced due to SOX compliance requirements? Where the development has been most
powerful?
What would you see as concrete control enhancements as a result of SOX implementation?
Examples?
How would you describe the process of identifying and resolving the internal control
deficiencies/weaknesses? What is the role of SOX in this process?
What has happened in the area of internal control after SOX implementation? E.g. What decisions
have proved to be good / bad? Have we already “given up” on some of the requirements originally
launched through SOX?
In your opinion, what are the most important benefits of SOX for Nokia?
In your opinion, what are the biggest barriers of SOX for Nokia?
SOX as part of daily work
When considering all internal control activities taking place in the organization, what kind of role 
does SOX have there?
What kind of impact SOX had on employee’s daily tasks? Is there any change resistance
involved?
How well do you think employees are really following the control activities described in the 
catalog?
How is it ensured that the controls that are not under SOX assessment scope are actually 
properly performed?
How well do you think it’s understood within “average” employees what SOX means? Is there a 
need to understand SOX? Is there a possibility to misunderstand SOX in some cases?
How do you perceive the attitudes of employees for SOX and internal controls? DO you see any 
differences between units?
What are the typical control failures you come across to?
How do you think our daily practices and processes would differ if it wasn’t for SOX?
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Appendices
Appendix 4: Theme interview guide Example (EMPLOYEE)
Interviewees received a list of theme interview topics two days before the interview. This example 
demonstrates the most common questions covered during the interviews, as there were variations 
between the interviews. Follow-up questions were presented during each interview in addition to
the questions covered by the guide.
Background
What is your professional background?
How is your role related to internal controls and SOX compliance?
Internal controls in general
How would you describe the control environment and culture in your unit and generally in Nokia?
What kind of internal controls are there in your unit? How do you feel about these controls?
How are the internal controls linked to your everyday work?
How are the failures to follow the controls being detected or is there a risk that those are not
detected?
What are typical control deficiencies that are detected in your unit? And what is a typical
resolution / corrective action in order to solve the issue?
Attitudes and awareness
How are the control requirements trained or communicated within the organization?
In your opinion, what is the attitude of employees towards the controls in your unit and in general?
How is it ensured that employees are following the controls? How well do you think employees
are following the controls? 
How would you see the role of top management in SOX and internal controls? What about your
manager?
Based on your understanding, how well people in Nokia understand how their daily work is related
to internal control / SOX compliance?
SOX compliance
Could you describe, from your point of view, the meaning of SOX in practical terms in your unit?
What was your first reaction when SOX was introduced? How do you feel about it currently?
What changed when SOX was introduced? How do you feel about the change?
What kind of other reactions have you observed in your organization? How do you believe, in
general, people feel about SOX?
How did SOX change the daily activities and responsibilities of employees?
How are people motivated (or demotivated) to perform activities targeting to achieve SOX
compliance?
What would you see as concrete control enhancements as a result of SOX implementation?
Examples?
In your opinion, what are the most important benefits of SOX for Nokia?
In your opinion, what are the biggest disadvantages of SOX for Nokia?
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